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Introduction	
	 The	 organization	 of	 production	 in	 value	 chains	 has	 permitted	manufacturers	 and	 retailers	 alike	 to	 establish	 international	 production	networks	 geographically	 dispersed	 changing	 the	 nature	 of	 production	 and	employment	 relations	 in	 the	 global	 economy.	 This	 transition	 has	 produced	several	 transformations	 in	 food	 and	 agriculture	 and	 has	 resulted	 in	 the	emergence	of	retailers	as	big	buyers	in	the	global	agro-food	system.		The	 theoretical	 approach	 of	 global	 value	 chains	 has	 provided	 a	 useful	analytical	 framework	 to	 explain	 how	 production	 is	 organized	 in	 agri-food	sector	within	which	the	value	chain	is	driven	by	big	retailers.	In	buyer-driven	chains	 retailers	 not	 only	 control	 distribution	 but	 also	 shape	 production,	processing	and	consumption.	Their	market	concentration	and	their	power	to	unilaterally	dictate	terms,	prices	and	conditions	to	suppliers	have	resulted	in	the	worsening	of	working	conditions	within	supply	firms.	Suppliers	are	often	squeezed	 by	 retailers	 to	 reduce	 prices	 in	 order	 to	meet	 retailers’	 demands	and	are	forced	to	employ	cheap	labor.		Italy	is	the	world’s	third	largest	producer	of	industrial	tomatoes	after	the	U.S.	 and	China	 and	 the	 largest	 producer	 in	Europe.	The	 sixty	percent	 of	 the	production	 is	 absorbed	 by	 foreign	 markets	 such	 as	 Germany,	 UK,	 France,	USA,	Japan	and	Russia.	The	transformation	of	Italian	tomato	processing	in	a	retailer-driven	chain	 is	 indicated	by	 the	massive	presence,	 especially	 in	 the	
southern	district,	of	a	large	number	of	processing	companies	that	produce	for	the	market	of	private	labels.		Food	retail	chains	only	provide	brands	and	a	market	to	the	tomatoes	they	purchase	 from	 Italian	 suppliers.	 These	 suppliers	 are	 processing	 companies	located	mainly	 in	 the	provinces	of	Naples	 and	Salerno	 that	 transform	 fresh	tomatoes	 into	 products	 such	 as	 peeled	 tomatoes,	 pulp,	 sauce,	 and	concentrate.	The	processing	companies	buy	 tomatoes	 from	organizations	of	agricultural	producers	(OPs)	that	are	supplied	from	several	farms	both	large	and	small.	Capitanata	(an	area	of	Puglia	region)	is	the	first	supplier	of	 fresh	
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tomatoes	 of	 southern	 Italian	 processing	 companies.	 The	 territory	 is	characterized	by	a	strong	presence	of	 immigrant	workers	 that	make	up	 the	main	source	of	seasonal	labor	for	the	agricultural	companies	of	the	province	involved	 in	 the	production	of	 industry	 tomatoes.	 The	production	processes	and	working	conditions	within	supply	 firms	 located	 in	 this	area	are	heavily	influenced	by	the	actions	of	other	firms	included	in	the	value	chain	and	by	the	decisions	and	power	of	global	buyers	who	are	at	the	top	of	agri-food	chain.		The	structure	and	characteristics	of	the	chain,	the	relationships	of	power	and	authority	between	companies	within	it,	the	instability	and	seasonality	of	production,	 and	growing	 international	 competition	push	small	 farms	 to	use	cheap	and	flexible	workforce	in	order	to	respond	to	the	demand	of	food	retail	chains	and	processing	firms	at	the	lowest	possible	cost.	The	firms	located	in	the	lower	rings	of	the	value	chain	respond	to	their	need	for	flexible	and	low-cost	 labor	 through	 the	 activation	 and	 exploitation	 of	 economic	 and	 extra-economic	elements	in	order	to	maximize	their	profits.	The	 research	 aims	 to	 study	 the	 structure	 and	 the	 mechanisms	 that	regulate	 the	 working	 of	 tomato	 value	 chain,	 the	power	 and	 economic	relations	 between	 lead	 firms	 and	other	 companies	 included	 in	 their	 supply	chain	 and	 how	 the	 dynamics	 of	 production	 network	 and	 the	 social	 context	shape	labour	relations	and	working	conditions	within	supply	firms	located	at	the	lower	rings	of	the	supply	chain.	The	case	study	is	the	tomato	value	chain	of	southern	Italy	district	and	the	farm-work	in	Capitanata	(Puglia	region).	The	research	aims	to	answer	these	specific	questions:		
• What	is	the	structure	and	what	are	the	mechanisms	that	regulate	the	working	of	supply	chains	in	the	agri-food	industry	and	the	large	retailers?		
• How	 is	 the	 tomato	 chain	 structured,	 which	 actors	 define	 what	 the	 chain	requires,	and	how	are	these	requirements	transmitted	to	the	various	actors	in	the	chain?	
• What	 are	 the	 economic	 and	 power	 relations	 between	 lead	 firms	 and	 small	enterprises	included	in	their	supply	chain	and	what	is	their	relative	power?		
• Who	determines	the	conditions	of	work	within	supply	firms?	
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• To	what	extent	wages,	 rights,	 social	protection	 in	 the	small	 firms	 located	at	the	 lower	 rings	of	 the	 supply	 chain	are	affected	by	 the	decisions,	 strategies	and	policies	implemented	by	buyers?		
• What	is	the	role	of	the	social	context?	
• How	can	lead	firm	power	be	regulated?	
• Can	 still	 trade	 unions	 have	 a	 role	 in	 fighting	 the	 deterioration	 of	 labour	relations	in	the	lower	rings	of	supply	chain?	By	which	strategies?		In	 terms	 of	 the	 research	 methods	 applied,	 the	 study	 builds	 upon	 a	qualitative	analysis	of	archive-documentation,	secondary	literature	and	semi-structured	interviews;	and	it	has	been	undertaken	in	three	major	steps.	First,	along	 the	 collection	 of	 secondary	 and	 primary	 documentation,	 fifteen	interviews	were	 carried	out	 in	Naples,	 Salerno	and	Foggia,	with	 experts	on	the	 sector	 and	 	 various	 companies	 constituting	 the	GVC:	 the	producers,	 the	intermediate	 traders	 and	 the	 processing	 companies.	 After	 such	 ‘top-down’	study	of	 tomato	value	chain,	 the	working	conditions	of	 the	 farmhands	have	been	analysed	 through	 semi-structured	 interviews	with	workers	 and	union	delegates.	Twenty-five	interviews	were	organised	with	workers	living	in	the	informal	 settlements	 (or	ghettos)	 at	 the	Foggia	district.	 Such	 fieldwork	was	carried	 out	 with	 the	 support	 of	 five	 migrant	 workers,	 using	 snowball	sampling,	 during	 the	 summers	 of	 2017	 and	 2018	 (during	 the	 harvesting	season),	in	a	very	difficult	context	characterized	by	a	lack	of	social	and	work	rights,	and	by	strong	housing	segregation	and	poverty.	This	methodological	choice	has	been	carried	out	according	to	sociological	 literature.	 Indeed,	 this	sampling	 technique	 is	 useful	 to	 study	 those	 groups	 composed	 of	members	who	keep	unknown	their	identity,	such	as	irregular	workers1.		Finally,	 trade	 union	 strategies	 and	 labour	 regulation	 issues	 have	 been	analysed	 through	 ten	 interviews	 to	 trade	 union	 officials,	 employers’	organizations	and	labour	inspectors	in	the	regions	of	Foggia	and	Rome.	
																																								 																					1	Cfr.	P.	Corbetta,	Metodologia	e	tecniche	della	ricerca	sociale,	Il	Mulino,	Bologna,	1999,	p.	350.	
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The	 research	 is	 structured	 as	 follows.	 In	 the	 first	 chapter	 I	will	 describe	the	 changes	 in	 the	 organization	 of	 production	 and	 in	 the	 international	division	of	labor	with	the	emergence	of	a	new	class	of	capitalists	that	become	the	dominant	drivers	of	the	globalization	of	production.	By	using	global	value	chains	 literature	 I	 will	 describe	 how	 in	 global	 value	 chains	 economic	 and	power	asymmetrical	relations	between	firms	has	meant	intense	pressure	on	suppliers	 who	 must	 keep	 wages	 low	 and	 resist	 improvements	 in	 labor	standards.	 Finally	 I	will	 discuss	 how	 the	 restructuring	 of	 global	 production	has	been	supported	not	only	by	capital	mobility	but	also	by	labour	mobility	insofar	as	 in	 industrial	 sectors	with	 lower	capital	accumulation	and	greater	geographical-fixity,	migrant	workers	have	come	to	constitute	a	key	segment	of	the	labour	forces.	In	the	second	chapter	I	will	analyse	the	power	of	retailers	and	their	role	in	leading	 global	 agri-food	 system.	 Furthermore,	 I	 will	 discuss	 how	 the	emergence	 of	 a	 new	 food	 regime	 and	 the	 growing	 buyer	 power	 of	transnational	 retail	 chains	 have	 restructured	 production	 and	 labor	 in	 the	agricultural	 sector.	 The	 incorporation	 of	 southern	 Italian	 agricultural	production	in	retailer-driven	chains	will	be	analyzed	taking	into	account	the	role	played	by	 international	migrations	and	exploitation	of	 labor,	especially	migrant	labor,	within	this	area.		In	 the	 third	 chapter	 I	 will	 analyze	 the	 structure	 and	 the	 composition	 of	Italian	tomato	value	chain	and	power	and	economic	relations	between	firms	within	 it.	 I	 will	 focus	 on	 the	 Southern	 District,	 where	 the	 majority	 of	processing	 firms	that	supply	European	 large	retailers	 through	private	labels	is	 concentrated.	 Through	 interviews	 with	 processors	 and	 member	 of	producers	 and	 industries	 association	 I	will	 show	 how	 the	 pricing	 policy	 of	international	 retail	 chains	 organised	 in	 buying	 alliances	 or	 buying	 groups	result	in	a	competitive	pressure	over	manufacturers	to	reduce	costs.		In	 the	 fourth	 chapter,	 through	 interviews	with	 farmers	 and	 tomato-picking	workers	 in	 the	 province	 of	 Foggia,	 I	 will	 analyze	 how	 vertical	 pressures	exercised	 by	 several	 firms	 within	 tomato	 value	 chain	 lead	 to	 the	deterioration	 of	 labor	 relations	 in	 small	 agricultural	 companies	 located	 in	
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Capitanata.	Then	I	will	 focus	on	the	struggles	of	both	FLAI-CGIL	and	USB	in	their	active	assistance	to	displaced	and	marginalised	workers	in	the	province	of	 Foggia.	 Finally,	 I	 will	 briefly	 discuss	 the	 limits	 and	 possibilities	 of	 the	strategies	that	these	two	unions	have	adopted	and	succinctly	advance	what	it	can	be	learnt	from	them.		
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I	Chapter	
Capital	and	Labor	dynamics	
1.1.	Fragmentation,	disintegration	and	labor	division		 The	 contemporary	 global	 economy	 is	 based	 on	 functional	 and	 spatial	fragmentation	of	production	processes.	Since	the	eighties,	 the	production	of	goods	 and	 services	 has	 been	 disintegrated,	 reorganized	 and	 redistributed	around	 the	world	on	a	global	 scale.	 It	has	 taken	on	 the	shape	of	a	 reticular	chain	of	production	whose	units	are	scattered	across	continents2.	The	 industrial	 structures	 of	 several	 countries	 are	 linked	 with	 networks	 of	suppliers	 and	workers	 across	 the	world.	 The	 production	 processes,	 that	 in	the	past	have	been	vertically	 integrated	with	entire	production	occurring	in	one	 place	 and	 in	 “one	 go”,	 have	 increasingly	 become	 fragmented	 into	separate	production	blocks.	Nowadays,	these	production	blocks	are	no	longer	produced	by	 one	 company,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 in	 one	place	 and	 in	 the	 same	country.	The	physical	separation	of	different	parts	of	the	production	process	allows	 producers	 located	 in	 different	 countries	 to	 create	 cross-border	production	 networks.	 The	 labor-intensive	 production	 blocks	 are	 often	located	 in	 countries	 with	 lower	 wages,	 lower	 working	 conditions,	 and	diminishing	workers’	rights.	These	outsourced	production	blocks	need	to	be	integrated	 and	 coordinated	 by	 different	 service	 links	 under	 the	 form	 of	transportation,	 communication,	 and	 various	 kinds	 of	 knowledge.	 The	possibility	to	segment	the	production	and	outsource	individual	processes	has	brought	several	scholars	to	speak	of	fragmentation	of	production3.		The	 changes	 in	 the	 way	 the	 global	 economy	 is	 organized	 are	 linked	 to	several	 organizational	 and	 technological	 shifts	 that	 have	 transformed	 the	nature	of	production,	trade,	investment,	and	employment.	As	noted	by	David	Harvey,	 «the	 transition	 to	 flexible	 accumulation	 was	 in	 part	 accomplished																																									 																					2	L.	Gallino,	Il	lavoro	non	è	una	merce.	Contro	la	flessibilità,	Laterza,	Bari,	2007.	3	R.	W.	Jones,	Globalization	and	Fragmentation	of	Production,	Seoul	Journal	of	Economics,	14,	1,	 2001:	 1-13.	 R.	W.	 Jones,	Henryk	Kierzkowski,	A	Framework	 for	Fragmentation.	 In	 Arndt	S.W,	Kierzkowski	H	(eds.),	New	Production	Patterns	in	the	World	Economy,	Oxford	University	Press	2001.	
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through	the	rapid	deployment	of	new	organizational	forms	-	just	in	time,	etc.	-	and	new	technologies	in	production.	Speed-up	was	achieved	in	production	by	 organizational	 shifts	 towards	 vertical	 disintegration	 –	 subcontracting,	outsourcing,	 etc.	 –	 that	 reserved	 the	 Fordist	 tendency	 towards	 vertical	integration»4.	If	the	vertically	integrated	method	of	production	–	the	so-called	Fordist	 model	 –	 has	 represented	 for	 many	 decades	 the	 main	 form	 of	 the	organization	 of	 production,	 for	 Feenstra	 	 «the	 rising	 integration	 of	 world	markets	 has	 brought	 with	 it	 a	 disintegration	 of	 the	 production	 process,	 in	which	manufacturing	 or	 services	 activities	 done	 abroad	 are	 combined	with	those	 performed	 at	 home.	 Companies	 are	 now	 finding	 it	 profitable	 to	outsource	increasing	amounts	of	the	production	process,	a	process	which	can	happen	either	domestically	or	abroad»5.		In	 fact,	 since	 the	 seventies	 production	 processes	 began	 to	 structure	themselves	around	the	activities	of	the	networks	of	geographically	dispersed	firms,	linked	functionally	but	legally	independent,	which	contribute	together	to	 the	production	of	a	single	good	or	service.	A	key	role	 in	 this	process	has	been	the	possibility	for	companies	to	draw	upon	offshoring	outsourcing.	The	first	 wave	 of	 global	 outsourcing	 began	 in	 the	 1960s	 and	 1970s	 with	 the	exodus	of	production	jobs	in	shoes,	clothing,	cheap	electronics,	and	toys.	This	process	 combines	 two	 phenomena.	 First,	 outsourcing	 is	 a	 practise	 used	 by	companies	to	reduce	costs	by	transferring	parts	of	work	to	external	suppliers	rather	than	having	them	completed	internally.	In	recent	years,	the	tendency	of	many	businesses	is	to	outsource	the	production	of	a	wide	range	of	goods	and	services	to	specialized	firms.	Second,	offshoring	refers	to	the	decision	of	moving	the	supply	of	goods	and	services	from	domestic	to	overseas	locations.	These	activities	may	be	carried	out	in	facilities	owned,	in	whole	or	in	part,	by	the	parent	company,	transnational	suppliers,	or	local	suppliers6.	As	reported	by	 the	United	States	 International	Trade	Commission	 in	 the	 report	Shifts	 in																																									 																					4	D.	 Harvey,	The	condition	of	postmodernity:	An	Enquiry	 into	 the	Origins	of	Cultural	Change,	Oxford:	Blackwell,	1989,	p.	284.	5	Robert	 C.	 Feenstra,	 Integration	 of	 Trade	 and	 Disintegration	 of	 Production	 in	 the	 Global	
Economy,	Journal	of	Economic	Perspectives	12,	4,	1998:	31–50,	p.	31.	6	G.	 Gereffi,	 The	 new	 offshoring	 of	 jobs	 and	 global	 development,	 ILO	 Social	 Policy	 Lectures,	Jamaica,	December	2005.	
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US	merchandise	 trade,	 in	 2001	 offshoring	 concerned	 the	 production	 of	 90	percent	of	all	U.S.	consumer	electronics,	80-85	percent	of	all	 footwear,	 toys,	luggage	and	handbags,	watches,	clocks,	games,	and	television	sets,	70	percent	of	all	bicycles,	60	percent	of	all	computers,	and	57	percent	of	all	apparel7.	The	geographical	shift	of	industries	is	not	a	new	phenomenon.	As	noted	by	J.	Smith,	«the	wildfire	of	outsourcing	spread	during	the	past	three	decades	is	the	 continuation,	 on	 a	 vastly	 expanded	 scale,	 of	 capital’s	 eternal	 quest	 for	new	 sources	 of	 cheaper,	 readily	 exploitable	 labor-power»8.	 David	 Harvey	uses	the	term	“spatial	fix”	«to	describe	capitalism’s	insatiable	drive	to	resolve	its	 inner	 crisis	 tendencies	 by	 geographical	 expansion	 and	 geographical	restructuring»9.	As	noted	by	Beverly	Silver,	spatial	fix	has	been	always	used	by	capital	(in	the	form	of	transnational	corporations,	companies	etc.)	as	a	tool	to	exceed	 the	profitability	of	 crises	and	control	of	 the	workforce.	The	same	process	 has	 been	 registered	 in	 the	 1950’s	 when	 many	 companies	 in	 the	automobile	 sector	 decided	 to	 move	 production	 from	 the	 U.S.	 to	 Western	Europe,	as	a	result	of	the	mobilizations	of	workers	and	increased	protection	granted	 to	 workers.	 Some	 years	 later,	 companies	 moved	 from	 Western	Europe	to	Mexico,	Brazil,	and	South	Africa.	In	addition,	in	the	early	seventies,	many	investments	had	been	moved	from	these	countries	over	to	South	Korea.	The	purpose	of	 these	 shifts	was	 to	 take	advantage	of	 cheap	 labor	and	non-unionized	workforce10.	This	trend	is	confirmed	also	by	the	recent	studies	of	Bronfenbrenner	and	Luce	who	analysed	the	impact	of	shifts	of	production	on	jobs	in	the	U.S.,	China,	and	around	the	globe	and	estimated	that	the	number	of	jobs	involved	in	shifts	of	production	from	the	U.S.	to	China	and	Mexico	each	year	 between	1992	 and	2001	was	between	70,000	 and	100,000	 jobs.	 They	have	highlighted	how	«it	seems	difficult	to	deny	a	systematic	pattern	of	firm	restructuring	 that	 is	moving	 jobs	 from	 union	 to	 non-union	 facilities	within																																									 																					7 	United	 States	 International	 Trade	 Commission:	 Shifts	 in	 US	 merchandise	 trade	 2001,	Appendix	C,	Washington,	DC,	USITC,	2002.	8	J.	 Smith,	 Imperialism	 in	 the	 Twenty-First	 Century.	 Globalization,	 Super-Exploitation,	 and	
Capitalism’s	Final	Crisis,	NYU	Press	and	Monthly	Review	Press,	2016,	p.	39.	9	D.	Harvey,	Globalization	and	the	Spatial	fix,	Geographische	revue,	2,	2001:	23-30,	p.	24.	10	Beverly	 J.	 Silver,	 Le	 forze	 del	 lavoro.	Movimenti	 operai	 e	 globalizzazione	 dal	 1870,	 Bruno	Mondadori,	Milano,	2008.	
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the	country,	as	well	as	to	non-union	facilities	in	other	countries»11.	Smith	 argues	 that	 the	 outsourcing	 of	 production	 takes	 two	 basic	 forms:	«foreign	 direct	 investment	 (FDI),	 where	 the	 production	 process	 is	 moved	overseas	 but	 kept	 in-house	 (in-house	 relation	 between	 the	 parent	 company	
and	 its	 overseas	 subsidiary),	 and	 arm’s-length	 outsourcing,	 when	 a	 firm	outsources	part	or	all	of	the	production	process	to	an	independent	supplier,	independent	in	the	sense	that	the	dominant	firm	owns	none	of	it	even	though	it	 may	 control	 its	 activities	 in	 many	 ways»12.	 The	 main	 strategy	 of	 large	companies	in	recent	years	is	to	take	up	arm’s	length	outsourcing	rather	than	FDI.	As	noted	by	Susan	Hayter,	«a	distinguishing	characteristic	of	the	current	phase	of	globalization	is	that	economic	activity	is	not	only	global	in	scope	but	also	global	in	organization»13.		Until	 the	 seventies,	 the	 processes	 of	 production	 took	 place	 in	 vertically	integrated	 companies.	 When	 multinational	 companies	 moved	 their	production	to	other	countries,	 they	did	 it	 through	 foreign	direct	investments	(FDI)	and	ownership	factories	keeping	their	vertically	integrated	form.	Since	the	 seventies,	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 globalization	 and	 several	 organizational	and	 technological	 changes	 have	 resulted	 in	 new	 ways	 of	 organizing	production.	Large	companies	started	transforming	their	vertically	integrated	structures	into	networks	of	decentralized	companies	-	scattered	all	over	the	world	 -	 which	 incorporated	 external	 suppliers	 and	 customers.	 These	production	 units	 are	 no	 longer	 part	 of	 the	 same	 company	 or	 its	 subsidiary	and	rather	became	independent	units	of	global	production	chains	 indirectly	controlled	 by	 large	 companies.	 As	 noted	 by	 Barrientos,	 «a	 shift	 has	 taken	place,	 particularly	 in	many	 final	 goods	 and	 service	 sectors,	 from	 control	 of	production	 by	 MNEs	 through	 ownership	 of	 overseas	 subsidiaries	 or	franchises	towards	out-sourcing	of	production	to	suppliers	where	there	is	no	legal	ownership,	but	over	whom	global	corporate	buyers	are	able	to	exert	a																																									 																					11	K.	Bronfenbrenner	and	S.	Luce,	The	Changing	Nature	of	Corporate	Global	Restructuring:	The	
Impact	of	Production	Shifts	on	Jobs	in	the	U.S.,	China	and	Around	the	Globe	 (Washington,	DC:	U.S.-China	Economic	and	Security	Review	Commission),	2004,	p.	38.	12	J.	Smith,	Imperialism	in	the	Twenty-First	Century,	op.	cit.,	p.	68	(My	Italics).	13	S.	Hayter,	The	social	dimension	of	global	production	systems:	A	review	of	the	issues,	Working	
Paper	No.	25,	ILO,	Geneva,	2004,	p.	1.	
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high	 level	of	 control.	Corporate	buyers	may	be	 international	agents,	brands	or	 retailers.	 They	 are	 not	 necessarily	 northern	 based,	 and	 increasingly	dominant	 firms	 are	 emerging	 within	 regional	 production	 networks	 inside	Asia,	Africa	and	Latin	America»14.		As	mentioned	earlier,	such	international	outsourcing,	initially	took	place	in	labor-intensive	industries	(such	as	apparel,	footwear,	and	toys)	and	later	on	also	 in	 industries	 such	 as	 agro-food	 and	 services.	 Rapid	 technological	advancement	 and	 lowered	 costs	 in	 transport,	 communications	 and	information	 technology	 simplified	 the	 outsourcing	 of	 production	 by	 MNCs	and	 brand-name	 companies	 to	 developing	 countries15.	 An	 incentive	 to	 “de-verticalize”	 and	 buy	 goods	 and	 services	 from	 outside	 vendors,	 as	 noted	 by	Smith,	 is	 that	arm’s	 length	also	signifies	hands	clean:	 	«the	outsourcing	 firm	externalizes	 not	 only	 commercial	 risk	 and	 low	 value-added	 production	processes,	 it	 also	 externalizes	 direct	 responsibility	 for	 pollution,	 poverty	wages,	and	suppression	of	trade	unions»16.	As	noted	by	Gereffi	«a	global	manufacturing	system	has	emerged	in	which	production	 and	 export	 capabilities	 are	 dispersed	 to	 an	 unprecedented	number	of	developing	as	well	as	industrialized	countries»17.		These	shifts	of	the	organization	of	production	have	led	to	the	creation	of	a	“new	class	of	capitalists”,	as	TNCs,	Marketers,	and	Brand-named	manufactures,	and	Big	Retailers	 like	Walmart,	Tesco,	Carrefour,	etc.,	become	the	dominant	drivers	 of	 the	 globalization	 of	 production.	 The	 growth	 of	 the	 power	 of	 this	new	class	of	capitalists	-	and	their	ability	«to	coordinate	and	control	supply	chain	operations	in	more	than	one	country	even	if	they	do	not	own	them»18	-	have	marked	the	supremacy	of	commercial	capital	on	manufacturing	capital.		
																																								 																					14	S.	Barrientos,	Global	Production	Systems	and	Decent	Work,	ILO,	Geneva,	2007,	p.	3.	15	S.	Barrientos,	F.	Mayer,	J.	Pickles,	A.	Posthuma,	Decent	Work	in	Global	Production	networks:	
Framing	the	policy	debate,	International	Labour	Review,	150,	3-4,	2011:	229-317.	16	J.	Smith,	Imperialism	in	the	Twenty-First	Century,	op.	cit.,	p.	81	17	G.	Gereffi,	The	global	economy:	Organization,	governance	and	development.	In	N.	Smelser	&	R.	Swedberg	(eds.)	Handbook	of	Economic	Sociology,	Chapter	8,	Princeton	University	Press,	2005:	160-182,	p.	163	18	P.	Dicken,	Global	Shift:	Mapping	the	Changing	Contours	of	the	World	Economy,	The	Guilford	Press,	New	York	London,	Sixth	Edition,	2007,	p.	60.	
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In	the	new	global	economy	the	old	and	classic	conception	of	“international	division	of	labor”	-	based	on	the	polarization	of	the	world	economy	in	a	core	and	 dependent	 periphery	 -	 no	 longer	 applies.	 In	 the	 eighties,	 Fröbel	 and	several	colleagues	argued	that	the	spatial	and	functional	fragmentation	of	the	processes	 of	 production	 through	 the	 relocation	 of	 production	 in	 low-wage	economies	 had	 produced	 a	 new	 international	 division	 of	 labor	 that	 took	advantage	 of	 advanced	 transport	 and	 communication	 technologies	 to	promote	the	global	segmentation	of	the	process	of	production19.	As	noted	by	Starosta	 and	 Charnock	 «the	 popularized	 version	 of	 the	 new	 international	division	of	labour	(NIDL)	thesis	on	the	process	of	global	restructuring	argues	that,	 faced	 with	 declining	 profitability	 in	 advanced	 capitalist	 countries	(mainly	 due	 to	 rising	wages),	 transnational	 corporations	 (TNCs)	 started	 to	relocate	 labour-intensive	manufacturing	to	 the,	 then	so-called,	Third	World,	thus	acting	as	a	major	factor	in	the	industrial	decline	that	seemed	to	prevail	in	 the	 former	 countries	 in	 the	 late	 1970s	 and	 early	 1980s.	 Third	 World	countries,	 for	 their	 part,	 provided	 TNCs	 with	 a	 huge	 potential	 reserve	 of	cheap	and	disciplined	 labour-power.	Combined	with	technological	advances	in	the	means	of	communication	and	transport,	the	increasing	fragmentation	of	 production	 processes	 and	 the	 consequent	 simplification	 of	 semi-skilled	and	 unskilled	 tasks	 together	 created	 a	 tendency	 for	 the	 establishment	 of	export-oriented	 world	 market	 factories	 in	 the	 Third	 World»20.	 	 Starosta	argued	 that	 the	 NIDL	 thesis	 had	 to	 be	 reconsidered	 and	 revised	 since	 the	solid	 agents	 which	 had	 driven	 these	 transformations	 had	 not	 been	exclusively	TNCs:	 «the	 geographical	 relocation	of	 the	 valorisation	of	 capital	based	 on	 the	 exploitation	 of	 relatively	 cheap	 and	 compliant	 labor	 power	might	 as	well	 take	place	 through	 the	development	of	 competitive	 ‘national’	capitals	 in	 the	 so-called	 ‘periphery’	 or	 ‘semi-periphery’.	 Moreover,	 these	global	 transformations	 have	 been	mediated	 by	 the	 policies	 of	 nation-states	and	the	struggles	of	workers.	In	this	sense,	TNCs,	‘national’	capitals	from	the																																									 																					19	Fröbel,	Folker,	 Jürgen	Heinrichs,	and	Otto	Kreye.	The	New	International	Division	of	Labor,	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1980.	20 	G.	 Charnock,	 G.	 Starosta	 (Eds.),	 The	 New	 International	 Division	 of	 Labour.	 Global	
Transformation	and	Uneven	Development,	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2016,	p.	80	
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‘periphery’,	 states	 and	workers’	 agency	have	 certainly	been	different	 active	forces	 whose	 actions	 have	 personified	 the	 unfolding	 of	 the	 underlying	determinations	of	these	global	transformations»21.	Nowadays	the	contemporary	 international	division	of	 labor	 is	even	more	complex:	«it	 incorporates	a	great	number	of	diverse	and	spatially	separated	workforces	 who	 undertake	 specific	 compartmentalised	 tasks	 and	 who	 are	connected	to	the	larger	process	through	various	forms	of	social	organisation	–	 ranging	 from	 the	 bureaucratic	 control	 of	 multinational	 firms,	 to	 market	exchanges,	 social	 networks	 of	 subcontracting	 firms,	 and	 intricate	 webs	 of	financing	–	that	facilitate	complex	flows	of	goods,	money	and	information»22.	For	some	scholars,	the	new	articulation	of	the	processes	of	production	on	a	global	scale	has	resulted	in	positive	effects	for	the	industrializing	countries	by	 enabling	 their	 participation	 and	 integration	 in	 the	 global	 economy.	However,	 for	many	 critical	 scholars	 of	 the	world	 system	 these	 shifts	 in	 the	global	 economy	 have	 not	 fixed	 economic	 and	 power	 asymmetric	 relations	between	 the	 global	 North	 and	 South	 and	 have	 further	 contributed	 to	 the	strengthening	 of	 the	 imperialist	 nature	 of	 the	 world	 economy:	 on	 the	 one	hand	Southern	nations	still	compete	with	one	another	in	order	to	offer	cheap	labor	 to	 large	 northern	 companies	 by	 decreasing	 worker’s	 rights;	 on	 the	other	 hand,	 northern	 companies	 still	 compete	 with	 other	 northern	companies	in	order	to	outsource	production	to	low-wage	countries	in	a	rapid	and	efficient	manner.		By	studying	the	new	international	division	of	labor	as	an	underlying	basis	of	globalization	process,	Taylor	notes	how	«the	exercise	of	power	affects	the	geographical	distribution	of	productive	activities	–	with	 the	 technology	and	branding	 functions	 held	 by	 companies	 in	 the	 advanced	 industrial	 countries	
																																								 																					21	G.	 Starosta,	The	Outsourcing	of	Manufacturing	and	 the	Rise	of	Giant	Global	Contractors:	A	
Marxian	 Approach	 to	 Some	 Recent	 Transformations	 of	 Global	 Value	 Chains,	 New	 Political	Economy,	15:4,	543-563,	2010,	p.	557.	22	M.	 Taylor	 (Eds.),	 Global	 Economy	 Contested.	 Power	 and	 conflict	 across	 the	 international	
division	of	labour,	Routledge,	London,	2008,	p.11.	
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and	 low-cost,	 labour-intensive	 processing	 peripheralised	 to	 the	 developing	world	–	thereby	feeding	into	the	uneven	development	of	global	capitalism»23.		Although	trends	in	global	industrial	organization	have	been	characterized	by	an	increasing	regionalization	of	economic	activities	and	thereby	new	areas	of	inclusion,	the	analysis	of	the	structure	of	the	new	global	capitalist	economy	suggest	that	capital-labor	relations	have	become	a	relation	between	Northern	capital	and	Southern	labor	in	which	power	and	profits	remain	concentrated	in	imperialist	countries	which	still	drive	the	global	economy24.			The	 globalization	 of	 the	 processes	 of	 production	 and	 the	 possibility	 for	companies	to	substitute	higher	paid	domestic	labor	with	low-wage	southern	labor	also	had	an	impact	on	workers	and	the	labor	market	in	the	global	north.	As	a	result	of	increasing	competition	and	downward	pressure	on	wages,	the	labor	market	in	developed	countries	had	become	increasingly	flexible,	 labor	deunionizated,	 informalized	 and	 casualized,	 the	 working	 class	 fragmented	and	 disorganized	 and	 workers	 no	 longer	 retained	 protection	 from	 state	regulation	of	capital-labor	relations.	Dunn	explored	the	connection	between	the	dynamics	of	uneven	development	at	a	global	level	–	those	which	produce	“core”	 and	 “peripheral”	 countries	 and	 zones	 in	 the	world	 system	–	 and	 the	processes	 of	 class	 formation	within	 countries.	 He	 argues	 that	 «world	 class	system	may	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 continuum	 from	 protected	 labor25	through	wage	 labor	 to	 coerced	 labor	 which	 roughly	 corresponds	 to	 the	core/periphery	 hierarchy»26.	 As	 highlighted	 by	 J.	 Bair	 «core	 and	 periphery	each	 encompass	 a	 particular	mix	 of	 labor	 forms	 along	 the	 continuum,	with	the	 former	 concentrating	 more	 commodified	 and	 protected	 labor	 than	 the	latter»27.	 To	 sum	up,	 the	uneven	 structure	of	 a	 capitalist	world	 economy	 is	
																																								 																					23	Ibidem,	p.17.	24	J.	Smith,	Imperialism	in	the	Twenty-First	Century,	Op.	cit.	25	Citing	 Chase-Dunn,	 protected	 labor	 “in	 the	 sense	 that	 trade	 unions,	 welfare	 legislation,	and/or	 other	 politically	 articulated	 institutions	 (such	 as	 immigration	 controls)	 give	 them	some	 protection	 from	 competition	 in	 the	world	 labor	market	 and	 some	 advantages	 in	 the	struggle	with	capital”,	p.	39.	26	C.	Chase-Dunn,	Global	Formation:	Structures	of	the	World	Economy,	second	edition.	Lanham,	MD:	Rowman	&	Littlefield,	(1998	[1989]),	pp.	39-40.	27	J.	Bair,	M.	Verner,	New	Geographies	of	Uneven	Development	in	Global	Formation:	Thinking	
with	Chase-Dunn,	Journal	of	World	Systems	Research,	Vol.	23,	Issue	2,	2017:	604-619,	p.	612.	
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answered	by	an	unequal	 structure	of	a	world-class	 system	both	at	a	nation	and	worldwide	level.			
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1.2.	Global	restructuring	and	global	migrations		 The	global	 restructuring	of	productive	activities	has	brought	 impact	also	to	the	transnational	movement	of	labor	in	developed	countries.	As	noted	by	Smith,	during	the	neoliberal	era	the	phenomenon	of	economic	restructuring	takes	place	in	two	ways:	outsourcing	and	migration.	They	have	become	two	aspects	of	the	same	phenomenon	and	two	fundamental	ways	used	by	capital	to	 increase	 profits:	 «through	 the	 emigration	 of	 production	 to	 low-wage	countries,	or	the	 immigration	of	 low-wage	migrant	workers	 for	exploitation	at	home»28.		The	transnational	movement	of	labor	originates	and	develops	in	line	with	the	 movements	 of	 capital	 from	 northern	 to	 southern	 countries.	 The	correlations	between	 the	globalization	of	production	 through	 the	 exporting	of	jobs	to	developing	countries	and	the	growth	of	global	migration	have	been	discussed	by	Sassen.	She	argued	 that	migrating	 for	work	 in	 low	wage	 labor	markets	in	developed	countries	is	linked	to	some	shifts	in	the	economic	and	social	 structure	 of	 the	 developing	 countries	 as	 a	 result	 of	 their	industrialization.	 Furthermore,	 the	 increasingly	 concentration	 of	 immigrant	labor	in	some	sectors	of	developed	economies,	for	example,	the	service	sector,	may	 be	 viewed	 as	 one	 of	 the	 constraints	 in	 the	 transformation	 of	 the	international	division	of	labor	insofar	as	some	low-wage	jobs	cannot	easily	be	exported29.		Pradella	 and	 Cillo,	 in	 a	 study	 on	 labor,	 exploitation,	 and	 immigration	 in	Western	 Europe,	 argue	 that	 migrations	 are	 crucial	 for	 the	 reproduction	 of	global	 capitalism	 and	 need	 to	 be	 analyzed	 while	 bearing	 in	 mind	 the	international	 dynamics	 of	 accumulation	 and	 restructuring	 processes	 of	production.	They	state	that	«contemporary	migratory	movements	need	to	be	understood	 against	 the	 backdrop	 of	 the	 growth	 in	 the	 global	 industrial	reserve	army	of	labor	(which	plays	a	fundamental	role	in	the	disciplining	of																																									 																					28	J.	Smith,	Imperialism	in	the	Twenty-First	Century,	cit.,	p.	188.	29	S.	Sassen,	The	Mobility	of	Labor	and	Capital:	A	Study	in	International	Investment	and	Labor	
Flows,	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1998.	
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labor)	 due	 to	 the	 processes	 of	 impoverishment,	 rural	 dispossession	 and	production	 restructuring	 occurring	 in	 the	 Global	 South	 in	 the	 neoliberal	period.	 An	 abundant	 labor	 supply,	 in	 fact,	 creates	 the	 conditions	 for	 the	compression	of	wages	and	puts	pressure	on	employed	workers,	limiting	their	claims,	and	these	workers	are	forced	by	the	low	level	of	real	wages	to	prolong	the	 working	 day,	 reducing	 the	 demand	 for	 labor	 power	 and	 permitting	 a	greater	 labor	 supply	 in	 the	market	 –	 in	 a	 vicious	 circle	 of	 impoverishment	and	exploitation»30.		The	presence	of	immigrant	labor	in	Northern	countries	meets	the	demand	for	 cheap	 labor	 in	 the	 domestic	 labor	 markets.	 Migrant	 workers	 tend	 to	accept	 lower	 wages	 and	 terms	 and	 conditions	 of	 employment	 than	 local	workers	and	satisfy	 the	dirty,	dangerous	and	hard	 labor	demand	 in	 several	sectors	as	agriculture,	hospitality,	construction,	care,	etc.	This	process	is	the	result	 of	 the	 combination	 and	 interaction	 of	 different	 elements	 as	 labor	market	and	migration	policies	aim	to	create	a	different	system	of	rights	and	employment	structure.	As	highlighted	by	Robinson,	if	the	capital	in	developed	countries	needs	the	labor	power	of	transnational	migrants,	this	labor	power	must	be	tightly	kept	under	control	in	order	to	keep	immigrant	labor	low-cost	and	 flexible	 for	 companies:	 «state	 controls	 over	 immigrant	 labor	 and	 the	denial	of	civil,	political,	and	other	citizenship	rights	to	immigrant	workers	are	intended	not	to	prevent	but	to	control	the	transnational	movement	of	 labor	and	 to	 lock	 that	 labor	 into	 a	 situation	 of	 permanent	 insecurity	 and	vulnerability»31.	The	creation	of	categories	such	as	“citizen”	and	“immigrant”	is	 fundamental	 because	 «the	 super-exploitation	 of	 an	 immigrant	workforce	would	not	be	possible	if	that	workforce	had	the	same	civil,	political	and	labor	rights	as	citizens,	if	it	did	not	face	the	insecurities	and	vulnerabilities	of	being	undocumented	or	illegal»32.																																										 																					30	L.	Pradella,	R.	Cillo,	Labor,	Exploitation	and	Migration	in	Western	Europe:	An	International	
Political	 Economy	 Perspective,	 in	 L.	 Waite,	 G.	 Craig,	 H.	 Lewis,	 K.	 Skrivankova	 (Eds.),	
Vulnerability,	 Exploitation	 and	 Migrant.	 Insecure	 Work	 in	 Globalised	 Economy,	 Palgrave	Macmillan,	2015,	p.	47.	31	W.	I.	Robinson,	X.	Santos,	Global	Capitalism,	Immigrant	Labor,	and	the	Struggle	for	Justice,	Class,	Race	and	Corporate	Power:	Vol.	2:	Iss.	3,	Article	1,	2014,	pp.	6-7.	32	Ibidem,	p.	7.	
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The	 relation	between	 labor	markets	 and	 immigration	 controls	 (aimed	 to	regulate	not	only	conditions	of	the	entrance	as	well	as	the	conditions	of	stay)	have	 been	 explored	 by	 Anderson	 who	 argues	 that	 immigration	 controls	produce	 precarious	 workers	 who	 have	 certain	 types	 of	 relations	 with	employers	and	the	labor	market.	This	happens	in	three	ways:	the	selection	of	legal	 entrants,	 molding	 of	 employment	 relations,	 and	 the	 creation	 of	institutionalised	uncertainty33.	For	 many	 scholars,	 immigration	 controls	 do	 not	 penalize	 only	 migrant	workers	 by	 denying	 them	 social	 and	 labor	 rights,	 but	 also	 contributes	 to	 a	more	general	process	of	labor	market	segmentation	and	the	deterioration	of	labor	conditions	of	the	entire	working	class.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																								 																					33	B.	 Anderson,	 Migration,	 immigration	 controls	 and	 the	 fashioning	 of	 precarious	 workers,	Work,	Employment	and	Society,	Vol.	24(2):	300–317,	2010.	
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1.3.	Global	Value	Chains		 In	 the	 global	 economy,	 international	 trade	 is	 coordinated	 by	 lead	 firms.	The	activities	of	these	firms	are	organized	in	global	value	chains.	The	concept	of	 global	 value	 chains,	 along	 with	 other	 concepts	 and	 tools	 such	 as	 global	
commodity	chains	 (GCCs),	global	supply	chains	 (GSCs)	 and	global	production	
networks	 (GPNs),	 has	 been	 used	 since	 the	 early	 1990s	 to	 capture	 and	describe	 the	 dynamics	 of	 global	 production	 and	 distribution	 and	 the	functioning	 of	 the	 contemporary	 capitalist	 system.	 The	 term	 value	 chain	«describes	the	full	range	of	activities	that	companies	and	workers	do	to	bring	a	 product/good	 from	 its	 conception	 to	 end	 use	 and	 beyond.	 This	 includes	activities	such	as	design,	production,	marketing,	distribution	and	support	to	the	final	consumer»34.	A	value	chain	includes	activities	that	can	be	contained	within	 a	 single	 firm	 or	 can	 be	 divided	 among	 different	 companies.	 A	 value	chain	 becomes	 global	 when	 the	 activities	 are	 divided	 among	 different	companies	 across	different	 countries.	The	division	 of	 functional	 and	 spatial	activities	is	based	on	the	idea	that	some	activities	in	the	chain	are	performed	better	 by	 external	 and	 independent	 companies	 than	 within	 vertically	integrated	companies35.		Within	value	chains,	not	all	 firms	are	equal	 in	terms	of	economics	power	and	organizational	skills	and	the	firms	that	exercise	more	power	are	defined	as	 lead	 firms.	 The	 lead	 firm	may	 be	 defined	 as	 the	 company	 that	 controls,	integrates	and	coordinates	 the	activities	geographically	distributed	of	other	firms	included	within	the	global	supply	chain.	In	GVCs,	the	capabilities	of	lead	companies	to	govern	the	chain	provide	them	with	the	power	to	decide	where	
to	produce,	what	has	to	be	produced,	how	and	under	what	conditions,	and	for	
what	price.	In	a	way,	they	exercise	considerable	power	over	other	companies	included	in	their	chain36.	These	lead	firms,	often	MCNs,	tend	to	increase	and																																									 																					34	www.globalvaluechains.org/concept-tools.	35 	C.	 Lane,	 National	 Capitalism	 and	 Global	 Production	 Networks:	 An	 Analysis	 of	 their	
Interaction	in	two	Global	Industries,	in	Socio-Economic	Review,	6,	2,	2008:	227-260.	36	G.	 Gereffi,	 J.	 Humphrey,	 T.	 Sturgeon,	 The	 Governance	 of	 Global	 Value	 Chain,	 Review	 of	International	Political	Economy	12,	1,	2005:78-104.	
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maintain	their	specialization	 in	 the	upstream	 (R&D,	design	capabilities)	and	
downstream	(marketing	networks,	distribution,	post-sale	services)	segments	of	 the	value	 chain	while	outsourcing	 the	 rest	 (manufacturing	and	assembly	functions).	The	specialization	in	the	upstream	and	downstream	segments	of	the	 value	 chain	 allows	 them	 to	 secure	 a	 high	 economic	 return	 in	 terms	 of	investment	 and	 competitive	 advantage37.	 A	 recent	 example	 of	 this	 trend	comes	 from	 the	 automobile	 industry	 in	 which	 some	 activities	 that	 were	previously	 conducted	 ‘inside’	 the	 corporation	 -	 as	 the	 manufacturing	 of	components	used	to	assemble	automobiles-	are	increasingly	being	contracted	out.	 In	 1999,	 General	 Motors,	 the	 world’s	 largest	 automobile	 producer,	decided	to	spin-off	its	components	manufacturing	subsidiary	company	Delphi	in	 order	 to	 make	 it	 more	 competitive	 in	 terms	 of	 production	 costs38.	 The	strategy	 of	 international	 outsourcing,	 instead,	 allows	 lead	 firms	 to	 obtain	 a	more	 flexible	 organization	 of	 the	 processes	 of	 production,	 maximise	efficiency,	minimise	waste,	respond	to	changing	consumer	demand,	ensure	a	constant	 supply	 of	 goods	 at	 competitive	 prices	 and	 to	 leave	 the	 burden	 of	responsibilities	 relating	 to	 labor	 rights	 and	 working	 conditions	 on	 the	suppliers.	In	a	global	economy,	lead	firms	aim	to	benefit	from	differentials	in	wage	levels	and	employment	conditions	through	outsourcing	and	they	place	pressure	on	 their	 suppliers,	which,	 in	 turn,	are	 forced	 to	pass	 this	pressure	onto	 other	 firms	 and	 on	 their	 workers39.	 The	 outsourcing	 is	 used	 by	 lead	firms	 to	 exceed	 the	 limits	 set	 by	 national	 regulatory	 frameworks	 and	bargaining	 structures	 and	 to	 seek	 competitive	 advantage	 through	 cheap	labor.	 Indeed,	 international	 outsourcing	 is	 designed	 to	 take	 advantage	 of	differences	 among	 countries	 in	 terms	 of	 labor	 regulation	 and	 employment	conditions40.		
																																								 																					37	P.	Dicken,	N.	M.	Coe,	M.	Hess,	H.	W.	Yeung,	Making	connections:	Global	production	Networks	
and	World	City	Networks,	Global	Networks	10,	1,	2010:	138-149.	38	A.	Rannie,	A.	Herod,	S.	McGrath-Champ,	Global	production	networks,	labor	and	small	firms,	Capital	&	Class,	37,	2,	2013:	177-195.		39	J.	Flecker,	Outsourcing,	Spatial	Relocation	and	Fragmentation	of	Employment,	Competition	&	Change,	13,	3,	2009:	251-266.	40 	P.	 K.	 Robinson,	 H.	 Rainbird,	 International	 Supply	 Chains	 and	 the	 Labour	 Process,	Competition	&	Change,	17,	1,	2013:	91-107.	
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The	transformation	of	global	production	has	 increasingly	challenged	also	the	ability	of	the	nation	states	to	regulate	or	hold	MNEs	accountable.	In	many	cases,	 governments	 have	 lured	 overseas	 investments	 and	 contracts	 by	offering	tax	and	regulatory	concessions.	Indeed,	in	the	global	economy,	many	manufacturing	and	assembly	activities	carried	out	for	lead	firms	are	located	in	 exporting-processing	 zones	 (EPZs).	 These	 areas	 had	 been	 created	 in	 the	early	 sixties	 in	 order	 to	 attract	 investments	 and	 employment	 by	 providing	factories,	 infrastructure,	 and	 benefits	 in	 terms	 of	 fiscal	 and	 financial	incentives.	 In	 the	 last	 twenty	 years,	 the	 number	 of	 EPZs	 in	 the	 world	 has	grown	 exponentially	 from	 80	 in	 1975	 to	 3.000	 in	 2002.	 The	 number	 of	countries	with	 EPZs	 has	 grown	 from	 25	 to	 116	 in	 27	 years.	More	 than	 70	percent	of	 the	global	EPZ	workforce	 is	 located	 in	China41.	 In	many	of	 these	zones,	 where	 foreign	 companies	 produce	 mainly	 for	 export,	 the	 working	conditions	are	characterized	by	low	wages,	gender	discrimination,	excessive	working	 hours	 and	 bad	 health	 and	 safety	 standards42.	 As	 noted	 by	 ILO,	«working	conditions	and	industrial	relations	in	these	zones	often	do	not	meet	the	 standards	 set	 out	 in	 ILO	 instruments.	 The	 biggest	 challenge	 facing	workers	 in	 these	 zones	 is	 in	 the	 area	 of	 freedom	association	 and	 collective	bargaining»43.		As	noted	by	Lidia	Greco,	 in	 the	global	economy	we	are	witnessing	a	new	international	division	of	 labor	characterised	by	a	widespread	use	of	vertical	ties,	in	the	form	of	subcontracting	and	international	outsourcing,	with	which	lead	 companies	 give	 up	 the	 direct	 control	 of	 production	 preferring	 the	indirect	control	of	a	chain44.	Commodity	chains	-based	on	subcontracting	and	outsourcing-	 in	 which	 indirectly	 controlled	 companies	 produce	 goods	 and	services	on	behalf	of	lead	companies	are	key	to	understanding	the	workings	of	 a	 new	 capitalist	 system.	 The	 increasing	 dominance	 of	 lead	 companies	 is																																									 																					41	G.	Gereffi,	The	new	offshoring	of	jobs	and	global	development,	op.	cit.	42 	AA.	 VV.,	 Behind	 the	 Brands	 Name.	 Working	 Conditions	 and	 Labour	 Rights	 in	 Export	
Processing	Zones,	International	Confederation	of	Free	Trade	Unions	(ICFTU),	2004.	43	http://www.ilo.org/actrav/areas/WCMS_DOC_ATR_ARE_EPZ_EN/lang--en/index.htm	44	L.	 Greco,	Produzione	globale,	 lavoro	e	strategia	sindacale:	alcune	riflessioni	a	partire	dalla	
teoria	delle	catene	globali	del	valore,	 in	V.	Borghi,	L.	Dorigatti,	R.	Rizza,	V.	Telljohann	(a	cura	di),	 Lavoro	 e	partecipazione.	 Sindacati	 e	movimenti	 sociali	 nella	globalizzazione	dei	 processi	
produttivi,	Franco	Angeli,	Milano,	2011.	
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characterised	by	the	commercial	power	they	exert	over	suppliers.	Suppliers,	in	fact,	are	increasingly	dependent	on	sales	to	large	firms	and	on	their	price	policy.	 The	 spatial	 and	 functional	 fragmentation	 of	 the	 processes	 of	production	 allows	 lead	 firms	 to	 compare	 the	 costs	 and	 capabilities	 of	suppliers	 on	 a	 global	 scale	 and	move	 production	 blocks	 between	 different	suppliers	and	countries.	The	rise	of	prices,	competition	and	the	fluctuations	of	 the	demand	for	goods	and	services	prompt	supplier	 firms	to	subcontract	production	blocks	to	other	small	firms,	through	the	use	of	labor	contractors	and	intermediaries,	which	make	use	of	informal	work	and	cheap	labor.	These	firms	 and	 their	 workers	 are	 often	 unknown	 to	 the	 lead	 firm	 and	 their	relations	 with	 the	 lead	 firm	 are	 “indirect	 relations”45.	 For	 example,	 the	football	manufacturing	value	chain	 that	 is	 controlled	by	companies	as	Nike,	Puma,	Adidas,	etc.,	some	phases	of	the	process	of	production	are	outsourced.	The	outsourcing	of	the	process	of	stitching	balls	is	carried	out	through	more	than	3000	subcontractors	that	act	as	a	link	between	suppliers	and	stitchers.	The	 stitchers	 are	 paid	 per	 unit	 and	 are	 generally	 either	 employed	 by	 the	subcontractors	or	are	self-employed46.	Global	 value	 chains	 include	 large,	 medium-sized	 and	 small	 firms	 across	multiple	 tiers	 and	 different	 countries	 in	 both	 the	 formal	 and	 informal	economies.	The	power	and	economic	relations	between	lead	firms	and	other	enterprises	included	in	their	supply	chain	are	asymmetrical.	This	asymmetry	is	reflected	in	an	unequal	distribution	of	profits	and	opportunities	among	the	firms	 along	 the	 value	 chain	 and	with	 a	 deterioration	 of	 the	 labor	 relations	especially	 to	 the	 detriment	 of	 the	workers	 located	 in	 the	 lower	 ring	 of	 the	production	 chain	 forced	 to	 accept	 working	 conditions	 characterised	 by	informal	work,	cheap	labor	and	lower	levels	of	social	protection.		As	noted	by	Milberg	and	Arnim,	«the	asymmetry	of	market	structures	 in	global	 production	 networks,	 with	 oligopoly	 firms	 in	 lead	 positions	 and	competition	 among	 first	 and	 certainly	 second-tier	 suppliers,	 has	 meant																																									 																					45	ILO,	Report	IV,	Decent	work	in	a	global	supply	chain,	2016,	105th	Session.	46 	P.	 Lund-Thomsen	 et	 al.,	 Labour	 in	 global	 value	 chains:	 Work	 conditions	 in	 football	
manufacturing	 in	 China,	 India	 and	 Pakistan,	 Development	 and	 Change,	43,	 6,	 2012:	 1211-1237.	
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intense	 pressure	 on	 suppliers	 who,	 in	 seeking	 to	 maintain	 markups,	 must	keep	wages	low	and	resist	improvements	in	labor	standards	that	might	lead	to	a	shift	in	the	supply	process	to	another	firm	or	country»47.	In	 the	 global	 value	 chains,	 only	 the	 first-tier	 suppliers	 have	 contractual	relationships	 with	 the	 lead	 firm.	 The	 subcontracted	 second-tier	 suppliers,	often	 composed	 of	 very	 small	 companies,	 have	 no	 formal	 contractual	relationship	with	the	lead	firm.	The	lead	firm	is	not	the	legal	employer	of	the	workers	 of	 subcontracted	 companies	 and	 has	 no	 formal	 responsibility	 for	their	working	conditions48.	The	workers	of	subcontracted	companies	have	a	
substantial	but	not	formal	employment	relationship	with	 the	 lead	 firm.	Still,	the	 subcontracted	 companies	must	 answer	 to	 the	 requests	 of	 the	 lead	 firm	and	deal	with	all	 the	disadvantages	regarding	the	cutting	of	 labor	costs	and	the	ever-increasing	flexibility	generated	by	the	competitiveness	of	the	global	economy.		As	noted	by	Gereffi,	 «the	 global	 economy	 is	 increasingly	 concentrated	 at	the	top	and	fragmented	at	the	bottom,	both	in	terms	of	countries	and	firms.	Because	of	this	structure,	profits	are	driven	down	at	the	base	of	global	value	chains	 because	 of	 intense	 competition,	 and	 there	 is	 no	 money	 for	reinvestment,	innovation,	or	for	improving	wages	and	profits	among	smaller	producers» 49 .	 The	 suppliers,	 therefore,	 «have	 no	 rents	 to	 share	 with	employees,	 and	 can	 survive	 only	 if	 wages	 are	 kept	 at	 a	 minimum.	 The	increased	 use	 of	 sweatshop	 labor	 today,	 which	 has	 come	 with	 the	 rise	 in	arm’s-length	outsourcing,	can	be	seen	as	tied	to	global	production	sharing»50.	The	 revolution	 in	 transportation	 and	 communications	 technology	 has	permitted	 manufacturers	 and	 retailers	 alike	 to	 establish	 international	production	 and	 trade	 networks	 geographically	 distributed,	 changing	 the	nature	of	production	and	labor	relationships.	One	of	the	sociological	theories																																									 																					47	W.	 Milberg,	 R.	 Von	 Arnim,	U.S.	 Offshoring:	 Implications	 for	 Economic	Growth	 and	 Income	
Distribution,	Schwartz	Center	For	Economic	Policy	Analysis	The	New	School,	Working	Paper	2006-3,	p.	17.	48	ILO,	Report	IV,	Decent	work	in	a	global	supply	chain,	2016,	105th	Session.	49	G.	 Gereffi,	The	new	offshoring	of	 jobs	and	global	 development,	 ILO	 Social	 Policy	 Lectures,	Jamaica,	December	2005,	p.	40.	50 	W.	 Milberg,	 Labor	 and	 the	 Globalization	 of	 Production.	 Causes	 and	 Consequences	 of	
Industrial	Upgrading,	Palgrave	Macmillan	Ltd,	2004,	p.	10		
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that	 analyses	 the	 articulation	 of	 new	 capitalist	 structure	 is	 the	global	value	
chains	theory	(GVCs).	Developed	since	the	nineties,	this	approach	looks	at	the	organization	of	global	 industries	through	the	analysis	of	 their	structure	and	activities.	In	the	context	of	globalization,	the	activities	that	constitute	a	value	chain	are	generally	carried	out	in	inter-firm	networks	on	a	global	scale.	The	interconnection	 across	 companies	 or	 sectors	 through	 supply	 networks	 or	financial	 links	 are	 multiple	 and	 intense.	 In	 this	 context,	 «the	 GVCs	methodology	 is	 a	 useful	 tool	 to	 trace	 the	 shifting	 patterns	 of	 global	production,	 link	 geographically	 dispersed	 activities	 and	 actors	 of	 a	 single	industry,	 and	 determine	 the	 roles	 they	 play	 in	 developed	 and	 developing	countries	alike»51.	Global	value	chains	include	two	main	types	of	firms:	«lead	firms,	which	are	typically	 transnational	 corporations	 (TNCs)	 headquartered	 in	 the	 advanced	industrial	 countries,	who	 control	 and	define	 the	main	 activities	 in	 terms	of	price,	delivery	and	performance,	and	the	supplier	companies	who	produce	the	goods	and	services	in	GVCs,	generally	located	in	developing	countries.	Thus,	the	GVC	enterprise	sector	links	both	developed	and	developing	countries	into	a	 common	 global	 supply	 chain»52.	 As	 noted	 by	 Gereffi,	 GVC	 focuses	 on	 the	sequences	of	tangible	and	intangible	value-adding	activities,	from	conception	and	production	to	end	use.	Therefore,	GVC	analysis	allows	us	to	understand	the	organization	and	 the	working	of	 the	global	 industries	both	 from	the	top	
down	 (how	 lead	 firms	 “govern”	 their	 global-scale	 affiliate	 and	 supplier	networks)	and	 from	the	bottom	up	 (how	 these	business	decisions	affect	 the	trajectory	 of	 economic	 and	 social	 “upgrading”	 or	 “downgrading”	 in	 specific	countries	and	regions)53.	There	 are	 four	 basic	 dimensions	 that	 GVC	methodology	 explores:	 (1)	 an	input-output	 structure	 (which	 describes	 the	 process	 of	 transforming	 raw	materials	 into	 the	 final	 product	 through	 the	 breakdown	 of	 the	 chain	 into																																									 																					51	G.	Gereffi,	K.	Fernandez-Stark,	Global	value	chain	analysis:	a	primer,	Center	on	Globalization,	Governance	e	Competitiveness,	Duke	University,	Durham,	North	Carolina,	USA,	2011,	p.	2.	52	G.	 Gereffi,	 X.	 Luo,	 Risks	 and	 Opportunities	 of	 Participation	 in	 Global	 Value	 Chains,	 World	Bank	Working	Paper,	2014,	p.	5.	53	G.	Gereffi,	K.	Fernandez-Stark,	Global	value	chain	analysis,	Op.	cit.	
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different	segments	of	activities);	(2)	a	geographical	consideration	(degree	of	geographical	 distribution);	 (3)	 a	 governance	 structure,	which	 explains	 how	the	 value	 chain	 is	 controlled;	 (4)	 an	 institutional	 context	 in	 which	 the	industry	value	chain	is	embedded54.	A	further	element	of	analysis	referred	to	as	upgrading	has	been	added	to	these	four	dimensions:	it	indicates	the	ability	of	firms	to	move	to	a	stronger	position	in	the	chain	through	product	design,	processing	or	industrial	orientation	in	order	to	access	higher	value	activities.	As	 previously	 stated,	 the	 term	 “value	 chain”	 describes	 the	 full	 range	 of	activities	 that	 companies	 and	workers	do	 to	 bring	 a	 product/good	 from	 its	conception	to	end	use	and	beyond.	This	generally	includes	activities	such	as	research	 and	 design,	 production,	 distribution	 and	marketing,	 and	 sale	 and	support	 to	 the	 final	 consumer	 (input-output	 structure).	 Once	 a	 general	knowledge	 of	 the	 industry	 has	 been	 identified,	 segments/activities	 of	 the	chain	can	be	identified	and	differentiated	by	considering	the	value	they	add	to	the	product.	For	example,	the	apparel	value	chain	is	organized	around	five	main	 activities/segments:	 (1)	 raw	 material	 supply,	 including:	 natural	 and	synthetic	 fibers;	 (2)	provision	of	components,	such	as	 the	yarns	and	 fabrics	manufactured	 by	 textile	 companies;	 (3)	 production	 networks	 consisting	 of	garment	factories,	including	their	domestic	and	overseas	subcontractors;	(4)	export	 channels	 established	 by	 trade	 intermediaries;	 and	 (5)	 marketing	networks	at	the	retail	level55.	Each	of	these	segments	(or	nodes)	of	the	chain	is	composed	of	 firm	networks	and	each	of	them	involves	the	acquisition	and	organization	 of	 input,	 workforce,	 transportation,	 distribution,	 and	consumption.	The	different	segments	(nodes)	of	the	chain	link	firms,	workers	and	 economies	 of	 different	 countries.	 An	 excellent	 example	 of	 how	 value	chains	link	different	geographic	spaces	is	the	Apple	iPhone.	It	is	designed	in	California	 but	 90	 percent	 of	 its	 components	 are	 manufactured	 outside	 the	USA.	 It	 is	 assembled	 in	China	using	 advanced	 semiconductors	 from	Taiwan																																									 																					54	G.	 Gereffi,	 The	 organization	 of	 Buyer-Driven	 Global	 Commodity	 Chains:	 How	 US	 Retailers	
Shape	Overseas	Production	Networks.	In	G.	Gereffi,	M.	Korzeniewicz	(eds.),	Commodity	Chains	
e	Global	Capitalism,	Praeger,	Westport,	1994:	95-122.	55	K.	 Fernandez-Stark,	 S.	 Frederick,	 G.	 Gereffi,	 The	 Apparel	 Global	 Value	 Chain.	 Economic	
Upgrading	 and	 Workforce	 Development,	 Center	 on	 Globalization,	 Governance	 e	Competitiveness,	Duke	University,	Durham,	North	Carolina,	USA,	November	2011.	
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and	Germany,	memory	chips	from	South	Korea	and	Japan,	chipsets	from	the	United	 Kingdom,	 display	 panels	 from	 Taiwan	 and	 South	 Korea,	 and	 rare	metals	from	China	and	Africa56.		In	 a	 global	 value	 chain,	 the	 firms	 that	 develop	 and	 sell	 brand-name	products	 control	how,	when,	 and	where	manufacturing	will	 take	place,	 and	how	much	 profit	 emerges	 at	 each	 stage.	 The	most	 important	 value-adding	activities	 are	 intangible	 services	 that	 occur	 before	 and	 after	 the	 process	 of	production.	The	profits	come	from	combinations	of	high-value	activities	such	as	research,	design,	sales,	marketing,	and	services.	These	activities	are	crucial	in	order	to	capture	the	largest	share	of	gains.	Keeping	in	mind	the	example	of	Apple,	 if	 we	 try	 to	 break	 down	 and	 analyse	 the	 gains	 from	 the	 iPhone	between	Apple,	 its	suppliers,	cost	of	materials,	China	labor	(for	components	and	assembly)	and	Non-China	labor	(for	manufacturing	components),	we	can	note	 that	 58.5	 percent	 of	 the	 gains	 is	 gained	 by	 Apple,	 14.3	 percent	 by	suppliers,	 3.5	 percent	 by	 Non-China	 labor,	 1.8	 percent	 by	 China	 labor	 and	21.9	percent	is	spent	on	the	materials57.	As	 far	 as	 the	 governance	 dimension	 is	 concerned,	 Gereffi	 defines	 it	 as	«authority	 and	 power	 relationships	 that	 determine	 how	 financial,	 material	and	human	resources	are	allocated	and	flow	within	a	chain»58.	The	analysis	of	governance	 -	 the	ability	of	more	powerful	 firms	 to	dominate	and	 control	the	 activity	 of	weaker	 firms	 in	 the	 chain	 -	 allows	one	 to	understand	how	a	chain	is	controlled	and	coordinated	when	certain	exponents	in	the	chain	have	more	 power	 than	 others	 and	 how	 they	 appropriate	 and/or	 distribute	 the	value	that	is	created.	As	noted	by	Robinson	and	Rainbird,	in	a	global	economy,	outsourcing,	as	well	as	the	geographical	distribution	of	activities,	results	in	a	loss	of	direct	control	typical	of	the	hierarchical	relationships	within	the	firm.	This	 shift	 prompts	 the	 lead	 firm	 to	 find	 alternative	 mechanisms	 for																																									 																					56	J.	Donaghey,	J.	Reinecke,	C.	Niforou,	B.	Lawson,	From	employment	relations	to	consumption	
relations:	balancing	labor	governance	in	global	supply	chains,	Human	Resource	Management,	53,	2,	2014:	229-252.	57	Jenny	 Chan,	 Ngai	 Pun	 and	Mark	 Selden,	The	politics	of	global	production:	Apple,	Foxconn	
and	China’s	new	working	class,	New	Technology,	Work	 and	Employment,	 28,	 2,	 2013:	 100-115.	
58	G.	Gereffi,	The	organization	of	Buyer-Driven	Global	Commodity	Chains,	op.	cit.,	p.	97.	
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controlling	the	processes	of	production.	The	control	of	inter-firm	relations	is	exercised	 not	 through	 ownership	 but	 through	 governance:	 the	 capacity	 to	exercise	 control	 through	 the	specification	of	 the	product,	quality	 standards,	quantities,	delivery	dates,	and	price59.		The	dimension	of	the	governance	is	significant	in	terms	of	understanding	what	 firm	 leads	 the	 chain,	 the	 mechanisms	 that	 lead	 companies’	 use	 to	control	quality	and	price	in	contexts	where	production	and	distribution	have	been	outsourced	to	other	companies.	The	governance	is	described	by	Gereffi	in	 terms	 of	 “buyer-driven”	 and	 “producer-driven”	 chains.	 Producer-driven	chains	 refer	 to	 those	 high	 capital	 and	 technology	 industries	 such	 as	automobiles,	computers,	aircraft	and	electrical	machinery.	In	these	industries,	the	 control	 of	 the	 production	 system	 is	 managed	 by	 transnational	corporations	 (TNCs)	 or	 large	 vertically	 integrated	 firms	 through	 their	administrative	 headquarters.	 In	 these	 chains,	 the	 lead	 firms	 tend	 to	 keep	control	 of	 the	high	 capital	 activities	 internally	 and	 to	outsource	high	 labor-intensive	activity	through	international	subcontracting60.	Buyer-driven	chains	refers	 to	 high-intensity	 labor	 sectors	 such	 as	 garments,	 footwear,	 toys,	consumer	electronics,	agri-food,	in	which	the	lead	firms	are	big	retailers	like	Wal-Mart,	 Tesco,	 Marks	 &	 Spencer,	 and	 marketers	 and	 brand-named	
manufacturers	such	as	The	Limited,	The	GAP,	H&M,	Benetton,	Nike,	Reebok,	Levi	 Strauss,	 Hugo	 Boss,	 Diesel,	 etc.	 These	 lead	 firms	 tend	 to	make	 use	 of	decentralized	 production	 networks	 located	 in	 low-wage	 economies	 where	production	 is	 carried	 out	 by	 independent	 factories.	 These	 independent	factories	 produce	 finished	 goods	 or	 components	 of	 parts	 following	 the	 set	guidelines	 of	 buyers	 that	 design	 the	 products.	 The	 main	 characteristic	 of	these	large	companies	is	that	they	do	not	own	any	production	facilities:	they	are	companies	without	factories.	These	lead	companies	(Retailers,	Marketers,	and	Brand-Name	manufacturers)	do	not	have	any	direct	 involvement	 in	the	production	 and	 have	 shifted	 towards	 activities	 that	 add	 value	 in	 the	 chain.	They	only	design	and/or	market,	but	they	do	not	produce	any	of	the	products																																									 																					59	P.	K.	Robinson,	H.	Rainbird,	International	Supply	Chains	and	the	Labour	Process…,	op.	cit.	60	G.	Gereffi,	The	organization	of	Buyer-Driven	Global	Commodity	Chains,	op.	cit.	
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they	 sell.	 In	 these	 chains,	 the	 market	 power	 gains	 do	 not	 result	 from	 the	technology	 advances	 but	 from	 product	 innovation,	 design,	 brand,	 sales,	distribution,	marketing,	and	financial	services.	In	the	buyer-driven	chains,	the	lead	companies	tend	to	operate	through	complex	networks	of	geographically	distributed	 contractors	 whose	 tasks	 are	 to	 contract	 manufacturing	 to	independent	 factories	 and	 verify	 that	 the	 production	 of	 the	 products	corresponds	 to	 the	 specifications	 provided	 by	 the	 buyers.	 These	 lead	 firms	may	decide	to	outsource	part	or	all	of	their	activities	such	as	manufacturing,	packaging,	and	distribution,	to	different	agents	around	the	world.	«The	main	job	 of	 the	 core	 company	 in	 this	 commodity	 chains	 is	 to	 manage	 these	production	and	trade	networks	and	make	sure	all	the	pieces	of	the	business	come	together	as	an	integrated	whole»61.		In	buyer-driven	chains,	the	localization	of	manufacturing	processes	in	low-age	 economies	 aims	 to	 quickly	 respond	 to	 fluctuations	 and	 changes	 in	consumer	demand	and	production	costs	that	usually	affect	some	sectors.	The	vast	 contracting	 networks	 allow	 buyers	 to	 buy	 commodity	 and	 labor	 only	when	 they	 need	 leaving	 on	 suppliers	 or	 subcontractors	 the	 costs	 and	 risks	associated	with	 the	 ownership	 of	 production	 facilities.	 «Contracting	means	that	the	so-called	manufacturer	need	to	employ	any	production	workers,	run	the	 risk	 of	 unionization	 or	 wage	 pressures,	 or	 be	 concerned	 with	 layoffs	resulting	 from	 changes	 in	 product	 demand»62.	 The	 competitive	 pressure	tends	to	rise	mainly	within	the	segments	of	the	chain	where	the	processes	of	production	 are	 located.	 This	 has	 considerable	 implications	 on	 the	working	conditions	 of	 employees	 because	 the	 competitive	 pressure	 on	 the	 firm	networks	that	make	up	these	segments	prompts	companies	to	cut	labor	costs.	This	may	be	carried	out	through	cutting	wages	or	using	subcontracting.	The	degree	of	the	geographical	distribution	of	the	chains,	their	governance	structure,	 and	 their	 organizational	 complexity	 depends	 on	 different	 factors	such	 as	 labor,	 markets,	 and	 technology.	 The	more	 globalized	 chains	 affect																																									 																					61	Ibidem,	p.	99.	62	R.	 P.	 Appelbaum,	 G.	 Gereffi,	 Power	 and	 Profits	 in	 The	 Apparel	 Commodity	 Chains.	 In	 E.	Bonacich,	 L.	 Cheng,	 N.	 Chinchilla,	 N.	 Hamilton	 and	 P.	 Ong	 (Eds.),	 Global	 Production:	 The	
Apparel	Industry	in	the	Pacific	Rim,	Chapter:	3,	Temple	University	Press,	1994:	42-62,	p.	44.	
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sectors	 such	as	apparel,	 toys,	 shoes,	 etc.,	 in	which	 the	capital	may	 fluctuate	more	easily	and	the	competition	between	firms	becomes	more	intense	due	to	the	easy	replicability	of	the	economic	activities.	In	this	sector,	the	lead	firms	tend	to	focus	on	the	upstream	and	downstream	segments	of	the	value	chain	outsourcing	the	production	to	supplier	networks	located	in	different	parts	of	the	world.	The	 less	globalized	chains	 include	sectors	such	as	the	automobile	in	 which	 high	 levels	 of	 technology	 and	 knowledge	 render	 the	 competition	between	 firms	more	difficult.	These	chains	are	 shorter	 than	others	because	the	lead	firm	tends	to	keep	high-value	activities	internally	and	in	developed	economies	and	outsource	only	a	short	portion	of	the	activities	to	other	firms	in	more	competitive	countries	in	terms	of	labor	costs.	In	 the	 global	 economy,	 the	 expansion	 of	 production	 capabilities	 and	 the	participation	of	a	wide	range	of	firms	and	countries	in	global	value	chains	do	not	 necessarily	 result	 in	 the	 reduction	 of	 poverty	 and	 the	 improvement	 of	work	and	employment	 conditions	and	 relations.	This	occurs	because	 in	 the	global	 value	 chains	 the	 governance	 is	 typically	 exercised	by	 lead	 firms	 that	have	the	power	to	control	and	decide	how	the	chain	will	be	divided,	what	role	will	be	allocated	to	each	firm	in	terms	of	division	labor	and	how	much	profit	will	be	allocated	to	each	firm.	As	noted	by	Flecker,	the	quality	of	work	and	the	nature	of	labor	relations	are	determined	by	the	position	of	a	firm	in	a	value	chain,	by	the	degree	of	dependence	between	firms	and	by	the	way	in	which	power	and	authority	operate	in	supply	relations63.	
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1.4.	Working	Conditions	and	labor	regulation	in	the	global	supply	
chains	
	 The	 GVC	 theory	 aims	 to	 analyse	 the	 global	 economy	 by	 looking	 at	 the	functioning	of	global	production	networks.	The	emphasis	of	the	GVC	theory	is	on	the	governance	mechanism	within	global	value	chains	and	on	the	relations	between	firms	linked	by	the	flow	of	commodities.	Instead,	less	attention	has	been	 paid	 to	 labor	 issues	 concerning	 low	 wage	 levels,	 deterioration	 of	working	 conditions,	 overwork,	 informal	 work,	 unsafe	 working	 conditions,	lack	 of	 freedom	 of	 association,	 and	 the	 role	 of	 the	 protagonists	 called	 to	regulate	labor	relations	and	economic	activities	on	a	global	scale.	While	many	scholars	 state	 that	 the	 geographical	 distribution	 of	 economic	 activities	 has	created	 many	 opportunities	 for	 workers	 in	 developing	 countries,	 others	highlight	how	the	organization	of	production	in	global	value	chains	has	also	resulted	in	the	split	of	the	processes	of	production		in	many	segments	and	in	the	 location	 of	 labor-intensive	 segments	 in	 low-wage	 economies	 leading	 to	the	proliferation	of	sweatshops.	This	process	responds	to	the	need	of	capital	to	 find	 social-spaces	 conditions	 that	 are	 able	 to	 ensure	 the	 reproduction	of	
surplus.		According	 to	 Clelland,	 sweatshops	 in	 global	 commodity	 chains	 may	 be	conceptualized	 as	 dark	 value	 following	 the	 shift	 from	 a	 focus	 on	industry/firm-centric	 analysis	 of	 added	 value	 to	 a	 focus	 on	 the	 forms	 of	hidden	 value	 that	 capitalists	 expropriate	 from	 workers.	 For	 Clelland,	commodity	chains	are	surplus-extraction	chains	based	on	massive	transfers	of	 dark	 value	 from	 under-compensated	 formal	 labor,	 from	 informal	 sector	labor,	from	unpaid	household	labor	and	from	unpaid	ecological	externalities.	This	 dark	 value	may	 be	 found	 in	 all	 factors	 of	 production	 and	 its	 transfer	occurs	any	 time	a	capitalist	obtains	a	component	of	production	at	 less	 than	the	average	world-market	price.	This	dark	value	benefits	not	only	capitalists	but	consumers	as	well	in	the	form	of	lower	prices64.	
																																								 																					64	Donald	A.	 Clelland,	Unpaid	Labor	as	Dark	Value	 in	Global	Commodity	Chains.	 In	Wilma	A.	
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The	shifts	recorded	within	the	organization	of	the	global	economy	lead	us	to	analyse	three	fundamental	issues.	The	first	one	involves	the	consequences	of	 this	new	organization	of	global	production	on	 the	work	activities	and	on	the	workers.	The	second	and	strictly	interconnected	issue	is	who	determines	the	conditions	of	work	within	global	supply	chains.	These	questions	deserve	to	be	better	researched.	As	 noted	 by	 Pun	Ngai,	 «the	 dominant	 buyers	 in	 buyer-driven	 chains	 are	able	 to	 control	 production	 (e.g.	 delivery	 dates,	 quality	 standards,	 design	specifications)	 over	 long	 distances	 without	 exercising	 ownership»65.	 Non-ownership	 of	 suppliers,	 in	 fact,	 enables	 them	 to	 impose	 flexible	 fluctuating	conditions	 according	 to	 their	 needs.	 For	 instance,	 global	 sourcing	 provides	them	with	the	possibility	to	order	a	constantly	variable	amount	of	goods	and	products	in	such	a	way	in	order	to	suit	changing	consumers’	demand.	At	the	same	time,	flexible	labor	and	the	use	of	overtime	enable	them	to	adapt	to	the	fluctuating	 demand	 of	 products	 and	 to	 the	 rapidly	 changing	 consumers’	tastes.	These	shifts	in	the	organization	of	production	have	changed	the	nature	of	employment	relations	in	the	contemporary	capitalist	system	resulting	in	a	transition	 from	 secure	work	 to	 flexible	 and	 informal	work.	 The	 heightened	competition	which	arises	from	international	trade	is	a	key	factor	in	shaping	the	 dynamics	 of	 jobs	 and	 job	 quality.	 Indeed,	 in	 the	 global	 economy,	 high	degrees	of	production	 flexibility,	variable	and	short-term	orders,	 the	rise	of	competition,	 fluctuations,	 and	 changes	 in	 the	 consumers’	 demands	 are	 all	factors	that	have	contributed	to	the	growth	of	flexible,	insecure	and	informal	work66.	The	possibility	for	employers	to	hire	workers	for	a	brief	time	in	order	to	satisfy	the	fluctuation	of	the	demand,	allows	them	to	keep	labor	costs	low	and	 to	 respond	 easily	 to	 buyers’	 demands.	 As	 noted	 by	 Barrientos	 in	 a	research	on	the	fruit	export	sector	in	South	Africa,	the	participation	in	global																																									 																																								 																																								 																																								 							Dunaway	(Eds.)	Gendered	commodity	chains.	Seeing	Women’s	work	and	Households	in	Global	
Production,	Stanford	University	Press,	2004.	Donald	 A.	 Clelland,	 The	 Core	 of	 the	 Apple:	 Dark	 Value	 and	 Degrees	 of	 Monopoly	 in	 Global	
Commodity	Chains,	Journal	of	World	Systems	Research,	Volume	20,	Number	1:	82-111,	2014.	65	Ngai-Ling	Sum,	Pun	Ngai,	Globalization	and	Paradoxes	of	Ethical	Transnational	Production:	
Code	of	Conduct	in	a	Chinese	Workplace,	Competition	&	Change,	Vol.	9,	No.	2,	June	2005	181-200,	p.	184.	66	ILO,	Report	VI,	Decent	Work	and	Informal	Economy,	90Th	Session,	2002.		
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value	chains	may	have	contradictory	effects,	both	for	producers	and	workers.	In	South	Africa,	most	of	the	fruit	export	goes	to	supplying	big	retailers,	who	have	 avoided	 direct	 investments	 in	 production	 and	 are	 only	 specialized	 in	marketing	and	in	the	coordination	of	their	supply	chains.	Also	in	this	sector,	as	well	 as	 in	 the	apparel	 and	electronics	 sectors,	 lead	 firms	 tend	 to	 shift	 to	those	activities	that	add	value	in	the	chain	such	as	investments	in	postharvest	facilities	and	the	optimisation	of	logistics.	The	participation	of	South	Africa’s	firms	in	global	value	chains	has	not	resulted	in	an	increase	 in	the	quality	of	jobs.	 Instead,	 it	 has	 had	 three	 simultaneous	 effects:	 «firstly,	 increasing	competition	 at	 the	 production	 level,	 thus	 reducing	 real	 prices	 paid	 to	producers	for	exported	fruit,	which	dominant	global	buyers	(supermarkets)	are	able	to	exploit;	secondly,	stimulating	a	significant	change	in	employment	strategies	 of	 producers,	 thus	 increasing	 the	 informalisation	 of	 fruit	 work,	especially	through	the	increased	use	of	contract	labor;	thirdly,	driving	up	the	standards	 producers	 have	 to	 meet	 to	 sell	 to	 large	 supermarkets,	 both	 in	terms	 of	 the	 quality	 of	 their	 product	 and	 the	 conditions	 of	 employment	 of	their	workers»67.		The	 informalisation	 and	 the	 deterioration	 of	 employment	 relations	 in	supply	 chains	 are	 often	 the	 gateways	 to	 forced	 labor	 because	 the	informalities	 enable	 them	 to	 avoid	 several	 low	 obligations	 and	 formal	arrangements.	 As	 noted	 by	 Ashley,	 the	 existence	 of	 forced	 labor	 in	 supply	chains	is	a	problem	that	is	inextricably	linked	to	global	commerce.	The	term	“forced	 labor”	 «refers	 to	 situations	 in	 which	 persons	 are	 coerced	 to	 work	through	the	use	of	violence	or	intimidation	or	by	more	subtle	means	such	as	accumulated	debt,	retention	of	identity	papers,	or	threats	of	denunciation	to	immigration	 authorities» 68 .	 For	 Allain	 and	 his	 colleagues,	 «it	 is	 now	commonplace	to	frame	analyses	of	forced	labor	in	the	context	of	such	product	supply	 chains.	Because	 each	 stage	 involves	 the	deployment	of	 labor,	 forced																																									 																					67	S.	 Barrientos,	 A.	 Kritzinger,	The	poverty	 of	work	and	 social	 cohesion	 in	global	 export:	 the	
case	 of	 South	 African	 fruit.	 In	 D.	 Chidester,	 P.	 Dexter	 and	 J.	 Wilmot	 (eds.)	What	 Holds	 Us	
Together:	Social	cohesion	in	South	Africa,	Cape	Town,	HSRC	Press,	2003,	p.	116.	68	Ashley	 Feasley,	 Eliminating	 Corporate	 Exploitation:	 Examining	 Accountability	 Regimes	 as	
Means	to	Eradicate	Forced	Labor	from	Supply	Chains,	Journal	of	Human	Trafficking,	2:1,	15-31,	2016,	p.	17.	
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labor	can,	in	principle,	arise	at	any	of	the	stages	in	the	product	supply	chain.	However,	 forced	 labor	 is	 usually	 associated	 with	 activities	 towards	 the	beginning	of	these	supply	chains	such	as	agriculture,	fishing,	etc.»69.		The	 impact	 of	 the	 organization	 of	 production	 in	 GVCs	 on	 working	conditions	 has	 been	 discussed	 by	 several	 economists	 and	 sociologists	 and	also	analysed	 in	 the	2013World	 Investment	Report.	The	report	argues	that:	«buyer-driven	GVCs	are	 typically	 focused	on	reduced	sourcing	costs,	and	 in	many	 labor-intensive	 industries	 this	means	 significant	 downward	 pressure	on	 labor	 costs	 and	 environmental	 management	 costs.	 Some	 suppliers	 are	achieving	 reduced	 labor	 costs	 through	 violations	 of	 national	 and	international	labor	standards	and	human	rights	laws.	Practices	such	as	forced	labor,	child	labor,	failure	to	pay	minimum	wage	and	illegal	overtime	work	are	typical	 challenges	 in	 a	 number	 of	 industries.	 In	 addition	 to	 downward	pressure	 on	 wages,	 the	 drive	 for	 reduced	 costs	 often	 results	 in	 significant	occupational	safety	and	health	violations»70.	As	the	result	of	the	rise	of	global	competition,	very	often	global	buyers	face	pressures	to	reduce	costs	in	their	global	value	chains.	 	This	signifies	 in	pressures	on	both	wages	and	working	conditions:	 «pressures	 on	 costs	 from	 global	 buyers	mean	 that	 GVC-related	employment	 can	 be	 insecure	 and	 involve	 poor	 working	 conditions.	 While	some	core	workers	for	key	suppliers	gain	most	in	terms	of	pay	and	benefits,	companies	 supplying	 global	 buyers	 frequently	 reduce	 costs	 by	 employing	temporary	 or	 casual	 workers	 in	 their	 plants	 and	 outsourcing	 work	 to	subcontractors	where	working	conditions	are	considerably	poorer»71.		As	 mentioned	 in	 the	 previous	 section,	 the	 organization	 of	 processes	 of	production	 	 in	 GVCs	 and	 the	 fragmentation	 of	 production	 activities	 on	 a	global	 scale	 also	 result	 in	 the	 fragmentation	 of	 the	 liabilities	 of	 employers	insofar	 as	 the	 use	 of	 subcontracting	 and	 triangular	 relationships	 of	employment	relations	make	it	difficult	to	identify	who	would	be	responsible	for	bad	working	conditions	in	global	supply	chains.																																										 																					69	J.	 Allain,	 A.	 Crane,	 G.	 LeBaron,	 L.	 Behbahani,	 Forced	 labour’s	 business	models	 and	 supply	
chains,	Joseph	Rountree	Foundation,	2013,	p.	40.	70	UNCTAD,	World	Investment	Report	2013,	p.	162.	71	Ibidem,	p.	158.		
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The	 issue	 related	 to	 the	 fragmentation	 of	 liabilities	 leads	 us	 to	 the	 third	fundamental	 issue:	how	can	 the	power	of	 lead	 firms	and	 labor	 relations	be	regulated.	The	multiscalar	 future	of	globalization	brings	us	 to	also	consider	the	 role	 of	 the	 state	 in	 the	 regulation	 of	 labor	 and	 economic	 activities.	Globalization	 has	 led	 to	 a	 reconfiguration	 of	 state-market	 relations	 in	 the	economic	 domain.	 Economic	 globalization,	 for	 instance,	 by	 no	 means	necessarily	 translates	 into	 a	 diminution	 of	 state	 power;	 rather,	 it	 is	transforming	 the	 conditions	 under	 which	 state	 power	 is	 exercised72.	 The	state	in	a	global	economy	continues	to	act	as	a	protagonist	of	regulation.	Its	regulatory	action	is	structured	on	a	double	tier:	on	the	one	hand,	it	provides	the	conditions	for	accumulation,	on	the	other	hand,	it	provides	a	framework	for	 labor	 market	 regulation.	 In	 the	 last	 few	 decades,	 following	 neoliberal	politics,	state	regulatory	action	has	been	focused	especially	on	setting	up	new	spaces	 for	 capitalist	 accumulation,	 promoting	 a	 re-regulation	 of	 capital	 and	labor	 relations.	 State	 action	 has	 been	 characterized	 by	 several	 measures	aiming	 to	 promote	 a	 globalization	 process	 by	 setting	 up	 ZES,	 adopting	company-friendly	 policies	 in	 order	 to	 snare	 investments,	 adopting	 more	flexible	labor	regulatory	regime,	etc.	One	of	 the	 asymmetries	 resulting	 from	 the	 globalization	of	 economies	 is	the	 gap	 between	 the	 global	 dimension	 of	 production	 and	 the	 domestic	dimension	 of	 labor	 regulation.	 Indeed,	 in	 the	 last	 few	 decades,	 the	 huge	power	 of	 lead	 firms	 and	 the	 global	 dimension	 of	 the	 organization	 of	production	have	resulted	in	a	strong	demand	for	the	regulation	of	labor	and	economic	activities	 to	be	moved	from	a	national	 to	a	global	 level.	 Industrial	relations	are	 internationalizing	rapidly	by	developing	new	protagonists	and	forms	 of	 governance	 to	 deal	 with	 the	 regulation	 of	 labor73.	 As	 noted	 by	Niforou,	 «the	 high	 complexity	 of	 GVCs	 and	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 global	
																																								 																					72	D.	Held,	A.	McGrew,	Globalization,	Entry	for	The	Oxford	Companion	to	Politics	of	the	World,	2001.	73	A.	Hassel,	The	Evolution	of	a	Global	Labour	Governance	Regime,	Governance,	Vol.	21,	No.	2:	231-251,	2005.	
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overarching	authority	have	been	balanced	by	 the	emergence	of	 governance	mechanisms	of	different	forms	and	at	different	levels»74.		In	 other	words,	 numerous	 forms	 of	 governance	 have	 emerged	 since	 the	1980s	 in	response	 to	 the	absence	of	an	 international	 framework	to	prevent	or	regulate	 the	excess	of	globalization	 in	 terms	of	social	and	environmental	impacts	 and	 the	 violations	 of	 human	 rights.	 “New	 protagonists”	 such	 as	transnational	corporations,	ONG,	NATO,	have	emerged	alongside	“traditional”	ones	-	such	as	states,	trade	unions,	and	international	organizations	-	and	have	created	 different	 forms	of	 regulations.	 The	 labor	 regulation	 demand,	 due	 to	the	 weakness	 of	 traditional	 protagonists	 and	 state	 regulation	 compared	 to	capitalist	power,	has	mainly	resulted	in	the	growth	of	private	regulation,	also	called	soft	or	self-regulation.	The	main	protagonists	of	this	type	of	regulation	are	 transnational	 corporations.	 The	 tools	 used	 to	 ensure	 respect	 for	 some	rules	 (mainly	 workers’	 rights	 and	 environmental	 protection)	 by	 the	 firms	included	in	their	supply	chains	are:	codes	of	conduct,	quality	assurance	(Q.A.),	accounting	and	management	standards,	international	framework	agreements	(IFAs).		Through	codes	of	conduct,	in	particular,	firms	agree	to	comply	with	many	rules	 in	 order	 to	 ensure	 good	working	 conditions,	 health,	 and	 safety	 in	 the	workplace,	no	forced	labor,	no	child	labor,	decent	wages,	no	overtime	work,	anti-discrimination,	freedom	of	association	and	collective	bargaining75.		Private	 regulation	 especially	 stems	 from	 the	 need	 of	 many	 lead	 firms	 to	preserve	their	image	and	market	power	avoiding	name	and	shame	campaigns	led	 mostly	 by	 ONGs76.	 In	 this	 form	 of	 regulation,	 the	 ONGs,	 often	 the	expression	of	 consumer	power,	 therefore	become	a	new	protagonist	 that	 is	able	 to	 influence	 consumers’	 views	 and	 to	 place	 pressure	 on	 companies	 in	order	to	encourage	them	to	implement	appropriates	codes	of	conduct.	
																																								 																					74	C.	Niforou,	Labor	leverage	in	Global	Value	Chains:	the	role	of	interdependencies		and	multi-
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The	 main	 criticism	 regarding	 codes	 of	 conduct	 refers	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 this	instrument	 is	 an	 expression	 of	 a	 form	 of	 regulation	 that	 is	 not	 binding	 on	firms	and	it	takes	place	without	negotiation	and	in	a	voluntary	and	unilateral	manner,	confusing	rights	with	business	rules.	Furthermore,	codes	of	conduct	are	considered	an	exercise	of	hypocrisy	due	to	their	incompatibility	with	the	real	 requests	 made	 by	 lead	 firms	 (in	 terms	 of	 costs	 reduction)	 to	 their	suppliers	and	are	viewed	by	trade	unions	as	an	excuse	to	exclude	them	from	decisions	relating	to	 labor	issues	and	labor	organization	in	the	workplace77.	In	addition,	another	limit	of	this	tool,	as	proven	by	a	research	on	the	working	conditions	within	Nike	supply	chains,	concerns	the	difficulties	of	monitoring	for	compliance	of	factory	activities	with	codes	of	conduct78.	Another	instrument	of	private	global	labor	governance	is	the	International	
Framework	 Agreements	 (IFAs).	 IFAs	 are	 agreements	 between	 single	multinational	enterprises	(MNE)	and	global	union	federations	(GUFs)	that	set	out	 frameworks	 for	 industrial	 relations	 throughout	 the	 corporation	 and	sometimes	 its	 supply	 chain.	 Through	 IFAs,	 multinational	 enterprises	undertake	 to	 ensure	 some	 of	 the	workers’	 rights.	 Until	 2010,	 80-plus	 IFAs	existed	 in	 the	world,	 covering	approximately	6.3	million	workers	excluding	suppliers	 and	 sub-contractors.	 As	 noted	 by	 Papadakis,	 «IFAs	 aim	 at	 jointly	promoting	 and	 monitoring	 fundamental	 labor	 standards	 across	 the	worldwide	 operations	 of	 MNEs,	 in	 particular	 in	 the	 areas	 of	 freedom	 of	association	 and	 the	 right	 to	 collective	 bargaining,	 but	 also	 of	 good	 labor	relations	 and	 decent	 conditions	 of	 work»79 .	 Citing	 Hammer,	 «based	 on	different	 sectoral	determinants,	 industrial	 relations	structures	and	 forms	of	organising,	 an	 analytical	 distinction	 is	 drawn	 between	 “bargaining”	agreements	 and	 “rights”	 agreements.	 This	 distinction	 relates	 to	 the	
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conclusion,	 the	 content	 as	well	 as	 the	procedure	of	 IFAs»80.	The	 IFAs	differ	from	other	instruments	of	regulation	because	they	are	the	outcome	of	direct	negotiations	between	the	representatives	of	management	and	workers	in	an	MNE	 and	 because	 they	 open	 doors	 to	 the	 monitoring	 of	 supply	 chains	 by	trade	 unions.	 IFAs	 allow	 therefore	 to	 achieve	 several	 aims:	 to	 ensure	fundamental	rights	 to	MNE	workers	and	suppliers	and	subcontractors	MNE	workers,	 to	 acknowledge	 trade	 union	 legitimacy,	 and	 to	 improve	international	cooperation	between	different	actors	and	organizations.	One	of	the	 IFA	 limits	 lies	 in	 the	 fact	 that	the	 vast	majority	of	 IFAs	 can	be	 found	 in	“producer-driven	 chains”,	 such	 as	 the	 automotive	 and	 electrical	 industries,	rather	than	“buyer-driven	chains”.	As	stated	by	Papadakis,	«MNEs	governing	these	 chains	 usually	 have	 a	 hierarchical,	 vertically	 integrated	 production	structure.	They	are	also	often	characterized	by	strong	relationships	between	MNEs	 and	 their	 first-tier	 suppliers,	 by	 a	 solid	 workplace	 organization	throughout	the	chain,	and	by	strong	home-country	unions	and	work	councils	that	become	instrumental	in	the	monitoring	and	implementation	of	IFAs.	This	feature	creates	a	suitable	institutional	environment	for	IFAs.	In	contrast,	IFAs	have	difficulty	in	securing	a	presence	in	“buyer-driven”	global	supply	chains,	which	 are	 characterized	 by	 an	 outsourcing	 of	 most	 if	 not	 all	 of	 the	 MNE	production	 to	 developing-country	 suppliers.	 MNEs	 operating	 in	 “buyer-driven”	industries,	such	as	the	garment	or	banana	supply	chains,	not	only	are	very	 remote	 from	 the	 actual	 workplace	 in	 which	 their	 products	 are	manufactured,	 but	 are	 also	 often	 embedded	 in	 a	 culture	 of	 union	avoidance»81.	 In	 conclusion,	we	 can	 say	 that	 through	 IFAs	 trade	unions	 are	able	to	participate	in	the	shaping	of	a	global	labor	governance	system	and	to	promote	 the	 claims	 of	workers	 in	 the	 processes	 of	 the	 globalization	 of	 the	economy.	Private	 regulation	 calls	 into	 question	 the	 issue	 of	 enforceability	 of	 used	tools,	 that	 is,	 to	what	extent	 they	are	able	 to	protect	workers’	 rights	and	 to	
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regulate	employment	relations.	The	voluntary	nature	of	instruments	and	the	lack	 of	 a	 penalty	 system	 renders	 a	 firm’s	 commitment	 toward	 establishing	maintaining	 and	 monitoring	 labor	 standards	 no	 longer	 dependent	 on	 the	respect	of	the	law	but	on	the	business	decisions	of	the	single	firm.		The	shifts	in	the	global	economy	not	only	require	new	global	governance	but	also	 a	 change	 in	 the	 strategy	 of	 trade	 unions	 aimed	 to	 articulate	 the	representation	 of	workers’	 claims	 on	 a	 global	 scale	 alongside	 value	 chains.	This	is	the	greatest	challenge	for	the	contemporary	labor	union	movement	in	the	 globalized	 era.																					
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II	Chapter		
Across	agri-food	chains:	retailers,	agriculture	and	migrations	
	
2.1.	Retailing	revolution		 Large	retailers	are	a	typical	example	of	buyer-driven	chains.	The	rise	and	spread	 of	 large	 retail	 firms	 have	 had	 many	 implications	 on	 employment	structure,	wages,	class	dynamics,	poverty	and	public	assistance	of	developed	and	developing	countries1.	Many	studies	have	highlighted	how	retail	growth	destabilized	 traditional	grocery	stores2,	affected	 local	 food	production	systems3,	and	had	an	 impact	(directly	and	indirectly)	on	labor	relations4.	Nowadays	 big	 retailers	 play	 the	 same	 role	 as	 the	 great	 manufacturing	firms	of	the	Fordist	era.	 	As	noted	by	Lichtenstein,	«at	the	crux	of	the	global	supply	chains	stand	the	Wal-Marts,	 the	Home	Depots,	and	the	Carrefours	of	our	 time.	 They	 make	 the	 markets,	 set	 the	 prices,	 and	 determine	 the	worldwide	distribution	of	 labor	 for	the	gigantic	stream	of	commodities	that	now	flows	across	their	counters»5.			The	workings	of	mega-retailers	reflect	a	new	regime	of	production	(just	in	time)	 and	 accumulation	 (flexible	 accumulation)	 of	 global	 capitalism.	 For	 D.	Harvey	 «flexible	 accumulation	 rests	 on	 flexibility	 with	 respect	 to	 labour	processes,	 labour	 markets,	 products	 and	 patterns	 of	 consumption.	 It’s	characterized	by	 the	emergence	of	 entirely	new	sectors	of	production,	new	
																																								 																					1	K.	 Stainback,	E.	Ekl,	The	spread	of	“big	box”	retail	firms	and	spatial	stratification.	Sociology	Compass.	2017;11:e12462.	https://doi.org/10.1111/soc4.12462.	2	C.	 Fishman,	The	Wal-Mart	Effect:	How	the	World’s	Most	Powerful	Company	Really	Works—
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ways	 of	 providing	 financial	 services,	 new	 markets,	 and,	 above	 all,	 greatly	intensified	 rates	 of	 commercial,	 technological,	 and	 organizational	innovation»6.		Abernathy	(1999),	analysing	the	retail	sector,	used	the	term	lean	retailing	
revolution	 in	order	to	describe	new	technologies	and	management	practices	adopted	 and	 refined	 by	 several	 companies.	 This	 revolution	 involved	 new	information	 technologies,	 new	 product	 labelling,	 and	 new	 methods	 of	distribution7.	Lean	retailers	no	longer	have	warehouses	full	of	products	ready	to	 be	 sold.	 They	 simply	 own	 the	 products	 on	 the	 selling	 floor.	 On	 Sunday	nights,	 after	weekend	 sales	 are	 declared,	 products	 are	 ordered	 by	 retailers	through	 a	 computerized	 inventory	 system.	 The	 order	 is	 electronically	transmitted	 to	 the	 offshore	 suppliers	 on	 the	 same	 night.	 On	 Mondays,	suppliers	 ship	 the	ordered	products	 in	 containers	and	 the	products	usually	arrive	 at	 a	 retailer’s	 distribution	 center	 by	Wednesday	 of	 the	 same	week8.	This	new	supply	chain	management	system	allowed	for	the	shifting	of	risks	and	costs	of	unstable	consumer	demand	from	retailers	to	suppliers.	Therefore,	 production	 requires	 that	 retailers	 and	 supply	 chain	 firms	 be	functionally	 linked.	Analysing	 the	working	of	Wal-Mart,	 Lichtenstein	wrote:	«using	a	wide	variety	of	new	information	technologies,	these	retailers	collect	point-of-sale	(POS)	data	and	relay	it	electronically	through	their	supply	chain	to	 initiate	 replenishment	 orders	 almost	 instantaneously.	 When	 Wal-mart	sells	 a	 tube	 of	 toothpaste	 in	 Memphis,	 that	 information	 passes	 straight	through	to	the	P&G	headquarters	office	 in	Cincinnati,	 flashing	directly	to	an	offshore	 toothpaste	 factory,	 which	 adjusts	 its	 production	 schedule	accordingly»9.		As	noted	by	Halebsky,	the	rationalization	of	many	managerial	tasks	by	the	use	of	computer	technologies	and	the	restructuring	of	 the	retail	 industry	by																																									 																					6	D.	Harvey,	The	condition	of	postmodernity,	cit.,	p.	147.	7	F.H.	Abernathy,	J.	T.	Dunlop,	J.	H.	Hammond,	D.	Weil,	A	Stitch	in	Time:	Lean	Retailing	and	the	
Transformation	 of	 Manufacturing	 Lessons	 from	 the	 Apparel	 and	 Textile	 Industries,	 Oxford	University	Press,	New	York,	1999. 8	F.	H.	Abernathy,	A.	Volpe,	D.	Weil, The	future	of	the	apparel	and	textile	industries:	prospects	
and	choices	for	public	and	private	actors,	Environment	and	Planning	A,	volume	38,	pp.	2207-2232,	2006.	9	N.	Lichtenstein,	Supply	Chains,	Workers'	Chains,	cit.,	p.	21.	
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mergers	and	acquisitions	have	resulted	in	the	creation	of	powerful	retailers	in	the	form	of	superstores	and	chain	stores10.	The	globalization	of	supply	chains,	the	impact	of	IT	and	the	revolution	of	logistics	allowed	big	retailers	to	increase	their	profit	margins	by	expanding	in	lower-wage	 economies	 and	 obtaining	 lower	 prices	 from	 their	 international	suppliers.	 In	 addition	 to	 controlling	 suppliers’	 costs,	 big	 retailers	 have	 also	benefited	 from	macroeconomic	 contexts	 unfavorable	 to	 labor	 in	 high-wage	economies	 further	 increasing	 gains	 and	 their	 market	 power.	 As	 noted	 by	Baud	 and	 Durand:	 «first,	 they	 have	 expanded	 their	 activities	 in	 low-wage	countries	where	 labour	militancy	 is	 weak.	Moreover,	 globalization	 and	 the	introduction	of	information	technologies	in	the	work	process	have	worsened	the	 position	 of	 low-skilled	 workers	 in	 high-income	 economies,	 fuelling	 a	systemic	 rise	 in	 inequalities.	 Labour	 in	 the	 retail	 sector	 has	 been	 severely	exposed	 to	 this	 adverse	 evolution	 because	 the	 sector	 is	 a	 labour	 intensive	tertiary	 industry,	markedly	 segmented	 in	 terms	of	workforce	 remuneration	and	 with	 a	 large	 proportion	 of	 low	 skilled	 workers»11.	 Several	 studies12	highlighted	mechanisms	used	by	big	retailers	 to	control	 labor	costs	such	as	part-time	labor,	gender	pay	gap,	unpaid	overtime,	union	discriminations,	and	subcontracting,	etc.		To	sum	up,	the	rise	of	the	power	of	big	retailers	and	the	increasing	of	their	profit	margins	has	been	carried	out	through	several	factors	as	globalization,	new	information	technologies,	the	revolution	of	logistics,	 low	prices	and	the	intensification	of	worker	exploitation	within	both	domestic	and	foreign	labor	markets.	
	
	
																																									 																					10	S.	Halebsky,	Superstores	and	the	Politics	of	Retail	Development,	City	&	Community	3(2):115	–	134,	2004.	11	C.	 Baud,	 C.	 Durand,	 Financialization,	 globalization	 and	 the	 making	 of	 profits	 by	 leading	
retailers,	Socio-Economic	Review,	Volume	10,	Issue	2,	2012:	241–266,	p.	255.	12	N.	Lichtenstein,	Wal-Mart:	The	Face	of	the	Twenty-First	Century	Capitalism.	New	York:	New	Press,	2006;	B.	Ehrenreich,	Nickel	and	Dimed.	On	(Not)	Getting	By	in	America.	New	York:	Owl	Books,	2001.	
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2.2.	 Global	 agro-food	 system	 and	 transnational	 supermarket	
chains	
Innovations	 in	 communications	 and	 technology,	 logistics	 development,	new	 management	 practices,	 international	 trade,	 and	 increased	 capital	mobility	 enabled	 retailers	 to	 purchase	 from	 producers	 worldwide.	 These	changes	 also	 have	 an	 effect	 on	 the	 food	 and	 agricultural	 sector	 which	 is	controlled	by	a	few	leading	food	retailers.		As	noted	by	Burch	and	Lawrence,	 in	 the	past	 the	role	of	 the	retail	sector	was	 to	market	 products	 realized	 by	 the	manufacturing	 industry.	 From	 the	late	 1960s,	 control	 over	 the	 establishment	 and	 management	 of	 agri-food	supply	chains	passed	from	food	manufacturers	to	supermarkets	leading	to	a	reconfiguration	 of	 the	 manufacturer-dominated	 supply	 chain.	 Flexible	systems	 of	 production	 based	 on	 contracts,	 extensive	 shift	 work,	 and	continuous	 production	 have	 been	 exported	 to	 production	 sites	 all	 over	 the	world.	 Many	 developing	 countries	 have	 been	 incorporated	 into	 the	 supply	chain	as	sources	of	cheap	processed	foodstuff	and	fresh	fruit	and	vegetables	in	demand	by	consumers	in	the	North13. This	shift	in	power	has	resulted	in	two	factors:	«the	first	is	the	emergence	of	 a	monopsony	 in	 distribution,	 in	which	 a	 relatively	 large	 number	 of	 food	processing	companies	are	forced	to	sell	their	products	to	a	limited	number	of	globally-focused	 retailers	 who	 exercise	 enormous	 purchasing	 power	 in	 an	increasingly	concentrated	market;	 the	second	 is	 the	growing	significance	of	supermarket	 “own	brand”	 products	 (referred	 to	 as	private	 labels	 in	 the	US)	and	supermarket	“generic	brands”	(typically	marketed	under	a	“No	Frills”	or	“Savings”	 label),	 which	 have	 in	 recent	 years	 come	 to	 compete	 with	 the	branded	products	of	the	established	food	manufacturing	companies»14.	
																																								 																					13	D.	Burch,	G.	Lawrence,	Towards	a	third	food	regime:	behind	the	transformation,	Agric	Hum	Values,	26:	267–279,	2009.	14	D.	 Burch,	 G.	 Lawrence,	 Supermarket	own	brands,	 supply	 chains	and	 the	 transformation	of	
the	agri	food	system.	International	Journal	of	Sociology	of	Agriculture	and	Food,	2005,	13(1):	1–18,	p.	1.	
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As	highlighted	by	Konefal	et	al.,	the	transition	from	a	Fordist	to	a	flexible	accumulation	 has	 produced	 three	 transformations	 in	 food	 and	 agriculture	and	 has	 resulted	 in	 the	 emergence	 of	 Transnational	 Supermarket	 Chains	(TSCs)	as	the	most	powerful	protagonists	in	the	global	agro-food	system15.		The	 first	 transformation	 affects	 the	 scale	 and	 geography	 of	 agro-food	networks	 shifting	 from	 local,	 regional	 and	 national	 networks	 to	 a	 global	network.	 The	 global	 reach	 of	 agri-food	 supply	 chains	 -	 allowed	 by	 free	international	trade,	foreign	investments,	and	logistics	development	-	enables	fresh	 and	 processed	 agri-food	 products	 to	 be	 shipped	 across	 national	borders.	The	 second	 transformation	 is	 the	 emergence	 of	 buyer-driven	 commodity	chains	and	the	rise	of	the	power	of	Transnational	Supermarket	Chains	as	big	buyers	 in	 the	 global	 agro-food	 system.	 As	 argued	 also	 by	 Lee	 et	 al.,	 in	globalized	 agri-food	 chains	 power	 has	 shifted	 in	 favor	 of	 retailers	 vis-à-vis	producers.	«In	advanced	economies	and	developing	nations	as	well,	modern	retailers	 and	 supermarkets	have	grown	ever	 larger,	 and	as	 lead	 firms,	 they	drive	 the	 agrifood	 chains	 linking	 daily	 grocery	 shoppers	 to	 small	 farmers	around	the	world.	Their	enormous	buying	power	and	well-known	consumer	brands	allow	them	to	dictate	cost-cutting	measures	and	enhanced	standards	to	their	suppliers»16.	The	 third	 transformation	 affects	 the	 changes	 in	market	 differentiation	 and	consumption	patterns.	Lead	firms	aim	to	take	competitive	advantage	not	only	by	 price-based	 competition	 but	 also	 through	 the	 development	 of	 products	that	allow	them	to	distinguish	themselves	from	competitors.		These	changes	shaped	the	 form	of	a	new	food	system	characterized	by	a	flexible	 production	 and	 international	 sourcing	 of	 food	 products	 set	 by	
																																								 																					15	J.	 Konefal,	 M.	 Mascarenhas,	 M.	 Hatanaka,	 Governance	 in	 the	 global	 agro-food	 system:	
Backlighting	 the	 role	 of	 transnational	 supermarket	 chains,	 Agriculture	 and	 Human	 Values,	2005,	22:	291–302.	16	J.	 Lee,	 G.	 Gereffi,	 J.	 Beauvais,	 Global	 value	 chains	 and	 agrifood	 standards:	 challenges	 and	
possibilities	for	smallholders	in	developing	countries,	Proceedings	of	the	National	Academy	of	Sciences	of	the	United	States	of	America,	2012,	vol.	109,	no.	31:	12326-31,	p.	12326.	
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international	retailers	and	based	on	convenience,	freshness,	innovation,	and	health17.	Analyzing	the	transformations	of	the	global	agro-food	system	Bonanno	et	al.	highlighted	how	corporations	«have	sought	cheaper	sources	of	 labor	and	land;	captured	 the	benefits	of	 improved	 technologies	of	 transportation;	and	whipsawed	 nation-states	 and	 localities	 into	 providing	 tax	 incentives	 and	benefits,	to	satisfy	their	individual	‘‘bottom	lines’’	–	that	is,	their	profits»	18.	The	emergence	of	TSCs	 signifies	 that	 they	determine	 the	quality	and	 the	type	 of	 food	 that	 people	 consume,	 its	 cost,	 how	 and	 where	 it	 should	 be	produced	 and	 at	 what	 price.	 TSCs	 not	 only	 control	 distribution	 but	 also	decisively	 shape	 the	 production,	 processing,	 and	 consumption	 of	 food	 as	 a	result	of	their	enormous	buyer	power19.	These	retailers	have	avoided	direct	involvement	in	production	focusing	mainly	on	the	activity	that	adds	value	in	the	 chain 20 	-	 marketing,	 developing	 their	 own	 brands,	 investing	 on	postharvest	 facilities,	 barcoding	 products,	 ready-prepared	 vegetables	 and	salads,	logistics	etc.	-	and	the	coordination	of	their	supply	chains.		These	firms	have	 invested	 heavily	 in	 the	 development	 of	 their	 supply	 chains,	 greatly	increasing	monitoring	and	 the	control	of	 suppliers.	As	noted	by	Brown	and	Sander,	 «increasingly,	 the	 competitive	 advantage	 of	 supermarkets	 in	 the	north	 is	 a	 function	 of	 how	well	 they	 can	manage	 their	 supply	 chain.	 Their	business	 model	 –	 focusing	 on	 maximizing	 returns	 for	 shareholders	 and	keeping	 costs	 competitively	 low	 for	 consumers	 –	 demands	 increasing	flexibility	 through	 “just	 in	 time	 delivery,	 tighter	 control	 over	 inputs	 and	standards	and	ever-lower	prices»21.		
																																								 																					17	D.	Burch,	G.	Lawrence,	Towards	a	third	food	regime…,	cit.	18	A.	Bonanno,	L.	Busch,	W.	Friedland,	L.	Gouveia,	E.	Mingione,	Introduction,	In	A.	Bonanno,	L.	Busch,	 W.	 Friedland,	 L.	 Gouveia	 and	 E.	 Mingione	 (eds.),	 From	 Columbus	 to	 ConAgra:	 The	
Globalization	of	Agriculture	and	Food,	Lawrence,	Kansas:	University	of	Kansas	Press,	1994,	p.	15.	19	D.	 Burch,	 G.	 Lawrence,	 Supermarket	 and	 agri-food	 supply	 chains.	 Transformations	 in	 the	
production	and	consuption	of	foods,	Edward	Elgar	Publishing,	2007.	20	G.	Gereffi,	The	Global	Economy,	cit.	21	O.	 Brown,	 C.	 Sander,	 Supermarket	 buying	 power:	 Global	 supply	 chains	 and	 smallholder	
farmers,	International	Institute	for	Sustainable	Development,	2007. 	
	 39	
Supermarket	 chains	 have	 great	 power.	 As	 highlighted	 by	 Ploeg,	 «it	 is	becoming	difficult,	if	not	often	impossible,	for	farmers	to	sell	food	ingredients	or	for	consumers	to	buy	food	outside	of	the	circuits	that	they	control»22.		The	 excess	 capacity	 in	 overseas	 factories	 and	 the	 concentration	 of	 buying	power	in	the	retail	sector23	allow	them	to push	the	costs	and	risks	of	business	down	 the	 supply	 chain,	 dictating	 cost-cutting	 measures	 to	 their	 suppliers.	Furthermore,	their	requirements	have	led	to	the	decline	of	smallholders	who	have	 been	 squeezed	 by	 large-scale	 producers	 and	 excluded	 from	 the	supermarket	 supply	 chain.	 For	 example,	 the	 horticulture	 industry	 in	 sub-Saharan	 Africa	 is	 dominated	 by	 a	 few	 large	 exporters	 that	 are	 supplied	mainly	by	large	producers24.	The	rise	of	the	power	of	supermarket	chains	has	resulted	in	the	development	of	global	oligopolies	in	the	retail	sector	and	their	increasing	 market	 power.	 As	 noted	 by	 Dolan	 and	 Humphrey	 on	 European	food	 retailers	 «food	 retailing	 has	 become	 increasingly	 concentrated	 in	Europe.	 In	 1996,	 the	 top	 five	 supermarket	 chains	 had	 a	 total	 food	market	share	of	more	 than	50	percent	 in	all	but	 three	EU	countries	 (Spain,	Greece,	and	Italy).	This	process	is	particularly	noticeable	in	the	UK,	where	the	largest	six	food	retailers	had	captured	a	76	percent	share	of	fruit	and	vegetable	sales	by	1997»25.	Oligopolistic	 competition	 results	 in	 a	 small	 number	of	 retailers	that	 fight	 amongst	 themselves	 by	 using	 marketing	 and	 product	differentiation	 in	 order	 to	 capture	 market	 share	 and	 customer	 loyalty.	 As	argued	by	Burch	and	Lawrence	«this	intense	competition	means	that	each	of	the	major	supermarket	chains	seeks	to	buy	high-quality	product	lines	at	the	lowest	possible	price,	which	is	reflected	further	upstream	in	the	supply	chain	as	 food	manufacturers	 bear	 down	on	 their	 suppliers	 (i.e.	 the	 farmers),	 and	farmers	attempt	to	bear	down	on	their	suppliers»26.	
																																								 																					22	J.D.	van	der	Ploeg,	The	food	crisis,	industrialized	farming	and	the	imperial	regime,	Journal	of	Agrarian	Change,	10	(1),	2010:	98–106,	p.	101.	23	G.	Gereffi,	The	organization	of	Buyer-Driven,	cit.	24	G.	Gereffi,	The	Global	Economy,	cit.	25 	C.	 Dolan,	 J.	 Humphrey,	 Governance	 and	 trade	 in	 fresh	 vegetables:	 The	 impact	 of	 UK	
supermarkets	 on	 the	 African	 horticulture	 industry,	 Journal	 of	 Development	 Studies,	 2000,	37(2):	147–176,	p.	148.	26	D.	Burch,	G.	Lawrence,	Supermarket	own	brands…,	cit.	
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The	 restructuring	 and	 control	 of	 the	 global	 agro-food	 system	by	 TSCs	 is	now	being	exercised	through	the	mechanism	of	standards.	In	order	to	supply	supermarket	chains,	producers	have	to	meet	food	standards	such	as	quality	(appearance,	 cleanliness,	 taste),	 safety	 (pesticide	 or	 artificial	 hormone	residue,	microbial	presence),	 authenticity	 (guarantee	of	 geographical	 origin	or	 use	 of	 traditional	 processes)	 and	 the	 goodness	 of	 production	 processes	(with	 respect	 to	 worker	 health	 and	 safety,	 or	 to	 environmental	contamination) 27 .	 These	 standards	 may	 work	 as	 a	 barrier	 mainly	 for	smallholders	in	developing	countries,	because	they	are	unable	to	meet	them,	therefore,	forcing	their	exclusion	by	supermarket	chains.	For	the	purpose	of	remaining	included	in	the	chain,	suppliers	are	usually	subject	to	an	audit	and	must	 demonstrate	 that	 they	 can	 meet	 the	 standards	 set	 by	 supermarket	chains28.	Suppliers	unable	to	do	so	are	excluded	and	marginalized.		An	 example	 of	 European	 private	 standards	 for	 the	 production	 of	 fresh	fruits	 and	 vegetables	 comes	 from	 Euro-Retailer	 Produce	 Working	 Group	Good	 Agricultural	 Practices	 (EUREPGAP29)	 set	 by	 a	 consortium	 of	 leading	European	 retailers	 known	 as	 the	 Euro-retailer	 produce	 working	 group	(EUREP).	 The	 focus	 of	 Eurepgap	 is	 food	 safety	 and	 quality	 as	 well	 as	 the	provisions	 on	 labor	 and	 environmental	 impacts.	 If	 a	 producer	 or	 supplier	wants	to	sell	to	any	of	the	leading	European	TSCs	they	need	to	comply	with	the	standards	set	by	EUREP.		As	noted	by	Konefal	at	al.,	«the	unequal	power	of	 suppliers	 vis-a`-vis	 retailers	 is	 also	 evident	 in	 the	 EUREPGAP	 standard	itself.	The	way	EUREPGAP	has	been	structured,	suppliers	are	responsible	for	the	 costs	 of	 complying	with	 EUREPGAP	 in	 terms	 of	 both	 technological	 and	organizational	 upgrades	 and	 certification.	 For	 many	 smaller	 suppliers,	compliance	is	too	expensive.	Consequently,	smaller	sized	suppliers	are	being	squeezed	 out	 of	 business	 or	 have	 had	 to	 reorient	 their	 products	 to	 other,	often	less	profitable,	markets.	The	effect	is	that	an	increasingly	consolidated	retail	 sector	 is	 dealing	 with	 an	 increasingly	 consolidated	 network	 of																																									 																					27	T.	Reardon,	E.	Farina,	The	rise	of	private	food	quality	and	safety	standards:	Illustrations	from	
Brazil,	International	Food	and	Agribusiness	Management	Review,	2002,	4(4):	413–421.	28	Dolan	et	al.,	cit.	29	http://www2.globalgap.org/fruit/index_html	
	 41	
suppliers»30.		Although	 standards	 are	 necessary	 for	 increasingly	 globalized	 and	geographical	 distributed	 agro-food	 systems,	 they	 represent	 a	 strong	mechanism	 of	 control	 because	 through	 private	 standards	 TSCs	 decide	 on	factors	such	as	who	the	producers	will	be,	where	the	location	of	production	is	and	what	are	the	conditions	of	production.	As	stated	in	the	previous	chapter,	when	 control	 cannot	 be	 exercised	 through	 ownership	 it	 is	 then	 exercised	through	 governance,	 namely:	 the	 specification	 of	 the	 product,	 quality	standards,	quantities,	delivery	dates,	and	price.	The	 changes	 in	 capitalist	 food	 and	 farming	 systems	 have	 led	 several	scholars	such	as	Burch	and	Lawrence	to	discuss	third	food	regime. Unlike	first	and	second	food	regimes	-	respectively	based	on	wheat	and	sugar	trade	and	on	industrial	agriculture	-	the	third	food	regime	«is	one	that	is	lead	by	global	corporations	 that	 are	 profiting	 from	 the	 re-organisation	 of	 agri-food	chains»31.							
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																									 																					30	Konefal	et	al.,	cit.,	p.	298.	31	D.	Burch,	G.	Lawrence, Towards	a	third	food	regime…,	cit.,	p.	267.	
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2.3.	Retailers’	power		
	 In	 the	 last	 couple	 of	 decades,	 the	 aspect	 of	 grocery	 retailing	 had	profoundly	 changed	 with	 the	 emergence	 and	 the	 increased	 prevalence	 of	large	 retail	 chains.	 As	 noted	 by	 Dobson,	 «where	 once	 retail	 markets	 were	highly	 fragmented,	 consisting	 predominantly	 of	 traditional	 independent	retailers,	 they	 have	 become	 highly	 consolidated,	 driven	 by	 a	 process	 of	organic	 growth	 and	 mergers	 by	 leading	 retailers.	 The	 result	 has	 been	 the	marginalisation	 of	 small	 independent	 retailers,	 restricted	 to	 acting	 as	convenience	stores	 (for	so-called	 top-up	shopping),	and	market	domination	by	a	limited	number	of	large-format,	multiple-store	retailers	that	attract	the	bulk	of	consumer	spending»32.			
Tab.	1.	Retailers’	global	geography	
	
Source:	Deloitte,	Global	Powers	of	Retailing	2017,	The	art	and	science	of	customers.																																											 																					32 	P.	 Dobson,	 Retailer	 buyer	 power	 in	 European	 markets:	 lessons	 from	 grocery	 supply,	Loughborough	University	Business	School,	Working	Paper	No.	2002-1,	p.	7.	
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Retail	chains	have	become	increasingly	concentrated	both	at	the	national	level	 and	 international	 level	 because	 they	 have	 also	 sought	 to	 extend	 their	operations	abroad	(Tab.	1).		In	1999,	the	ten	largest	retailers	controlled	30%	of	all	retail	food	sales	in	the	European	Union.	 This	 level	 had	 increased	by	25%	 from	1993	 to	 199933. In	2013	the	percentage	of	market	share	of	 the	 top	10	 food	retailers	 in	Europe	was	16.834. 	As	 highlighted	 by	 Dobson, «the	 substantial	 market	 shares	 held	 by	 the	leading	 retailers	have	offered	 them	 increased	ability	 to	exercise	 substantial	buyer	power	over	suppliers.	With	their	control	of	shelf	space	and	the	greatly	reduced	 number	 of	 competitors,	 therefore	 offering	 fewer	 alternatives	 for	suppliers	 seeking	 a	 route	 to	 market,	 these	 large	 retailers	 have	 in	 effect	become	 “gatekeepers”	 for	 access	 to	 consumers.	 This,	 in	 turn,	 has	 allowed	these	 large	 retailers	 greater	 prospect	 of	 obtaining	 price	 concessions	 from	suppliers	as	well	as	being	able	to	charge	suppliers	directly	for	access	to	their	stores	 and	 impose	 other	 restraints	 on	 suppliers»35.	 These	 benefits	 allowed	the	 largest	 retailers	 to	 reinforce	 their	 competitive	 advantage	 and	 increase	their	 power	 of	 laying	 down	 their	 terms	 and	 conditions	 to	 suppliers.	 The	buyer	power	of	 these	 large	 retailers	 has	 become	 so	big	 that	 it	 undermined	the	market	 survival	 of	many	 suppliers	 and	 shaped	 the	working	 conditions	within	supply	firms.		The	 prevalence	 of	 these	 large	 retail	 chains	 and	 the	 unequal	 power	 of	suppliers,	vis-a`-vis	retailers,	has	resulted	in	increasing	friction	among	them,	forcing	several	national	authorities	to	reflect	on	what	they	call	Buyer	Power	of	large	retail	chains	and	its	effects	on	suppliers	and	consumers.		As	 noted	 by	 Dobson	 «retailer	 buyer	 power	 is	 essentially	 the	 ability	 of	leading	retail	firms	to	obtain	from	suppliers	more	favorable	terms	than	those	available	 to	 other	 buyers,	 or	 which	 would	 otherwise	 be	 expected	 under	
																																								 																					33	Ibidem.	34	European	Commission,	The	economic	 impact	of	modern	retail	on	choice	and	innovation	 in	
the	EU	food	sector,	Final	Report,	September,	2014.	35	P.	Dobson,	Retailer	buyer	power	in	European	markets…,	cit.,	p.1.	
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normal	 competitive	 conditions»36.	 Buyer	 power	 signifies	 that	 retailers	 are	able	to	control	the	terms	and	conditions	of	supply.	As	highlighted	by	Dobson,	buyer	power	 gives	 retailers	 not	 only	 the	possibility	 to	 obtain	 low	prices.	 It	also	 manifests	 itself	 by	 pushing	 several	 contractual	 obligations	 onto	suppliers:	«these	include	direct	retailer	financial	benefits	that	take	the	form	of	 additional	 payments	 or	 discounts,	 including	 “listing	 charges,”	 where	buyers	require	payment	of	a	fee	before	goods	are	purchased	from	the	listed	supplier;	“slotting	allowances,”	where	 fees	are	charged	for	store	shelf-space	allocation;	retroactive	discounts	on	goods	already	sold;	and	unjustifiably	high	contributions	to	retailer	promotional	expenses»37.		Buyer	 power	 can	 also	 be	 used	 by	 retailers	 to	 impose	 several	 conditions	onto	suppliers	not	 just	related	to	prices,	such	as	terms	of	payment,	delivery	conditions,	the	possibility	of	unilaterally	modified	contractual	conditions,	the	power	of	de-listing,	etc.	Analyzing	power	and	economic	asymmetric	relations	between	 retailers	 and	 suppliers	 becomes	 crucial	 as	well	 as	 the	 question	 of	
trade	spending,	deeply	linked	to	the	buyer	power	of	retailers.		The	term	trade	spending	refers	to	all	the	fees	paid	by	suppliers	to	retailers	in	order	to	remunerate	the	promotional,	distributional	and	sales	activities	and	services	offered	by	retailers.	Therefore,	trade	spending	refers	to	all	business	practices	 by	 which	 retailers	 require	 to	 pay	 fees	 to	 suppliers	 in	 order	 to	support,	 promote,	 or	 simply	 sell	 their	 products.	 The	main	 feature	 of	 these	fees	 is	 that	 their	 trading	 takes	 place	 secretly,	 without	 any	 public	communications	of	the	conditions,	and	suppliers	must	pay	these	fees	before	they	 are	 able	 to	 supply	 their	 products.	 	 These	 fees	 may	 be	 required	 for	several	 activities	 such	 as	 marketing	 campaigns,	 the	 introduction	 of	 new	products,	etc.38.		Following	 Dobson,	 in	 order	 to	 understand	 the	 increasing	 power	 of	retailers	 over	 suppliers	 it	 is	 important	 to	 recognize	 the	 three	 interlinked																																									 																					36	P.	 W.	 Dobson,	 Exploiting	 Buyer	 Power:	 Lessons	 from	 the	 British	 Grocery	 Trade.	 Antitrust	Low		Journal,	Vol.	72:	529-562,	2005,	p.	532.	37	Ivi.	38	Cfr.	 Autorità	 garante	 della	 concorrenza	 e	 del	mercato	 (Agcm),	 Indagine	conoscitiva	 IC43,	Settore	della	grande	distribuzione	organizzata,	2013.	
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roles	 that	 retailers	 have	 from	 the	prospective	 of	 producers:	 «first,	 retailers	are	 producers’	 customers;	 they	 buy	 their	 products	 for	 resale	 to	 ultimate	consumers.	 Second,	 they	 act	 as	 competitors	 when	 they	 sell	 “own-label”	(otherwise	 known	 as	 “private	 label”	 or	 “store	 brand”)	 products	 in	competition	 with	 producer	 branded	 goods.	 Third,	 they	 are	 suppliers	 that	“sell”	shelf	space,	either	directly	through	listing	or	slotting	fees	or	indirectly	through	 requiring	 lower	 prices	 from	 producers	 as	 a	 condition	 of	 stocking,	and	advertising	space,	such	as	through	promotional	support	payments»39.		 To	what	extent	has	the	growth	of	retailers’	power	affected	the	Italian	food	market?	 	What	 is	 the	composition	of	 the	 Italian	 food	retail	 sector	and	what	has	been	the	growth	of	retail	chains	in	the	last	decades?	Italian	 retail	 sector	 is	 organized	 around	 three	 types	 of	 retail:	 grande	distribuzione	 (GD),	 distribuzione	 organizzata	 (DO)	 and	 independent	groceries	(Ind).	The	GD	is	a	chain	composed	of	several	sales	points	controlled	by	a	big	company	or	by	a	group	of	companies.	The	DO	is	a	chain	composed	of	several	sales	points	controlled	by	single	owners	(usually	small	and	medium	companies)	 linked	 together	 by	 a	 working	 relationship	 set	 by	 contractual	constraints	 or	 forms	 of	 association.	 Whilst	 leaving	 a	 certain	 degree	 of	autonomy	to	any	single	owner,	much	of	the	activities	such	as	logistics,	price	policies,	 supply	 networks,	 etc.,	 are	 centralized	 and	 controlled	 by	 the	 top	 of	the	association.		
Tab.	2.	Incidence	rates	per	type	of	retail	(2011)	
type	 %	of	sales	 %	of	m2	 %	in	numbers	DO	 56,3%	 59,3%	 65,6%	GD	 43,0%	 38,2%	 29,5%	IND	 0,7%	 2,5%	 5,0%	Total	 100,0%	 100,0%	 100,0%	Source:	Author’s	elaboration	on	Agcm	2012	
																																									 																					39	P.	W.	Dobson,	Exploiting	Buyer	Power…,	cit.,	p.	536	
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Following	 the	 statistical	 data	 of	 Federdistribution40,	 from	 1996	 to	 2010	the	 food	 retail	 sector	 in	 Italy	 has	 grown	 71	 percent	 in	 terms	 of	 business	volume.	The	turnover	of	food	retail	chains	increased	from	48	billion	in	1996	to	82	billion	 in	2010.	At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 turnover	 of	 traditional	 grocery	stores	 decreased	 by	 55	 percent.	 From	 1996	 to	 2009,	 the	 number	 of	 sales	points	 of	 food	 retail	 increased	 47	 percent	 while	 traditional	 grocery	 stores	decreased	18	percent	during	the	same	period41.		From	1996	to	2013,	the	percentage	of	food	distributed	in	retail	chains	had	grown	 from	 50.2	 percent	 to	 72.4	 percent.	 During	 the	 same	 period,	 the	percentage	of	 food	distributed	 in	 traditional	 grocery	 stores	decreased	 from	40.6	percent	to	17.5	percent42.		The	 Italian	 retail	 market	 is	 highly	 fragmented	 (Figure	 1):	 the	 top	 3	supermarket	 chains	 had	 achieved	 36%	 of	 total	 market	 share	 compared	 to	61%	of	the	top	3	supermarket	chains	 in	the	UK,	53%	in	France	and	54%	in	Spain43.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																									 																					40	National	retail	chains	federation.	41	Cfr.	Autorità	garante	della	concorrenza	e	del	mercato…,	cit.	42	Federdistribuzione,	La	mappa	del	sistema	distributivo	in	Italia,	2014.	43	Federdistribuzione,	La	distribuzione	moderna	in	Italia,	2017.	
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Figure	 1.	 Top	 ten	 players	 of	 the	 Italian	 food	 retail	 sector	 and	 their	
market	share	(%)	
	
	
Source:	Ac-Nielsen	2017		 As	shown	by	a	study	carried	out	by	the	Italian	Antitrust,	buyer	power	also	affects	Italian	food	retail	chains.	Trade	spending	has	an	impact	of	11	percent	on	 the	 profits	 of	 suppliers	 while	 it	 represents	 a	 large	 source	 of	 profit	 for	retailers44.	Furthermore,	as	noted	by	Barbera	et	all.,	the	increasing	power	of	big	 players	 have	 squeezed	 the	 profitability	 from	 small	 farmers	 in	 favor	 of	traders	and	bank	services	providers.	For	every	100	euros	spent	by	 families	for	farm	products	only	22.50	£	wind	up	in	the	pockets	of	farmers	while	36	£	to	those	of	traders.	The	net	value	for	farmers	is	1.80	£	while	for	traders	it	is	15	£45.																																												 																					44	Cfr.	 Autorità	 garante	 della	 concorrenza	 e	 del	mercato	 (Agcm),	 Indagine	conoscitiva	 IC43,	Settore	della	grande	distribuzione	organizzata.	45	Aa.	 Vv.,	 L’estrazione	 di	 valore	 nell’economia	 fondamentale,	 in	 F.	 Barbera,	 J.	 Dagnes,	 A.	Salento,	 F.	 Spina	 (eds.),	 Il	 capitale	 quotidiano.	 Un	 Manifesto	 per	 l’economia	 fondamentale,	Donzelli	Editore,	Roma,	2016.	
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2.4	 Corporate	 food	 regime	 and	 the	 restructuring	 of	 Italian	
agriculture		
The	 dominance	 of	 big	 supermarket	 chains,	 their	 market	 concentration,	and	 their	 power	 to	 unilaterally	 dictate	 terms,	 prices,	 and	 conditions	 to	suppliers	 have	 resulted	 in	 the	 worsening	 of	 working	 conditions	 and	 job	security	 within	 supply	 firms.	 Suppliers	 are	 often	 squeezed	 by	 retailers	 to	reduce	prices	 in	order	to	meet	retailers’	demands	and	are	forced	to	employ	cheap	 labor.	 The	 imbalances	 of	 power	 are	 having	 a	 big	 impact	 on	 rural	communities	 of	 many	 countries	 in	 terms	 of	 marginalization	 of	 small-scale	farmers	 and	 the	 increasing	 exploitation	 of	 agricultural	 labor	 forces,	 in	particular,	migrant	workers.		The	growth	of	the	power	of	supermarket	chains	is	an	expression	of	a	new	
food	regime.	 	As	described	by	McMichael,	«food	regime	analysis	emerged	to	explain	 the	 strategic	 role	 of	 agriculture	 and	 food	 in	 the	 construction	of	 the	world	capitalist	economy.	It	identifies	stable	periods	of	capital	accumulation	associated	with	particular	 configurations	of	geopolitical	power,	 conditioned	by	 forms	 of	 agricultural	 production	 and	 consumption	 relations	 within	 and	across	national	spaces»46.	Since	the	end	of	the	eighties	this	new	food	regime,	that	 of	 transnational	 corporation,	 has	 profoundly	 restructured	 production	(increasingly	 intensive,	 industrialized,	 specialized	 and	 standardized)	 and	labor	(increasingly	cheap,	flexible	and	exploitable)	in	the	agricultural	sector.		As	noted	by	McMichael,	«agro-industrialisation	increasingly	replicates	the	spatial	 mobility	 of	 manufacturing	 systems,	 including	 the	 sub-division	 of	constituent	 processes	 into	 global	 commodity	 chains	 (such	 as	 the	 animal	protein	complex).	And,	to	the	extent	that	it	is	premised	on	the	incorporation	(contract	 farming	 for	agribusiness)	and/or	dispossession	of	smallholders,	 it	has	a	labour	reserve	at	its	disposal»47.	As	mentioned	above,	the	new	food	regime,	called	corporate	food	regime,	is	characterized	 by	 a	 hegemonic	 power	 exercised	 by	 several	 international																																									 																					46	P.	McMichael,	A	food	regime	genealogy,	The	Journal	of	Peasant	Studies,	Vol.	36,	No.	1,	2009,	139–169,	p.	139.	47	Ibidem,	p.	161.	
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institutions	(such	as	WTO,	IMF,	WB)	and	corporations48.		As	 highlighted	 by	 McMichael	 «transnational	 corporations	 typically	subcontract	 with	 Third	 World	 peasants	 to	 produce	 specialty	 horticultural	crops	and	off-season	fruits	and	vegetables.	They	also	process	foods	(such	as	fruit	juices,	canned	fruits,	frozen	vegetables,	boxed	beef,	and	chicken	pieces),	often	in	export	processing	zones,	for	expanding	consumer	markets	in	Europe,	North	America	and	Pacific-Asia»49.		Corporations	 and	 international	 institutions	 are	 also	 driving	 land	
grabbing 50 :	 large-scale	 land	 acquisitions,	 either	 buying	 or	 leasing,	 by	governments	and	transnational	companies,	which	involves	several	countries	in	 continents	 such	 as	 Africa,	 South	America,	 and	Asia.	 From	2006	 to	 2011,	foreign	 group	 companies	 have	 bought	 more	 than	 200	 millions	 hectares	 of	land,	mostly	in	Africa51.	Land	grabbing	is	a	key	aspect	of	the	new	global	agro-business	pattern	and	is	 fully	 integrated	into	the	new	food	regime	promoted	by	corporations	and	international	institutions.	Following	 Friedmann,	 the	 corporations	 are	 leading	 the	transnationalization	 of	 agri-food	 capital	 by	 establishing	 a	 global	 private	regulation	 in	 order	 to	 organize	 steady	 production	 and	 consumption	conditions	 that	 can	 allow	 investments,	 supplies,	 and	 sales	 on	 a	 “global	scale”52.	 This	 new	 power	 has	 resulted	 in	 a	 concentration	 process	 to	 the	benefit	 of	 corporations	 both	 on	 the	 side	 of	 input	 supply	 (seeds,	 fertilizers,	pesticides)	as	well	as	on	 the	side	of	processing,	distribution	and	 the	sale	of	food53.	Nowadays,	agro-food	corporations	control	40%	of	global	 trade	 food:	20	companies	control	the	global	trade	of	coffee,	six	companies	control	70%	of	
																																								 																					48	P.	 McMichael,	 Global	 development	 and	 the	 corporate	 food	 regime.	 In:	 F.H.	 Buttel	 and	 P.	McMichael	 (eds.),	 New	 directions	 in	 the	 sociology	 of	 global	 development,	 Oxford:	 Elsevier	Press,	2005.		49	P.	 McMichael,	 Development	 and	 social	 change.	 A	 global	 perspective,	 Thousand	 Oaks,	 CA:	Pine	Forge	Press,	1996,	p.	105.	50	Cfr.,	 S.	 Liberti,	 Land	 Grabbing.	 Come	 il	 mercato	 delle	 terre	 crea	 il	 nuovo	 colonialismo,	Minimum	Fax,	Roma,	2011.	51	S.	Sassen,	Espulsioni.	Brutalità	e	complessità	nell’economia	globale,	Il	Mulino,	Bologna,	2015.	52	H.	Friedmann,	From	colonialism	to	green	capitalism:	social	movements	and	the	emergence	of	
food	regimes,	in	F.H.	Buttel,	P.	McMichael	(eds.),	New	directions	in	the	sociology	of	global	
development,	Vol.	11,	Elsevier,	Oxford,	2005,	pp.229-267.	53	Ibidem.	
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the	 global	 trade	 of	 corn	 and	 only	 one	 company	 controls	 98%	 of	 packaged	tea54.	The	new	food	regime	is	also	characterized	by	a	selective	appropriation	from	 agro-food	 corporations	 of	 social	 demands	 for	 fair	 trade,	 consumer	health,	 and	animal	welfare55.	As	noted	by	Corrado,	 the	 setting	of	 standards	such	 as	 quality,	 safety,	 environmental	 protection,	 etc.,	 has	 driven	 the	reorganization	 of	 global	 agri-food	 chains	 by	 corporations	 (mainly	 big	supermarket	chains)	which	are	now	able	to	decide	who	has	to	produce,	what	has	to	be	produced,	where	and	at	what	price56.		The	 reorganization	of	 the	global	agro-food	system	and	 the	 incorporation	of	 agricultural	 production	 in	 retailer-driven	 chains	 -	 in	 which	 flow	commodities,	technologies,	and	capital	-	has	also	affected	southern	European	countries.	 The	 region	 has	 undergone	 several	 changes	 in	 the	 structure	 of	production	 and	 agrarian	 relations57.	 The	 number	 of	 farms	 has	 steadily	decreased	while	the	average	size	of	 farms	has	grown.	The	restructuring	has	also	affected	production	(through	the	development	of	intensive	production	of	fruit	 and	 vegetables	 for	 transnational	 supermarket	 chains)	 and	 labor	(through	 the	 extensive	 use	 of	 a	 cheap	 and	 flexible	 migrant	 labor	 force)	changing	 profoundly	 the	way	 by	which	 food	 is	 produced	 and	 sold	 and	 the	composition	of	the	rural	working	class58.		As	 noted	 by	 Corrado,	 the	 agriculture	 of	 these	 areas	 has	 become	increasingly	dependent	on	agri-food	systems,	especially	processing	 factories	and	supermarket	chains,	enduring	price	pressures	exercised	by	international	competition59.	Analyzing	 the	 supply	 chain	of	 orange	 juice	 in	 southern	 Italy,	Mostaccio	highlighted	how	the	price	pressure	has	increasingly	become	a	way	
																																								 																					54	R.	Patel,	I	padroni	del	cibo,	Feltrinelli,	Milano,	2015,	p.	79.	55	H.	Friedmann,	From	colonialism	to	green	capitalism,	cit.	56	A.	 Corrado,	 Il	 paradigma	 dei	 semi.	 Crisi	 agro-alimentare	 e	 reti	 per	 un’altra	 agricoltura,	Aracne,	Roma,	2010.	57	Cfr.,	A.	Corrado,	C.	De	Castro	&	D.	Perrotta,	(Eds.),	Migration	and	agriculture.	Mobility	and	
change	in	the	Mediterranean	area,	London:	Routledge,	2016.	58	A.	 Corrado,	 C.	De	Castro	&	D.	 Perrotta,	Cheap	food,	cheap	labour,	high	profits:	agriculture	
and	mobility	 in	 the	Mediterranean.	 Introduction,	 in	 A.	 Corrado,	 C.	 De	 Castro	 &	 D.	 Perrotta,	(Eds.),	Migration	and	agriculture…,	cit.	59 Cfr.	 C.	 Colloca,	 A.	 Corrado,	 Trasformazioni	 meridionali:	 migranti	 e	 aree	 rurali.	
Un’introduzione,	in	C.	Colloca,	A.	Corrado	(eds.),	La	Globalizzazione	delle	campagne…,	cit.	
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used	 by	multinational	 companies	 to	 exercise	 power	 over	 suppliers	 causing	their	inclusion	or	exclusion	from	agri-food	chains60.		Across	 the	 Mediterranean,	 international	 competition	 takes	 place	 mainly	between	Southern	European	countries	and	some	MENA	countries.	There	are	two	factors	underlying	this	competition:	trade	policies,	in	particular	the	EU’s	CAP	 and	 the	 partnership	 agreements	 between	 the	 EU	 and	 some	 MENA	countries,	and	the	growth	and	dominance	of	supermarket	chains61.	 	 Indeed,	as	noted	by	Corrado	et	all.,	«supermarket	chains	can	buy	(cheap)	agricultural	products	 in	 various	 parts	 of	 the	 globe,	 thus	 exacerbating	 the	 competition	between	 farmers	 in	 different	 countries.	 This	 is	 evident,	 for	 example,	 in	 the	production	 of	 fresh	 strawberries	 and	 tomatoes	 on	 both	 sides	 of	 the	Mediterranean,	especially	in	Morocco	and	Spain.	As	mentioned,	a	number	of	mainly	European	corporations	produce	or	simply	trade	in	both	countries,	in	order	 to	 meet	 the	 year-round	 demand	 for	 seasonal	 and	 counter-seasonal	fresh	 products	 among	 the	 European	 supermarket	 chains.	 This	 process	 is	favoured	by	EU	trade	policies,	which	displace	the	EU–Morocco	trade	barrier	southwards	on	a	seasonal	basis	in	relation	to	the	production	of	fresh	fruit	and	vegetables»62.		To	 sum	 up,	 agriculture	 is	 increasingly	 becoming	 globalized.	 The	 global	trade	of	food,	enabled	by	its	transformation	in	commodity,	involves	more	and	more	firms	and	countries	that	compete	with	each	other.	The	central	nodes	of	the	network	that	control	global	agri-food	systems	are	increasingly	located	at	a	far	distance	from	areas	where	labor	and	production	take	place.	Global	trade	has	rendered	increasingly	cheap	food	that	comes	from	distant	countries	and	produced	on	a	large	industrial	scale.	The	driving	force	behind	this	process	is	the	 international	 trade	 agreements	 (GATT,	 TTP,	 EPA,	 etc.)	 by	 which	corporations	 (biotech	 corporations,	 food	 multinationals,	 big	 retailers,	 and	
																																								 																					60	F.	Mostaccio,	La	guerra	delle	arance,	Rubbettino,	Soveria	Mannelli,	2012.	61	A.	Corrado,	C.	De	Castro	&	D.	Perrotta,	Cheap	food,	cheap	labour…,cit.	62	Ibidem,	p.	8.	
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financial	protagonists)	aim	to	remove	trade	barriers,	transforming	significant	parts	of	the	world	into	huge	areas	of	free	trade63.			
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																									 																					63	S.	Liberti,	I	signori	del	cibo.	Viaggio	nell’industria	alimentare	che	sta	distruggendo	il	pianeta,	Minimum	Fax,	Roma,	2016.	
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2.5.	Agriculture	and	labor	migrations	in	Italy	
	 As	mentioned	in	the	previous	chapter,	mobility	continues	to	support	global	capitalism	in	important	aspects.	The	spatial	and	functional	fragmentation	of	the	 processes	 of	 production	 allowed	 capitalist	 industries	 to	 compare	 costs	and	capabilities	of	suppliers	on	a	global	scale	and	move	production	between	different	suppliers	and	countries	taking	advantage	of	cheap	labor	and	a	non-unionized	 workforce.	 In	 low	 wage	 industries	 that	 cannot	 move	 easily,	including	 industrial	 agriculture,	 food	 processing,	 extractive	 and	 service	industries,	 migrant	 workers	 have	 come	 to	 constitute	 a	 key	 segment	 of	 the	labor	force	insofar	as	some	low-wage	jobs	cannot	easily	be	exported64.	Hence,	outsourcing	 and	migration	 (i.e.	mobility	 of	 capital	 and	 labor)	 have	 become	two	 aspects	 of	 global	 restructuring	 and	 two	 fundamental	 ways	 used	 by	capital	to	increase	its	profits65.	In	southern	Europe	countries,	migrations	have	allowed	 the	restructuring	of	 the	 agricultural	 sector	 and	 ensured	 agri-food	 capital	 to	 increase	 its	profits66.	 After	 the	 Second	 World	 War,	 Italy	 started	 to	 also	 turn	 into	 an	immigration	 country.	 One	 of	 the	 first	 sectors	 of	 the	 Italian	 labor	 market	affected	by	the	presence	of	migrant	workers	was	agriculture.	The	emergence	of	migrations	in	Italy	coincides,	 in	fact,	with	the	restructuring	of	agriculture	production	and	with	the	transformation	of	agri-food	chains.		Within	Italian	agriculture,	migrations	began	in	Sicily	during	the	seventies	with	migrants	 arriving	 from	Tunisia	 and	 other	Maghreb	 countries.	 Then	 in	the	 eighties,	 migrants	 started	 to	 arrive	 from	 Sub	 Saharan	 Africa	 and	 later,	during	the	nineties,	from	Eastern	Europe67.	Only	since	the	early	2000s	did	the	agriculture	 sector	 begin	 to	 employ	 an	 increasing	 number	 of	 immigrant	
																																								 																					64	S.	Sassen,	The	Mobility	of	Labor	and	Capital,	cit.;	65	J.	Smith,	Imperialism	in	the	Twenty-First	Century,	cit;	66	Cfr.,	 C.	 Colloca,	 A.	 Corrado	 (eds.),	 La	 Globalizzazione	 delle	 campagne.	 Migranti	 e	 società	
rurali	nel	Sud	Italia,	Franco	Angeli,	Milano,	2013.		67	E.	 Pugliese,	 L’Italia	 fra	migrazioni	 internazionali	 e	migrazioni	 interne,	 il	Mulino,	 Bologna,	2006.		
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workers.	Their	presence	in	the	sector	has	been	steadily	growing	especially	in	the	last	two	decades68.	Following	 official	 statistics,	 in	 2015,	 foreign	 workers	 in	 the	 agriculture	sector	 were	 405,000:	 52%	 of	 them	 (211,000)	 were	 EU	 citizens	 (mainly	Romanian,	Polish,	and	Bulgarians)	and	48%	(194,000)	were	non-EU	citizens	(mainly	Indians,	Moroccans,	and	Albanians)69.		This	data	is	underestimated	because,	we	highlighted	by	the	National	Agrarian	Economy	Institute,	a	structural	component	of	the	Italian	agriculture	sector	is	the	 large	 use	 of	 irregular	 work.	 The	 estimates	 indicate	 the	 presence	 of	400,000	 irregular	 workers	 in	 Italian	 agriculture70 .	 This	 practice	 mainly	affects	 immigrant	 workers	 employed	 in	 the	 harvesting	 of	 tomatoes,	 fruit,	grapes,	 and	 olives,	 and	 it	 especially	 takes	 place	 in	 the	 southern	 Italy	countryside71.		The	 exploitation	 of	 labor,	 especially	 migrant	 labor,	 has	 been	 one	 of	 the	primary	 factors	 in	 the	 restructuring	 of	 the	 Italian	 agricultural	 sector	 in	 the	context	 of	 neoliberal	 globalization.	 As	 noted	 by	 Corrado,	 «the	 over-exploitation	of	migrant	labour	appears	to	be	one	of	the	strategies	employed	by	southern	European	farmers	in	resisting	the	liberalization	of	international	markets	and	the	retailer	driven	transformation	of	supply	chains»72.		As	mentioned	in	the	previous	section,	the	power	of	food	retail	chains	over	suppliers	 comes	 from	 their	 market	 food	 domination,	 from	 their	 role	 as	“gatekeepers”	 for	access	to	consumers,	and	from	the	growing	concentration	in	 the	 sector.	The	deterioration	of	working	 conditions	of	 farmhands	 can	be	considered	a	response	of	southern	European	farms	to	the	pressure	of	vertical	food	 chains	 and	 therefore	 the	 result	 of	 power	 and	 economic	 asymmetrical	relations	between	lead	firms	and	small	farms	included	in	their	supply	chain.																																									 																					68 	L.	 Pisacane,	 Lavoratori	 immigrati	 nell’agricoltura	 italiana:	 numeri	 e	 sfide	 verso	 una	
prospettiva	di	 integrazione,	 in	 C.	 Bonifazi	 (Eds.)	Migrazioni	e	 integrazioni	nell’Italia	di	oggi,	CNR-IRPPS,	Roma,	2017.	69	Crea,	Annuario	dell’agricoltura	italiana	2015,	Roma,	2017,	p.	165.	70	Cfr.	Agromafie	e	Caporalato,	Terzo	Rapporto,	Osservatorio	Placido	Rizzotto	(Eds.),	Ediesse,	Roma,	2016.	71	Inea	 (Istituto	 Nazionale	 di	 Economia	 Agraria),	 Gli	 immigrati	 nell’agricoltura	 italiana,	 M.	Cicerchia,	P.	Pallara	(Eds),	Roma,	2009.	72	A.	Corrado,	C.	De	Castro	&	D.	Perrotta,	Cheap	food,	cheap	labour…,cit.,	p.	10.	
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Within	 these	 farms,	 which	 carry	 out	 their	 activities	 during	 the	 periods	 of	“great	harvests”,	the	pricing	policy	imposed	by	buyers	is	reflected	on	a	great	demand	for	unskilled,	flexible,	precarious	and	cheap	labor.	In	southern	Italy,	this	demand	is	covered	by	migrant	workers	from	Africa	and	Eastern	Europe,	and	it	is	linked	to	the	“seasonal	circuits”73	of	the	agricultural	labor	force.	The	majority	 of	 these	 workers	 live	 in	 poor	 conditions	 within	 makeshift	 slums	built	by	workers	themselves	along	the	countryside.	The	system	of	hiring	day	laborers	is	managed	by	informal	intermediaries	called	Caporali,	and	the	farm	work	is	carried	out	 in	sweatshop	working	conditions:	bad	health	and	safety	conditions,	with	a	lack	of	labor,	social	and	human	rights74.	Typical	examples	are	the	Capitanata	(an	area	of	the	Puglia	region),	which	every	year	between	July	 and	 September	 attracts	 more	 than	 22,000	 farm	 hands	 for	 the	 tomato	harvesting	season75,	the	Plain	of	Sibari	and	Gioia	Tauro	(Calabria	region),	that	attracts	more	than	12,000	farm	hands	for	the	 fruit	harvesting	season	76,	 the	Plain	of	Sele77	for	 the	 rocket	and	 strawberry	harvesting	 season,	 the	Salento	area78	for	the	watermelon	harvesting	season,	etc.		The	 use	 of	 a	 cheap	 and	 flexible	 workforce,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 neoliberal	globalization,	 has	 been	 fundamental	 for	 the	 survival	 and	 for	 the	incorporation	of	small	farms	in	the	supply	chains	of	agro-food	industries	and	large	retailers.	Furthermore,	it	has	allowed	to	help	keep	labor	costs	low	and	to	 respond	 quickly	 to	 “just	 in	 time”	 demands	 of	 food	 retail	 chains	 and	processing	firms.																																									 																					73	MSF	 (Medici	 senza	 frontiere),	 I	 frutti	 dell’ipocrisia.	 Storie	 di	 chi	 l’agricoltura	 la	 fa.	 Di	
nascosto,	Sinnos,	Roma,	2005.	74	MSF	(Medici	senza	frontiere),	Una	stagione	all’inferno,	www.medicisenzafrontiere.it/,	2008;	L.	 Palmisano,	 I.	 Sagnet,	 Ghetto	 Italia.	 I	 braccianti	 stranieri	 tra	 caporalato	 e	 sfruttamento,	Fandango,	Roma,	2015.	75	Cfr.,	 A.	 Leogrande,	Uomini	 e	 caporali.	 Viaggio	 tra	 i	 nuovi	 schiavi	 nelle	 campagne	 del	 Sud,	Mondadori,	 Milano,	 2008;	 F.	 Fanizza,	 L’immigrazione	 nelle	 aree	 rurali	 della	 Puglia:	 il	 caso	
della	Capitanata,	in	C.	Colloca,	A.	Corrado	(Eds.),	La	Globalizzazione	delle	campagne…,	cit.	76	Cfr.,	 F.	Mostaccio,	La	guerra	delle	arance,	 cit;	A.	Corrado,	Territori	circolanti.	Migrazioni	e	
agricoltura	nella	piana	di	Sibari,	 in	 in	 C.	 Colloca,	 A.	 Corrado	 (eds.),	La	Globalizzazione	delle	
campagne…,	cit.	77	Cfr.,	G.	Avallone,	Sfruttamento	e	resistenze.	Migrazioni	e	agricoltura	in	Europa,	Italia,	Piana	
del	 Sele,	 Ombre	 Corte,	 Verona,	 2017;	 A.	 Botte,	Mannaggia	 la	 miserìa.	 Storie	 di	 braccianti	
stranieri	e	caporali	nella	Piana	del	Sele,	Roma,	Ediesse,	2009.	78 	Cfr.,	 Aa.Vv.,	 Sulla	 pelle	 viva.	 Nardò:	 la	 lotta	 autorganizzata	 dei	 braccianti	 immigrati,	DeriveApprodi,	Roma,	2012.	
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To	sum	up,	the	growing	power	of	retail	chains	and	their	price	policy	over	suppliers	 underpins	 the	 overexploitation	 of	migrant	workers	 and	 the	 large	use	of	illegal	intermediaries	in	Italy’s	agriculture	sector.	In	addition,	for	some	scholars	 the	 large	 use	 of	 cheap	 migrant	 workers	 in	 agriculture	 and	 their	segregation	 in	 this	 sector	 has	 been	 encouraged	 by	migration	 flows	 policies	managed	 by	 national	 and	 supranational	 governments.	 In	 fact,	 in	 southern	Italy,	centers	for	migrants	have	been	used	as	pools	of	cheap	labor79;	the	map	of	 these	 centers	 follows	 the	 geography	 of	 agriculture	 production	 and	 the	spatial	concentration	of	migrant	labor	forces80.			 What	 is	 the	 composition	 of	 the	 migration	 flows	 in	 Italy’s	 agriculture	sector?	Before	answering	this	question,	it	should	be	noted	that	Italian	agriculture,	as	underlined	by	Perrotta,	often	works	as	a	“clearing	house”	of	the	Italian	labor	market	in	so	far	as	agriculture	represents	a	space	where	excess	migrant	labor	forces	can	 find	precarious	shelter	 in	 times	of	economic	crises	while	waiting	for	better	job	opportunities81.	In	fact,	as	noted	by	Caruso	and	Corrado,	in	the	last	few	years,	southern	Italy	agriculture,	as	well	as	that	of	the	Spanish	one,	has	 seen	 a	 great	 increase	 of	migrant	 workers	 due	 to	 economic	 crises.	 The	crises	have	pushed	 the	migrant	 labor	 force	 towards	agriculture	by	 favoring	the	settlement	of	many	migrant	workers	in	this	sector82.	Nowadays,	the	Italian	countryside	is	crossed	by	heterogeneous	migrations	flows	in	terms	of	ethnicity,	migration	patterns	and	the	legal	status	of	migrant	workers.	 In	 the	 southern	 agricultural	 sector,	 most	 migrant	 workers	 come	
																																								 																					79	A.	 E.	 Castronovo,	Dentro	un	 limbo.	Marginalizzazione	 e	 resistenza	dei	 richiedenti	 asilo	del	
Cara	 di	 Mineo,	 in	 C.	 Benvegnù,	 F.	 E.	 Iannuzzi	 (Eds.)	 Figure	 del	 lavoro	 contemporaneo.	
Un’Inchiesta	sui	nuovi	regimi	della	produzione,	Ombre	Corte,	Verona,	2018.	80	G.	 Nigro,	 Lavori	 in	 corso.	 Pratiche	 e	 idee	 per	 la	 liberazione	 del	 lavoro	migrante,	 in	 Aa.Vv.	
Sulla	 pelle	 viva…,	 cit.;	 C.	 Colloca,	 A.	 Corrado,	 Trasformazioni	 meridionali:	 Migranti	 e	 aree	
rurali…,	cit.		81	D.	 Perrotta,	 Il	 lavoro	migrante	stagionale	nelle	campagne	 italiane,	 in	M.	 Colucci	 e	 S.	Gallo	(Eds.)	 L’arte	 di	 spostarsi.	 Rapporto	 2014	 sulle	 migrazioni	 interne	 in	 Italia,	 Donzelli,	 Roma,	2014.	82	F.	Caruso,	A.	Corrado,	Migrazioni	e	lavoro	agricolo:	un	confronto	tra	Italia	e	Spagna	in	tempi	
di	 crisi,	 in	 M.	 Colucci,	 S.	 Gallo	 (Eds.),	 Tempo	 di	 cambiare.	 Rapporto	 2015	 sulle	 migrazioni	
interne	in	Italia,	Donzelli,	Roma,	2015.	
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from	Africa	and	Eastern	Europe.	Following	Perrotta83,	in	relation	to	migrant	workers	 coming	 from	 Africa,	 we	 can	 identify	 three	 paths	 of	 migrants:	 1)	migrants	that	move	from	one	area	to	the	next	in	southern	Italy	in	relation	to	the	seasonal	labor	demand	of	the	important	harvests;	2)	migrants	that	leave	southern	 Italy	 after	 obtaining	 a	 legal	 status	 in	 order	 to	 travel	 to	 northern	Italy	to	work	in	a	factory;	3)	migrants	who	lose	their	jobs	in	northern	Italy	or	migrants	 on	 vacation	 that	 decide	 to	 work	 for	 a	 short	 period	 of	 time	 in	agriculture	 until	 the	 end	 of	 their	 holiday.	 In	 relation	 to	 migrant	 workers,	mainly	 Romanian	 and	 Bulgarian,	 from	 Eastern	 Europe,	 we	 can	 identify	workers	that	live	and	work	steadily	all	year	round	in	the	Italian	agricultural	sector	and	workers	who	 live	steadily	 in	 their	 country	or	 in	other	European	countries,	 moving	 to	 rural	 areas	 of	 Italy	 or	 to	 other	 southern	 European	countries	during	the	period	of	important	harvests.		Regarding	 intra-European	 migrations,	 as	 noted	 by	 Andrjiasevic	 and	Sacchetto,	they	can	no	longer	be	considered	a	linear	movement	between	two	countries	 (from	 a	 home	 country	 towards	 a	 destination	 country)	 or	 as	 a	circular	 flow	(from	a	born	country	 towards	a	destination	country	and	vice-versa)	 but	 need	 to	 be	 considered	 multidirectional	 flows	 linked	 to	 labor	market	policies;	intra-European	mobility,	in	fact,	is	on	the	rise	within	an	open	but	 stratified	 labor	 market	 that	 is	 used	 by	 migrants	 to	 their	 advantage	 in	order	to	improve	their	working	and	living	conditions84.	As	highlighted	by	Rigo	and	Dines,	nowadays	 the	work	 in	 the	agricultural	sector	 is	 increasingly	 viewed	 by	 migrants	 no	 longer	 as	 temporary	employment	 but	 as	 long-term	 employment,	 even	 if	 seasonal	 and	 cyclical85.	Until	 a	 few	 years	 ago,	 several	 research	 studies	 showed	 how	 most	 of	 the	migrant	 workers	 in	 the	 agriculture	 sector	 were	 illegal	 both	 in	 terms	 of																																									 																					83 	D.	 Perrotta,	 Il	 lavoro	 migrante	 stagionale	 nelle	 campagne	 italiane,	 cit.;	 D.	 Perrotta,	
Traiettorie	migratorie	nei	territori	del	pomodoro.	Rumeni	e	burkinabé	in	Puglia	e	Basilicata,	in	C.	Colloca,	A.	Corrado	(Eds.),	La	Globalizzazione	delle	campagne,	cit.,	pp.118-140.	84 	R.	 Andrjiasevic,	 D.	 Sacchetto,	 Il	 lavoratore	 multinazionale	 in	 Europa.	 Costrizioni	 e	
mobilitazioni,	 in	 S.	 Chignola,	D.	 Sacchetto	 (Eds.),	Le	reti	del	valore.	Migrazioni,	produzione	e	
governo	della	crisi,	DeriveApprodi,	Roma,	2017,	pp.	12-30.	85	E.	 Rigo,	 N.	 Dines,	 Lo	 sfruttamento	 umanitario	 del	 lavoro.	 Ipotesi	 di	 riflessione	 e	 ricerca	 a	
partire	dal	caso	delle	campagne	del	Mezzogiorno,	in	S.	Chignola,	D.	Sacchetto	(Eds.),	Le	reti	del	
valore,	cit.,	pp.	90-107.	
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residence	permits	and	employment	status.	At	present,	in	almost	every	Italian	region,	 the	majority	of	workers	 in	 the	agriculture	 sector	originate	 from	 the	European	 Union86 ,	 mainly	 from	 Romania,	 Poland,	 and	 Bulgaria.	 Extra-European	 immigrant	 workers	 come	 mainly	 from	 India,	 Morocco,	 and	Albania87.	 Immigrant	 workers	 from	 Africa	 are	 mainly	 from	 sub-Saharan	Africa,	albeit	 to	a	 lesser	extent	 than	 in	 the	past,	and	are	still	present	within	the	 Italian	 agriculture	 sector,	 especially	 in	 the	 south:	 most	 are	 asylum-seekers	and	others	have	subsidiary	or	humanitarian	protection88.		Even	 though	 a	 part	 of	 immigrant	 farmworkers	 in	 the	 Italian	 agriculture	sector	 has	 a	 residence	 permit 89 	and	 an	 employment	 contract,	 these	conditions	are	often	not	enough	to	protect	them	from	abuse	and	exploitation.	As	 has	 been	 shown	 by	 the	 NGO	 MEDU	 through	 a	 research	 carried	 out	 in	southern	Italy,	«to	have	an	employment	contract	is	no	guarantee	of	equal	and	right	employment	relation»	for	many	workers90.	The	 working	 conditions	 of	 farmhands	 are	 extremely	 rigid	 especially	 in	southern	 Italy,	 in	 the	areas	 as	Campania,	Puglia,	Calabria,	 and	Basilicata.	 In	these	 areas,	 low	 wages	 and	 exploitation	 are	 commonplace91.	 In	 terms	 of	working	 and	 living	 conditions,	 the	 most	 vulnerable	 workers	 are	 extra-European	migrants,	 especially	 Sub-Saharan	Africans.	Minimum	wages,	 both	with	and	without	contracts,	are	less	than	those	set	by	national	and	provincial	collective	contracts	of	employment.	The	salary	does	not	exceed	40	euros	and	depends	on	 the	 type	of	product	harvested	and	on	 the	migrant’s	nationality:	30	 to	35	euros	 for	Eastern	Europe	migrants	and	20	 to	25	euros	 for	African	migrants92.																																										 																					86	Inea	 (Istituto	 Nazionale	 di	 Economia	 Agraria),	 Indagine	 sull’impiego	 degli	 immigrati	 in	
agricoltura	in	Italia,	Roma,	2014.	87	Fondazione	Fai-Cisl	Studi	e	Ricerche,	Lavoratori	immigrati	in	agricoltura,	Quaderni.1,	2017.	88	A.	Barbieri,	G.	A.	Bari,	M.	Pesca,	Medu,	Terraingiusta:	 indagine	sulle	condizioni	di	vita	e	di	
lavoro	 dei	 braccianti	 stranieri	 in	 agricoltura,	 Dossier	 Statistico	 Immigrazione	 2015,	 Centro	Studi	e	Ricerche	IDOS,	Edizioni	Idos,	Roma,	2015,	pp.	281-286.	89	Ibidem,	p.	283.	90	MEDU	(Medical	Doctors	for	Human	Rights),	TerraIngiusta.	Rapporto	sulle	condizioni	di	vita	
e	di	lavoro	dei	braccianti	stranieri	in	agricoltura,	2015,	p.	86.	91	L.	 Zanfrini,	 Tra	 terra	 e	 cibo.	 Il	 lavoro	 immigrato	 nella	 filiera	 alimentare,	 in	 Caritas	 e	Migrantes,	XXIV	Rapporto	Immigrazione	2014,	p.	336.	92	A.	 Corrado,	 D.	 Perrotta,	 Migranti	 che	 contano.	 Percorsi	 di	 mobilità	 e	 di	 confinamenti	
nell’agricoltura	del	Sud	Italia,	in	“Mondi	Migranti”		3/2012,	pp.	103-128.	
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Regarding	these	conditions,	there	is	a	need	for	farmers	to	control	the	risks	of	a	production	system	characterized	by	increasing	international	competition	and	is	deeply	connected	to	the	pricing	policy	of	big	buyers	such	as	food	retail	chains.	 As	 highlighted	 by	 Corrado	 «the	 liberalization	 of	 the	 agricultural	market	 and	 therefore	 exposure	 to	 international	 competition,	 and	 the	restraints	 and	 pressures	 upstream	 and	 downstream	 in	 the	 production	process	imply	that	the	only	variable	able	to	be	adjusted	by	the	farmer	is	the	cost	of	 labor»93.	The	need	to	keep	 labor	costs	 low	and	meet	 the	 last	minute	demand	force	farmers	to	use	informal	labor	contractors	and	piecework	pay.	Most	of	the	workers	are	paid	for	each	filled	basket/crate.	The	pay	is	between	3.50	to	5.00	euros	for	each	filled	basket/crate.	Workers	also	have	to	pay	the	labor	contractor	5	euros	per	day	for	the	transportation	cost	and	0.50	cent	for	each	filled	basket/crate.	By	piecework	pay,	the	salary	of	the	farmhands	may	vary	 from	25	euros	 to	80	euros	per	day	according	 to	 the	production	 speed	and	day	labor	demand94.		As	 highlighted	 by	 Rigo	 and	 Dines,	 regarding	 claims	 of	 workers	 that	 are	now,	 although	 cyclically,	 a	 structural	 and	 stable	 component	 of	 agricultural	labor	 forces,	 firms	and	governments	are	not	responding	by	social	and	 labor	policies	 but	 through	 emergency	 measures,	 treating	 these	 workers	 in	 the	same	way	as	refugees95.	Changes	 within	 the	 global	 food	 chains	 over	 recent	 decades	 have	 had	 a	significant	 impact	 on	 the	 demand	 and	 deployment	 of	 informal	 workers	 in	many	countries.	The	massive	employment	of	a	casual	immigrant	labor	force	provides	flexibility	to	the	farmers	in	order	to	easily	satisfy	buyers’	orders	at	a	low	 labor	cost.	Furthermore,	 the	 large	use	of	 immigrant	 labor	enables	 local	agriculture	systems	to	implement	what	Colloca	and	Corrado	call	“outsourcing	in	place”96.		To	sum	up,	the	change	of	 food	regimes,	the	reorganization	of	global	agri-																																								 																					93	A.	 Corrado,	 Clandestini	 in	 the	 Orange	 Towns,	 Race/Ethnicity:	 Multidisciplinary	 Global	Contexts,	 Vol.	 4,	 No.	 2,	 Reworking	 Race	 and	 Labor	 (Winter	 2011),	 pp.	 191-201,	 Indiana	University	Press,	2011,	p.	196.		94	Cfr.	Agromafie	e	Caporalato,	cit.	95	Cfr.,	E.	Rigo,	N.	Dines,	Lo	sfruttamento	umanitario	del	lavoro,	cit.	96	C.	Colloca,	A.	Corrado,	Trasformazioni	meridionali,	cit.	
	 60	
food	 systems,	 the	 rise	 of	 international	 competition,	 the	 incorporation	 of	small-farms	in	global	agri-food	supply	chains,	the	fluctuations	and	changes	in	consumer	demand	and	the	growing	power	of	food	retail	chains	are	all	factors	to	take	into	account	in	order	to	understand	the	working	of	agriculture	sector	and	 the	 way	 by	 which	 the	 agriculture	 labor	 force	 and	 labor	 market	 are	managed.			
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III	Chapter		
The	tomato	value	chain			 The	 aim	 of	 this	 chapter	 is	 to	 demonstrate	 how	 European	 retailers,	controlling	 the	 market	 and	 the	 distribution	 of	 processed	 tomato,	 actually	control	 this	 commodity	 chain.	 The	 control	 of	 the	 chain	 is	 not	 exercised	directly	 through	ownership	but	 indirectly	 through	governance:	 specification	of	the	product,	quality	standard	delivery	dates	and,	above	all,	quantities	and	price.	 The	 focus	 will	 be	 on	 the	 Southern	 District,	 where	 the	 majority	 of	processing	 companies	 that	 supply	 European	 large	 retailers	 through	private	
labels	is	concentrated.		
	
3.1.	The	rings	of	the	tomato	supply	chain	
		 Italy	is	the	world’s	third	largest	producer	of	industrial	tomatoes	after	the	U.S.	and	China	and	the	largest	producer	in	Europe.	Tomato	production	is	the	strength	of	the	Italian	agro-food	system.	The	turnover	is	3	billion	euros	on	a	yearly	basis1.	The	Italian	tomato	is	grown	on	70.000	hectares:	30.000	of	these	are	 located	 in	 the	 Southern	 district	 (mainly	 in	 the	 provinces	 of	 Foggia,	Caserta,	 and	 Potenza),	 40.000	 in	 the	 northern	 district	 (mainly	 in	 the	provinces	 of	 Parma,	 Piacenza,	 and	 Ferrara)2.	 There	 are	 four	 main	 tomato	products:	Peeled	whole	tomatoes	(mainly	exported),	Pulp	(diced	or	crushed),	Sauce	and	Concentrate/Paste.			 As	reported	by	the	National	Canneries	Association	(ANICAV),	the	value	of	export	 of	 Italian	 tomatoes	 is	 1.6	 billion.	 Sixty	 percent	 of	 the	 production	 is	absorbed	 by	 foreign	 markets	 such	 as	 Germany,	 UK,	 France,	 USA,	 Japan,	Russia,	 and	 only	 forty	 percent	 by	 the	 domestic	market3.	 Furthermore,	 Italy	holds	the	first	position	in	the	ranking	of	global	suppliers	of	tomato	paste	and																																									 																					1	www.anicav.it	2	F.	Ciconte,	S.	Liberti	 (Eds.),	Spolpati.	La	crisi	dell’industria	del	pomodoro	tra	sfruttamento	e	
insostenibilità,	Terzo	rapporto	della	campagna	#Filiera	Sporca,	2017.	3	http://www.anicav.it/news/2017/3/21/464	
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concentrate	(26%),	followed	closely	by	China	(25%)	and	the	U.S.	(12%)4.	What	 is	 the	 structure	 and	 what	 are	 the	 mechanisms	 that	 regulate	 the	functioning	of	the	Italian	tomato	supply	chain?			 Retailers,	 especially	 European,	 purchase	 tomato	 products	 from	 Italian	suppliers.	 These	 suppliers	 are	 processing	 companies	 that	 transform	 fresh	tomatoes	 into	 products	 such	 as	 peeled	 tomatoes,	 pulp,	 sauce,	 and	concentrate.	The	processing	companies	buy	 tomatoes	 from	organizations	of	agricultural	producers	(OPs).	The	OPs	are	supplied	from	several	 farms	both	large	and	small.	The	price	of	tomatoes	is	fixed	by	industry	organizations	and	OPs	 once	 per	 year,	 but	 can	 be	 modified	 later	 on	 according	 to	 yield	 and	quality.	 In	2018,	the	average	contract	price	in	the	South	is	87	euros	per	ton	for	round	tomatoes	and	97	euros	per	ton	for	oblong	tomatoes	(only	grown	in	the	South)5.	In	the	North,	the	average	contract	price	is	79.75	euros	per	ton6.		
Processing	companies			 The	production	of	tomatoes	is	located	both	in	Northern	and	Southern	Italy	with	many	differences	between	the	two	areas.			 According	to	the	national	agency	for	the	disbursements	in	the	agriculture	sector,	in	2010,	75%	of	the	Italian	processing	companies	were	located	in	the	South,	 mainly	 in	 the	 Campania	 Region,	 19%	 in	 the	 North,	 mainly	 in	 the	Emilia-Romagna	 region,	 and	 only	 6%	 in	 Central	 Italy7.	 The	 same	 spatial	concentration	 is	 noted	 by	 Ismea,	 according	 to	which	 in	 2016	 there	 are	 21	processing	 companies	 in	 the	 Northern	 district	 (these	 represent	 95%	 of	tomatoes	 processed	 in	 the	 area)	 and	 70	 processing	 companies	 in	 the	Southern	district	(these	represent	95%	of	tomatoes	processed	in	this	area)8.		 In	 the	 northern	 district	 (Parma,	 Piacenza,	 and	 Ferrara)	 production	 is																																									 																					4	Ismea,	I	numeri	della	filiera	del	pomodoro	da	industria,	Roma,	2017.	5 www.agrisole.ilsole24ore.com/art/filiere/2018-05-15/siglato-accordo-2018-il-pomodoro-industria-bacino-centro-sud-165029.php?uuid=AE6ApmoE	6 https://agronotizie.imagelinenetwork.com/vivaismo-e-sementi/2018/02/13/pomodoro-da-industria-c-e-l-accordo-per-la-campagna-2018/57500	7 https://www.agea.gov.it/portal/page/portal/AGEAPageGroup/HomeOLDAGEA/01DX_AIUTIDOMANDAUNICA/09_PrugnePeschePerePomodori/05_ElencoImpreseTrasformatriciRiconosciute/Elencopomodoro200910.pdf	8	Ismea,	I	numeri	della	filiera	del	pomodoro	da	industria,	Roma,	2017	
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focused	on	 tomato	 concentrate	 (39.3%),	 pulp	 (35%),	 sauce	 (27.3%).	 In	 the	southern	 district	 (Salerno	 and	 Naples)	 production	 is	 focused	 on	 the	 San	
Marzano	 variety	 and	 peeled	 tomatoes	 (44%),	 pulp	 and	 sauce	 (48%),	 and	tomato	concentrate	(8%)9.			 The	main	 difference	 between	 these	 two	 production	 areas	 relates	 to	 the	distance	 between	 the	 farms	 and	 canneries:	 whereas	 in	 northern	 Italy	 the	production	 and	 processing	 take	 place	 in	 the	 same	 area	 (a	 short	 distance	away),	in	southern	Italy	the	processing	takes	place	mainly	in	the	provinces	of	Salerno,	 Naples	 as	well	 as	 in	 the	 province	 of	 Foggia	 (200	 km	 away),	 to	 be	exact,	in	Capitanata	(Puglia	region)	and	Potenza	(Basilicata	region)10.			 As	reported	by	Anselmo	Botte,	a	farmer	trade	unionist	of	the	province	of	Salerno:		 At	 the	 origin	 of	 this	 distance	 between	 farms	 and	 canneries	 is	 the	relocation	 of	 production	 from	 Campania	 to	 Capitanata	 during	 the	1980s	 due	 to	 a	 virus	 called	mosaico	 del	 cetriolo	 (CMV).	 Since	 the	beginning	 of	 the	 nineties,	 the	 tomato	 chain	 in	 southern	 Italy	 has	become	 longer	 and	 more	 fragmented	 (Interview	 with	 Anselmo	Botte).		 	Other	causes,	as	noted	by	Perrotta,	such	us	the	urbanization	of	the	province	of	 Salerno,	 and	 the	 need	 for	 more	 fertile	 and	 bigger	 plots	 of	 land	 has	contributed	to	this	relocation11.			
Producers	Organizations	(POs)		 The	 role	 of	 the	 organizations	 of	 producers	 is	 to	 plan	 the	 production	 for	their	 associates	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 quantity	 and	 quality.	 Furthermore,	 they	assist	farms	in	creating	innovation,	oppose	the	asymmetries	of	power	within																																									 																					9	Ibidem.	10	Cfr.	 D.	 Perrotta,	 Processing	 tomatoes	 in	 the	 era	 of	 the	 retailing	 revolution.	Mechanization	
and	migrant	 labor	 in	northern	and	 southern	 Italy,	 in	 Alessandra	 Corrado,	 Carlos	 de	 Castro,	Domenico	 Perrotta	 (Eds.),	 Migration	 and	 agriculture.	 Mobility	 and	 change	 in	 the	
Mediterranean	Area,	London,	Routledge,	2016,	pp.	58-75.	11	Ibidem.		
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the	agri-food	chain	and	boost	competitiveness.	They	heavily	control	relations	between	 farmers	 and	 processing	 companies	 insofar	 as	 they	 sell	 and	 bill	processing	companies	for	tomatoes	on	behalf	of	farmers.			 In	 the	 northern	 district	 there	 are	 16	 POs:	 Afe,	 Ainpo,	 Apo	 Conerpo,	Apofruit,	 Apol,	 Asipo,	 Asport,	 Cia,	 Cico,	 Cio,	 Apoe,	 Minguzzi,	 OP	 Ferrara,	Pempacorer,	 Poa,	 and	Casalasco.	 In	 the	 southern	district,	 instead,	 there	 are	more	 than	 30	 POs 12 ;	 some	 of	 them	 are:	 APO	 Foggia,	 Aspo	 Frutta,	Mediterraneo,	 Futuragri,	 Paco,	 Apom,	 Conapo,	 APOD,	 P.O.A.,	 Assodaunia,	Fimagri,	Geafruit,	La	Palma,	Caccavelli,	etc.		 As	we	will	see	further	on,	the	role	of	these	organizations	has	been	much	in	debate,	 especially	 in	 the	 southern	 district,	 for	 they	 operate	 as	 traders	searching	 to	 achieve	 benefits	 for	 them	 rather	 than	 the	 advantages	 for	producers.			
Farms		 According	 to	 national	 statistical	 data	 of	 2017,	 Italy	 has	 produced	 more	than	5	million	tons	of	 industrial	 tomatoes.	The	total	cultivated	 land	 is	more	than	70.000	hectares	mainly	located	in	the	South	and	the	North	(See	Tab	1.).	The	average	size	farm	is	5.5	hectares	per	farm	in	the	South	and	19	hectares	per	farm	in	the	North13.											
																																								 																					12	Ismea,	I	numeri	della	filiera	del	pomodoro	da	industria,	Roma,	2017.	13	Ismea,	I	numeri	della	filiera…,	cit.	
	 65	
Tab.	1	Production	and	cultivated	land	of	Italian	industrial	tomatoes	
(Year	2017)	
		 Total	production	-	Quintals	 Total	land	-	Hectares	
North		 26.070.693	 35.919	
Center	 2.396.149	 4.386	
South		 24.075.139	 35.233	
Italy	 52.541.981	 75.538	
Source:	Author’s	results	on	agri.istat.it			 The	 main	 areas	 of	 industrial	 tomato	 production	 are	 Puglia	 (17.146.500	quintals	in	2017)	and	Emilia	Romagna	(18.479.800	quintals	in	2017).	These	two	regions	produced	the	largest	proportion	of	industrial	tomatoes	in	Europe	and	together	account	for	about	70%	of	Italy’s	production	(see	Tab.	2)14.																	
																																								 																					14	Authors’	results	on	agri.istat.it	
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Tab.	2	Production	and	cultivated	land	of	industrial	tomatoes	in	Emilia	
Romagna	and	Puglia	(Year	2017)	
		 Total	production	-	Quintals	 Total	land	-	Hectares	
Emilia-Romagna	 18.479.800	 24.834	
Piacenza	 8.000.000	 10.100	
Parma	 2.895.400	 4.666	Reggio	nell'Emilia	 552.000	 850	Modena	 646.000	 760	Bologna	 222.600	 305	
Ferrara	 4.702.060	 6.380	
Ravenna	 1.382.640	 1.646	Forlì-Cesena	 65.600	 82	Rimini	 13.500	 45			 		 		
Puglia	 17.146.500	 19.170	
Foggia	 16.150.000	 17.000	Bari	 30.000	 100	Taranto	 202.500	 450	Brindisi	 380.000	 1.000	Lecce	 304.000	 380	Barletta-Andria-Trani	 80.000	 240	Source:	Author’s	results	on	agri.istat.it	 			 In	 the	 Puglia	 region,	 the	 production	 is	 concentrated	 in	 the	 province	 of	Foggia:	 94%	 of	 all	 the	 region’s	 production	 and	 30.7%	 of	 all	 of	 Italy’s	production	 comes	 from	 this	 province.	 In	 the	 Emilia	 Romagna	 region,	 it	accounts	 for	 about	 35%	 of	 Italy’s	 production.	 The	 production	 is	 mainly	located	 in	 the	 provinces	 of	 Piacenza,	 Ferrara,	 and	 Parma	 that	 represent,	respectively,	43%,	25%	and	16%	of	all	of	the	region’s	production15.			 According	 to	 the	 National	 Census	 of	 Agriculture	 (2010),	 in	 the	 Puglia																																									 																					15	Author’s	results	on	agri.istat.it	
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region,	 there	 are	20,603.49	hectares	 of	 cultivated	 land	 and	2,354	 farms	 for	the	 production	 of	 industrial	 tomatoes.	 The	majority	 of	 these	 farms	 (1,901)	are	located	in	the	province	of	Foggia.	In	the	Emilia	Romagna	region,	there	are	26,707.58	 hectares	 of	 cultivated	 land	 for	 the	 production	 of	 industrial	tomatoes	 and	 1,591	 farms:	 439	 in	 the	 province	 of	 Piacenza,	 256	 in	 Parma,	383	 in	 Ferrara	 and	 114	 in	 the	 province	 of	 Modena.	 While	 in	 the	 Emilia	Romagna	 region	 the	 average	 size	 farm	 is	 16.78	 hectares	 per	 farm,	 in	 the	Puglia	region	it	is	8.75	hectares16.			 The	 structure	 of	 property	 in	 the	 south	 is,	 therefore,	 more	 fragmented.	Furthermore,	 the	sector	seems	 to	be	 less	mechanized	 than	 that	of	northern	Italy	because	the	harvesting	of	tomatoes	is	mainly	carried	out	manually.				
Markets	and	Buyers		 As	 previously	 mentioned,	 foreign	 markets	 absorb	 sixty	 percent	 of	 the	Italian	 industrial	 tomato	 production.	 The	 major	 world	 markets	 of	 Italian	tomatoes	 are	 Europe	 (63%	 of	 total	 export),	 America	 (10%	 of	 total	 export)	and	Asia	(10%	of	total	export)17.		 According	 to	 international	 trade	 statistics,	 in	 2017	 the	 most	 important	foreign	 markets	 remained	 Germany	 (18%),	 UK	 (16%),	 France	 (8%),	 USA	(6%)	and	Japan	(5%)	(see	figure	1).										
																																									 																					16	Author’s	results	on	http://dati-censimentoagricoltura.istat.it/Index.aspx	17	Author’s	results	on	International	trade	statistics.	
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Figure	1.	Share	in	value	of	Italy’s	exports	in	2017	(%)	Product:	2002	Tomatoes,	prepared	or	preserved	
	Sources:	Author’s	results	on	Trade	Map	-	International	Trade	Statistics		From	2010	to	2017,	 Italy	has	exported	almost	two	million	tons	of	 tomatoes	per	 year.	 The	 quantity	 of	 Italian	 tomatoes	 purchased	 every	 year	 by	 major	global	buyers	has	remained	stable	over	the	years	(See	Figure	2).				
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Figure	 2.	 Exported	 quantity	 of	 Italian	 Tomatoes,	 Tons	 (Years	 2010	 to	
2017)	Product:	2002	Tomatoes,	prepared	or	preserved		
	Sources:	Author’s	results	on	Trade	Map	-	International	Trade	Statistics			 Italy	 is	 the	 first	 supplier	 of	 industrial	 tomatoes	 for	 many	 countries,	especially	 for	 European	 countries.	 In	 2017,	 65%	 of	 tomatoes	 imported	 by	Germany,	 almost	 400,000	 tons,	 originated	 from	 Italy.	 After	 Germany,	 the	main	 importers	 of	 Italian	 industrial	 tomatoes	 are	 France	 and	 the	 United	Kingdom.	 In	 these	countries,	61%	and	54%	of	 imported	 tomatoes	originate	from	Italy	(see	Figure	3).		 The	main	buyers	of	Italian	industrial	tomatoes	are	large	food	retail	chains.	With	the	decline	of	traditional	grocery	stores,	 these	chains,	along	with	their	huge	 purchasing	 power,	 control	 the	 commodity’s	market	 and	 sales.	 	 As	we	will	 see	 further	 on,	 their	 power	 to	 set	 prices,	 production	 standards	 and	conditions	of	supply	have	resulted	in	a	race	to	the	bottom.	The	reductions	of	the	 prices	 of	 this	 product	 mainly	 affect	 farm	 workers	 involved	 in	 tomato	harvesting.	
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Figure	3.	Share	of	tomato	products	imported	from	Italy	(%)	(Year	2017)	Product:	2002	Tomatoes,	prepared	or	preserved	
	
	Sources:	Author’s	results	on	Trade	Map	-	International	Trade	Statistics		
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3.2.	 Italian	 processing	 of	 tomatoes	 as	 a	 buyer-driven	 chain:	
findings	from	Southern	Italy	district	
		 In	2003,	Pritchard	and	Burch	argued	that	the	European	tomato	processing	sector	 did	 not	 represent	 an	 example	 of	 a	 buyer-driven	 chain18.	 In	 2016,	Perrotta	highlighted	how	the	Italian	tomato	production	chain	has	responded	to	retail	power	and	has	become	retailer-driven.	Indeed,	whereas	in	past	the	opponents	of	farmers	used	to	be	processors,	now	the	bargaining	power	is	no	longer	in	the	hands	of	the	canneries	but	in	those	of	retailers19.	As	reported	by	one	of	 the	 founders	of	 the	 tomato	processing	district	of	Northern	 Italy	«the	power	 dynamic	 within	 the	 different	 phases	 of	 production	 has	 changed	radically	 in	 Italy	 since	 the	 early	 1990s,	 with	 the	 development	 of	 modern	distribution.	In	the	rest	of	Europe	and	the	western	world,	the	dynamics	of	the	retail	market	were	far	more	advanced.	In	the	early	1990s,	when	we	changed	our	legislation,	we	began	to	see	shopping	small	and	large	retail	chains	spring	up	 and	 increase	 their	 share	 in	 the	 market	 as	 well	 as	 their	 negotiating	power»20.		 The	transformation	of	Italian	tomato	processing	in	a	retailer-driven	chain	is	 indicated	by	the	massive	presence,	especially	 in	 the	southern	district,	of	a	large	number	of	processing	companies	that	produce	for	the	market	of	private	
labels.	We	can	define	private	labels	as	«products	that	are	developed,	branded	and	marketed	by	retailers	rather	than	food	manufacturers.	Retailers	develop	and	sell	private	label	products	in	order	to	make	their	retail	proposition	more	attractive	to	consumers	by	enhancing	product	choice	and	value	for	money»21.		 As	reported	by	the	general	manager	of	the	National	Canneries	Association,	it	 is	 predominantly	 the	 southern	 district	 that	 is	 included	 in	 this	 market	segment:																																										 																					18 B.	 Pritchard	 and	 D.	 Burch.	 Agri-Food	 Globalization	 in	 Perspective:	 International	
Restructuring	in	the	Processing	Tomato	Industry.	Aldershot,	Hants,	England:	Ashgate,	2003.	19	D.	Perrotta,	Processing	tomatoes	in	the	era	of	the	retailing	revolution…,	cit. 20	Ibidem,	p.	12-13.	21	LEI,	Wageningen	 UR,	The	 impact	of	private	 labels	on	 the	 competitiveness	of	 the	European	
food	supply	chain,	European	Union,	2011,	p.	35.		
	 72	
	 As	 you	 may	 know,	 the	 total	 turnover	 for	 Italian	 tomatoes	 is	 more	than	3	billion	euros	on	a	yearly	basis	with	foreign	markets	absorbing	60%	 of	 the	 production.	 The	 southern	 district,	 in	 particular,	specializing	 in	 the	 peeled	 tomato	 production,	 holds	 the	 most	important	role	in	exporting.	Here,	70%	of	the	production	is	exported:	Europe,	 America,	 Australia,	 and	 Japan.	 Our	 suppliers	 are	 all	 Italian	because	 tomatoes	 need	 to	 be	 processed	 within	 24	 hours	 of	harvesting.	 In	 the	 southern	 district,	 90%	 of	 the	 processing	companies	are	concentrated	in	the	provinces	of	Naples	and	Salerno,	named	Agro	nocerino-sarnese.	The	processing	industry	in	these	two	provinces	 has	 a	 turnover	 of	 1.5	 billion	 euros.	 More	 than	 1	 billion	originates	 from	 the	 exports.	 More	 than	 one-third	 of	 the	 economic	activities	 of	 the	 ports	 of	 Naples	 and	 Salerno	 is	 due	 to	 the	 cannery	industry	of	Agro	nocerino-sarnese.	Every	year	 in	 this	 area	3	billion	cans	are	 filled	and	375,000	km	of	 labels	are	printed.	 If	one	were	 to	line	up	3	billion	of	 the	 cans,	one	after	 the	other,	 it	would	 circle	 the	earth	at	least	seven	times	over.	The	canned	industry	in	the	Campania	region	employs	over	12,000	seasonal	workers	and	3,000	permanent	workers.	A	company	that	produces	50,000	tons	of	tomatoes	per	year,	for	 example,	 employs	 100	 seasonal	 workers	 and	 has	 an	 average	turnover	of	5	million	euros.		In	 the	 Agro	 nocerino-sarnese,	 there	 are	 70	 processing	 companies.	Most	of	 them	are	 small	 companies.	80%	of	 tomatoes	are	processed	by	20	companies	and	the	remaining	20%	by	50	companies.	Five	large	companies	 such	 as	 Doria	 Spa	 (owner	 of	 three	 factories),	 Giaguaro	(owner	 of	 two	 factories),	 Attianese	 (owner	 of	 two	 factories),	 etc.,	produce	 almost	 200,000	 tons	 of	 tomatoes	 per	 year;	 twelve	companies	produce	between	50,000	to	100,000	tons	of	tomatoes	per	year;	 almost	 sixty	 companies	 produce	 less	 than	 50,000	 tons	 of	tomatoes	 per	 year.	 The	 major	 buyers	 of	 processed	 tomatoes	 are	catering	 to	 the	 industry	 and	 food	 retail	 sectors.	 The	 companies	 in	this	 area	 that	 actually	own	brands	are	very	 few.	More	 than	80%	of	the	 tomato	 production	 of	 the	 Agro	 nocerino-sarnese	 is	 for	 private	
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labels	 of	 food	 retailers.	 The	 food	 retail	 sector	 represents	 the	main	buyer	of	tomatoes	transformed	in	this	area,	especially	since	they	are	destined	 for	 abroad.	More	 than	 70%	 of	 the	 exports	 are	 for	 private	labels	of	big	 food	retail	chains	such	as	Tesco,	Sainsbury’s,	Lidl,	Aldi,	etc.	 94%	 of	 tomatoes	 processed	 by	 Doria	 Spa,	 for	 example,	 is	 for	private	 labels.	 If	 one	 visits	 a	 UK	 supermarket	 to	 buy	 a	 can	 of	tomatoes	the	label	will	indicate	that	it	had	been	produced	in	Italy	by	Doria	 Spa	 for	 Tesco	 or	 Sainsbury’s	 (Interview	 with	 the	 general	manager	of	Anicav).		 	Therefore,	 food	 retail	 chains	 only	 provide	 brands	 and	 a	 market	 to	 the	tomatoes	 they	 purchase	 from	 Italian	 suppliers.	 Doria	 Spa,	 one	 of	 the	most	important	companies	of	the	Southern	district	and	the	first	Italian	producer	of	baked	beans,	is,	in	fact,	the	first	company	in	the	British	private	label	tomato	market22.	 94.8%	 of	 the	 turnover	 of	 this	 company	 comes	 from	 the	 private	labels	market23.		 The	European	Union	is	the	world’s	 leading	region	in	terms	of	the	private	labels	share	of	the	food	market.	As	highlighted	by	Corrado	et	al.,	«thanks	to	private	 labels,	 retailers	 have	 been	 able	 to	 impose	 their	 own	 standards	 on	suppliers,	covering	a	wide	range	of	aspects	such	as	quantity,	quality,	prices,	food	 safety,	 environmental	 protection,	 packaging,	 as	well	 as	 the	 logistics	 of	delivering	 products,	 and	 in	 doing	 so	 have	 gained	 a	 further	 competitive	advantage	on	other	companies,	such	as	processors»24.		As	 noted	 by	 Burch	 and	 Lawrence,	 the	 development	 and	 the	 spread	 of	private	labels	has	resulted	in	increasing	competition	between	supermarkets’	own	brands	and	the	branded	products	of	food	companies25.			 The	 growing	 significance	 of	 private	 labels	 and	 the	 increasing	 amount	 of	shelf	 space	 that	 they	 command	within	 supermarkets	 signifies	 that	 there	 is	less	 shelf	 space	 available	 for	 branded	 products	 of	 food	 manufacturing																																									 																					22	Cfr.	 L.	 Brancaccio,	 L'oro	Rosso.	 Potenzialità	 e	 Limiti	Del	Distretto	Del	 Pomodoro	Dell'Agro	
Nocerino	Sarnese,	in	Meridiana,	no.	84,	2015,	pp.	41–66,	p.	65.	23	http://www.gruppoladoria.it/IT/investor-relations/financial-highlights.xhtml	24	A.	Corrado	et	al.,	Cheap	food,	cheap	labour,	high	profits…,	cit.,	p.	9.	25	D.	Burch,	G.	Lawrence,	Supermarket	own	brands,	supply	chains…,	cit.	
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companies.	Furthermore,	retailers	play	the	role	of	double	agent	because	they	treat	 the	 brands	 of	 producers	 as	 their	 customers	 (in	 buying	 and	 reselling	brands)	 as	 well	 as	 their	 competitors	 (in	 developing	 goods	 with	 private	labels).	 Therefore,	 retailers	 may	 take	 advantage	 of	 their	 double	 agent	position	and	may	use	their	power	as	gatekeepers	for	access	to	consumers	in	order	to	undermine	brands	and	increase	the	sales	of	private	labels	products.			 In	 this	 regard,	 Francesco	 Franzese,	 owner	 of	 the	 La	 Fiammante	 brand,	describes	 the	 competition	 between	 supermarkets’	 own	 brands	 and	 food	manufacturing	 companies	 and	 the	 risk	 for	 the	 latter	 to	 be	 forced	 out	 of	business	by	food	retail	chains.				My	main	buyers	are	food	retail	chains	(Conad,	Coop,	Carrefour,	Decò,	Sigma,	 etc.)	 and	 the	 catering	 industry	 that	 nowadays	 is	 a	 robustly	booming	market.	60%	of	the	production	is	for	food	retailers	and	the	remaining	 40%	 for	 the	 catering	 industry.	 	 85%	 of	 the	 entire	production	 is	 for	 our	 brand	 La	 Fiammante	 and	 only	 15%	 is	 for	private	labels.	So,	for	example,	we	supply	Conad	with	both	our	brand	and	private	labels.		Nowadays,	 the	 first	 goal	 of	 every	 food	 retail	 chain	 is	 to	 sell	 private	labels	 products.	 The	 main	 problem	 is	 that	 they	 also	 control	 the	selling	and	distribution	of	brand	products.	This	results	in	increasing	competition	 between	 them	 and	 us.	 This	 competition	 forces	 us	 to	spend	 8	 million	 euros	 per	 year	 on	 marketing	 in	 order	 to	 increase	customer	loyalty	and	product	demand.	The	price	of	my	product	will	always	be	higher	than	private	label	products	because	I	have	to	spend	money	to	compete	with	them.	If	the	food	retail	chains	want	to	force	you	out	of	the	business	they	can	do	so	easily	and	quickly.		We	chose	to	have	our	own	brand	because	 it	 is	 the	only	way	we	can	achieve	 an	 identity	 in	 the	 market,	 make	 certain	 of	 achieving	customer	 loyalty	 and,	 above	 all,	 to	 achieve	 higher	 profit	 margins.	This	 happens	 because	 customers	 trust	 you	 and	 are	 willing	 to	 pay	more	for	your	product.	(Interview	with	Francesco	Franzese).	
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3.3.	Economic	and	power	relations	within	the	tomato	value	chain	
of	the	southern	Italy	district	
	What	 are	 the	 economic	 and	 power	 relations	 between	 firms	 within	 the	tomato	value	chain	of	the	southern	district	and	what	is	their	relative	power?		
	
POs	and	farmers		 As	previously	mentioned,	 the	 role	 of	 these	organizations	has	been	much	debated,	especially	 in	 the	southern	district,	because	 they	operate	as	traders	seeking	to	obtain	benefits	for	them	rather	than	advantages	for	producers.	The	main	 problems	 of	 the	 Southern	 district	 are	 linked	 to	 the	 large	number	 of	 POs	 that	 operate	 in	 this	 area.	 If	 there	 are	 16	 POs	 that	supply	25	processing	companies	in	the	northern	district,	there	are	35	POs	 that	 supply	 more	 than	 70	 factories	 in	 the	 south.	 The	 primary	role	 of	 POs	 is	 to	 aggregate	 the	 tomato	 supply	 because	 factories	cannot	approach	1000	small	farmers	to	purchase	tomatoes	that	they	need	 and	 balance	 the	 relations	 between	 supply	 and	 demand.	 POs	also	 have	 the	 purpose	 of	 helping	 farmers	 during	 the	 production	process	 and	 to	 ensure	 the	 quality	 of	 production	 by	 providing	agronomic	 support	 and	 by	 ensuring	 the	 implementation	 of	 quality	standards.	This	 is	what	they	should	do	but	often	it	does	not	occur…	(Interview	with	the	general	manager	of	Anicav).		 	Within	 the	 tomato	 chain,	 the	 supply	 of	 the	 product	 to	 processing	companies	is	strongly	controlled	by	POs	because	they	sell	and	bill	tomatoes	to	 processing	 companies	 on	 behalf	 of	 farmers.	 In	 the	 southern	 district,	 the	main	 problem	 is	 that	 many	 of	 these	 POs	 do	 not	 consist	 of	 producers	 but	traders	 who	 take	 advantage	 of	 supplying	 tomatoes	 to	 processing	 firms.	Furthermore,	the	majority	of	these	POs	are	located	in	the	Campania	region,	a	great	 distance	 from	 where	 tomato	 cultivation	 usually	 takes	 place.	 The	
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wrongdoing	of	some	of	these	POs,	as	reported	by	a	farmer,	starts	before	the	harvesting	through	the	use	of	several	mechanisms:		 …They	 provide	 plants	 for	 free	 to	 farmers	 with	 the	 purpose	 of	obtaining	 their	 loyalty;	 they	 sell	 fertilizers	 to	 producers	 and	 gain	 a	percentage	 on	 the	 sales;	 they	provide	 free	 equipment	 for	 irrigating	fields;	they	also	pay	money	(between	1000	to	1500	euros	per	hectare)	to	farmers	in	order	to	help	them	pay	rent	for	the	fields	because	many	of	these	farmers	are	not	the	actual	owners	(Interview	with	Pietro).			 	The	tendency	of	many	Southern	POs	to	renounce	an	efficient	organization	of	 the	 supply	 chain	 and	 to	 operate	 as	 traders	 seeking	 to	 obtain	 their	 own	benefits	rather	than	for	producers	finds	definition	in	the	way	by	which	they	control	and	manage	the	tomato	supply	to	processing	companies.	As	explained	in	 the	 first	 section,	 the	 price	 of	 tomatoes	 is	 established	 by	 industry	organizations	 and	 OPs	 once	 per	 year	 before	 the	 harvesting	 season	 begins.	While	in	the	northern	district	this	rule	is	observed	by	and	is	valid	for	all	the	participants,	 in	 the	 southern	 district	 it	 is	 disregarded	 and	 the	 price	 of	tomatoes	mainly	depends	on	the	amount	of	the	seasonal	production	and	the	negotiations	between	one	single	PO	and	one	single	processing	 firm.	 Indeed,	the	main	 source	of	profits	 for	 these	 traders	 comes	 from	 their	 ability	 to	 sell	tomatoes	 to	 processing	 companies	 at	 a	 higher	 price	 than	 the	 price	 paid	 by	traders	to	the	farmers.			During	the	harvesting	season,	these	traders	provide	logistic	support	to	 farmers	 in	 order	 to	 move	 tomatoes	 from	 the	 fields	 to	 the	processing	 companies.	 This	 should	 be	 done	 for	 free	 but	 for	 every	truck	that	is	provided	to	the	farmer	traders	ask	50	euros.	Every	day,	during	the	harvesting,	thousands	of	trucks	leave	the	fields	to	supply	industries.	 	The	main	profits	for	these	traders	occur	when	they	take	tomatoes	 from	farmers	 for	a	price	and	then	sell	 them	to	processors	for	 a	 higher	 price.	 Their	 main	 source	 of	 profits	 comes	 from	 this	activity.	 This	 problem	 stems	 from	 the	 incapacity	 of	 farmers,	
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especially	 in	 the	 south,	 to	 become	 organized	 and	 have	 an	organization	 set	 up	 to	 be	 able	 to	 place	 their	 own	 interests	 before	those	of	traders.		I	 have	 seen	 very	 strange	 practices	 in	 this	 sector.	 For	 example,	 for	each	 truck	 of	 tomatoes	 I	 purchase	 from	 a	 PO,	 more	 or	 less	 2400	euros,	 I	 have	 to	 verify	 it	 through	 a	 sort	 of	 proof	 of	 purchase.	 They	often	falsify	these	proofs,	through	the	use	of	a	pc	program,	and	then	they	declare	to	farmers	that	the	processor	had	only	paid	2000	euros	for	 the	 truck	 of	 tomatoes	 falsely	 claiming	 that	 the	 quality	 of	 the	product	 was	 not	 up	 to	 par.	 In	 this	 way,	 they	 cheat	 farmers	 by	pocketing	 400	 euros.	 Furthermore,	 these	 traders	 are	 organized	 in	cooperatives.	 The	 cooperatives	 have	 management	 costs.	 When	 a	cooperative	 shows	 a	 farmer	 an	 invoice	 of	 2,000	 euros	 paid	 by	 a	processor,	 they	declare	 that	10%	of	 this	 amount	has	 to	be	kept	 for	the	management	costs	of	the	cooperative.	In	the	end,	the	farmer	has	earned	 only	 1800	 euros	 while	 the	 trader	 has	 earned	 600	 euros	without	doing	anything	(Interview	with	anonymous	processor).		 	Factual	 evidence	 shows	 how,	 especially	 in	 the	 Southern	 district,	most	 of	the	activities	of	POs	are	oriented	toward	the	search	of	annuities	rather	than	toward	an	efficient	organization	of	the	supply	chain26.			I	have	calculated	that	a	trader	earns	about	30%	of	his	total	turnover	without	 doing	 anything.	 Many	 farms	 economically	 crushed	 by	 the	activity	 of	 these	 traders	 ended	 up	 on	 the	 auction	 block	 and	 were	subsequently	 taken	 over	 by	 these	 traders.	 Today,	many	 ex-farmers	have	 become	 employees	 of	 these	 traders.	 Moreover,	 these	 traders	have	 many	 of	 the	 production	 quotas	 that	 enable	 them	 to	 obtain	subsidies	 from	 the	 Common	 Agricultural	 Policy	 (C.A.P.)	 of	 the	European	Union.	They	obtain	funds	without	ever	having	worked	the	lands	(Interview	with	Pietro).		 	
																																								 																					26	See	also	F.	Ciconte,	S.	Liberti	(Eds.),	Spolpati.	La	crisi	dell’industria	del	pomodoro,	cit.	
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The	 presence	 of	 this	 kind	 of	 individuals	 who	 take	 advantages	 of	 the	mismanagement	of	 the	supply	chain	not	only	 forces	the	southern	district	 to	become	less	competitive	but	it	mainly	and	seriously	undermines	the	incomes	of	 farmers	by	 creating	 conditions	 for	 the	employment	of	 informal	 and	 low-wage	workers.					 An	example	of	a	short	and	fair	chain	that	was	able	to	balance	the	economic	and	power	relations	between	farmers	and	processors	through	several	years	of	organization.	F.	Franzese:		I	 set	 a	 fixed	 price	 for	 tomatoes	 every	 year	 in	 November.	 It	 is	 one	thing	 to	 grow	 tomatoes	 and	 then	 set	 a	 price.	 It	 is	 another	 to	 set	 a	price	and	let	the	producer	decide	whether	or	not	he	should	grow	the	tomatoes	 at	 that	 price.	 I’m	 able	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 farmers	 obtain	10%	 more	 than	 the	 set	 price	 by	 industry	 organizations	 and	 Ops	every	 year.	This	 is	 because	my	 suppliers	have	 set	up	 a	PO,	 and	 the	name	is	Mediterraneo,	which	supply	just	La	Fiammante.	They	supply	me	with	a	very	good	product	and	I’m	able	to	pay	them	more.	We	also	offer	financial	support	to	suppliers	in	order	to	help	them	cover	part	of	the	production	costs	because	most	of	them	are	small	and	medium	farms	 that	 are	 not	 able	 to	 receive	 credit	 from	 the	 bank	 circuit	(Interview	with	Francesco	Franzese).			 	To	sum	up,	the	experiment	of	La	Fiammante	aims	to	balance	the	relations	between	 farmers	 and	 processors	 by	 setting	 a	 tomato	 price	 before	 the	harvesting	 season	 and	 by	 pushing	 traders	 out	 of	 business.	 Although	 this	strategy	works,	 the	 overcoming	 of	 supply	 chain	 problems	 cannot	 be	 left	 to	the	initiative	of	single	companies	but	needs	a	common	strategy	set	by	all	the	participants	as	producers	and	processors.			 According	to	the	general	manager	of	Anicav,	only	the	establishment	of	an	
Inter-Professional	 Agency	 could	 ensure	 an	 efficient	 management	 of	 the	economic	 relations	 between	 farmers	 and	 processors,	 avoiding	 all	 the	
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misinterpretations	within	 the	 supply	 chain	 that	 undermine	 their	 economic	activities.		We	usually	buy	tomatoes	directly	from	POs.	Nowadays	our	need	is	to	have	 an	 Inter-professional	 Agency	 (OI),	which	 already	 exists	 in	 the	North,	 that	 able	 to	 associate	 farmers	 and	 processors	 by	 using	 a	common	governance	system.	The	main	objectives	of	this	agency	are	three:	1)	to	regulate	relations	between	farmers	and	processors;	2)	to	regulate	 the	 planning	 and	 production	 processes;	 3)	 to	 apply	 “erga	omnes”	 agreements	 set	 by	 the	 agency.	 The	 agency	 also	 provides	 a	penalty	 system	 for	 firms	 that	 do	 not	 respect	 the	 rules.	 Another	objective	 of	 this	 agency	 is	 the	 implementation	 of	 a	 promotion	 and	enhancement	product	policy	(Interview	with	the	general	manager	of	Anicav	).	
	
Food	retail	chains	and	processors		 A	 further	 element	 that	 has	 lead	 to	 worsening	 economic	 conditions	 for	farmers	and	the	deterioration	of	labor	relations	-	especially	to	the	detriment	of	workers	placed	in	the	lower	ring	of	the	supply	chain	–	is	the	pricing	policy	of	 international	 retail	 chains	 that	 represent	 the	 main	 buyers	 of	 tomatoes	processed	within	southern	Italy	district.			 Through	 private	 labels,	 retailers	 are	 changing	 the	 relationships	 between	them	and	manufacturers	 transforming	 the	 latter	 into	 their	producers.	 Food	retail	 chains,	 as	 previously	 explained,	 are	 able	 to	 exercise	 control	 on	manufacturers	no	longer	through	ownership	but	through	the	specification	of	the	product,	quality	standards,	quantities,	delivery	dates,	and	prices.	Through	the	 development	 and	 distribution	 of	 private	 labels,	 the	 control	 and	 the	economic	 power	 of	 food	 retail	 chains	 over	 producers	 has	 become	increasingly	stronger.	As	highlighted	by	one	of	the	most	important	institutes	for	social-economic	research	in	the	fields	of	agriculture	«this	control	within	a	principal-agent	relationship	means	that	retailers	can	generally	exercise	very	significant	 buying	 power	 over	 private-label	 producers	 because	 they	 can	
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easily	 substitute	 one	 producer	 for	 another	 with	 minimal	 switching	 costs	while	 ensuring	 that	 producers	 compete	 vigorously	 for	 contracts	 (such	 as	through	 an	 auction	 system	 where	 lowest	 unit	 price	 offers	 determine	 the	award	of	private	label	supply	contracts)»27	.		 This	power	asymmetry	also	affects	 the	economic	 relations	between	 food	retail	 chains	 and	 the	 Italian	 canned	 tomato	 industry.	 It	 occurs	 especially	 in	the	 southern	 district	where	 processing	 companies	 that	 produce	 for	 private	labels	market	are	concentrated.			 This	 sector	 is	 heavily	 influenced	by	 big	 food	 retail	 chains	 because	production	mainly	takes	place	with	private	labels.	If	one	has	a	brand,	it	can	also	be	introduced	to	food	retailers.	If	one	doesn’t	have	a	brand,	nothing	 can	 be	 accomplished.	 Furthermore,	 this	 is	 a	 sector	 that	 is	linked	to	the	agricultural	supply	chain.	The	agricultural	supply	chain	is	 heavily	 dependent	 on	 the	 climate	 factor	 and	 as	 a	 result,	 this	prevents	 industries	 from	 making	 predictions	 on	 the	 quantity	 and	quality	 of	 the	 production.	 Since	 industries	 are	 forced	 to	 close	contracts	 with	 retailers	 prior	 to	 a	 harvest,	 this	 can	 have	 negative	effects	 on	 the	 business	 activities	 of	 all	 the	 operators	 in	 the	 supply	chain.	Unfortunately,	 food	retail	chains	have	an	enormous	ability	 to	concentrate	on	their	demand.	On	the	other	hand,	we	are	not	able	to	concentrate	on	our	supply,	due	 to	a	very	strong	 fragmentation,	and	so	we	are	forced	to	endure	their	downward	price	policy,	which	often	ends	 up	 being	 below	 production	 costs.	 The	 tomato,	 for	 example,	 is	considered	a	commodity	and	therefore	all	the	elements	linked	to	the	price	 are	 considered	more	 important	 than	 those	 related	 to	 quality.	Retailers	 have	 a	 huge	 dominance	 over	 the	 concentration	 of	purchases,	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 there	 are	 just	 a	 few	 stakeholders	who	implement	 the	 policies	 of	 aggregation	 in	 the	 purchasing	 phase.	 On	the	other	hand,	there	are	many	of	us	but	we	are	fragmented	and	do	not	 have	 the	 tools	 for	 concentrating	 our	 supply.	 Therefore,	 when	they	 announce	 a	 demand,	 a	 downward	 race	 among	 the	 processors																																									 																					27	LEI,	Wageningen	UR,	The	impact	of	private	labels	on	the	competitiveness	of	the	European	
food	supply	chain,	European	Union,	2011,	p.	38.	
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begins	 to	 lower	 the	 price	 of	 the	 product	 and	 cover	 the	 demand.	Competition	 has	 become	 even	 stronger	 because	 all	 the	 companies	that	meet	the	demand	for	retailers	produce	the	same	type	of	product.	This	 is	 the	 reason	why	 a	 jar	 of	 tomato	 costs	 1/3	 of	 what	 a	 cup	 of	espresso	coffee	costs	(Interview	with	the	general	manager	of	Anicav).			The	 power	 asymmetry	 is	 further	 strengthened	 by	 the	 auction	 system	 by	which	buying	groups	buy	tomatoes	 from	private	 label	suppliers.	The	aim	of	this	 system	 is	 to	 purchase	 the	 product	 as	 cheaply	 as	 possible	 therefore	triggering	a	fierce	competition	between	private	label	suppliers.		Today,	a	jar	of	tomatoes	costs	less	than	a	pack	of	gum.	The	problems	of	the	supply	chain	could	be	solved	even	with	a	10%	increase	in	the	price	of	the	product.	That	is,	instead	of	paying	50	cents	for	the	jar	of	tomatoes,	 you	 pay	 55.	 Unfortunately,	 this	 cannot	 be	 carried	 out	because	 the	 market	 is	 massively	 controlled	 by	 large	 retailers	 and	they	are	 interested	 in	keeping	 the	price	of	 the	product	 for	 the	 final	consumer	 as	 low	 as	 possible.	 Today,	 sales	 to	 the	 food	 retail	 chains	can	be	performed	by	private	negotiations	or	through	the	mechanism	of	online	auctions.	The	auctions	can	be	set	up	by	the	buying	groups	during	the	period	from	the	end	of	May	to	the	beginning	of	September,	that	 is,	 before	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 harvest	 season	 and	 production,	and	may	consider	only	private	 label	products.	The	problem	with	an	auction	is	double	depreciation.	The	auction	operates	in	the	following	manner.	The	group	would	 announce:	 I	 have	 a	 tender	 for	20	million	bottles	 and	 invite	 ten	processing	 companies	 to	 the	 auction.	Each	of	these	companies	would	make	an	offer.	A	traffic-like	light	appears	on	the	screen.	If	the	light	is	red,	it	means	that	the	bidder’s	placed	offer	is	distant	from	whoever	had	made	the	best	offer.	If	the	light	is	orange,	it	means	 that	 the	 bidder	 is	 approaching	 the	 best	 offer.	 If	 the	 light	 is	green,	this	means	that	the	bidder’s	placed	offer	is	the	best,	that	is,	the	most	 economically	 advantageous.	 At	 the	 end	 of	 the	 auction,	 the	lowest	offer	is	identified	and	this	offer	becomes	the	starting	point	for	the	 next	 auction.	 After	 ten	 days	 all	 the	 companies	 are	 called	 to	
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participate	 in	 the	 second	 auction.	 The	 starting	 price,	 that	 is,	 the	auction	base	price,	would	be	the	lowest	offer	identified	at	the	end	of	the	first	auction.	Each	processor	participating	in	the	auction	has	two	minutes	 to	 place	 a	 second	 offer.	 The	 one	 that	 offers	 the	 product	 at	the	lowest	price	wins.	The	problem	is	that	the	second	offer	would	not	take	place	on	the	upside	but	on	the	downside.	Obviously,	at	this	stage,	one	would	be	 forced	 to	 lower	 further	 the	price	of	 the	product.	The	last	auction	was	for	a	total	of	6	million	euros	for	a	production	of	20	million	 bottles28	won	 by	 two	 of	 the	 processors,	 one	 from	 the	 south	and	one	 from	 the	north,	 at	31.5	 cents	 a	bottle.	This	means	 that	 the	bottle	 of	 tomato	 sauce	 will	 be	 sold	 at	 a	 price	 of	 45-50	 cents	(Interview	with	Francesco	Franzese).		The	 problem	 of	 the	 auction,	 as	 reported	 by	 several	 processors,	 is	represented	by	the	fact	that	the	first	auctions	that	are	lost	are	those	that	then	determine	 the	 reference	 price	 for	 that	 product	 on	 the	market.	 That	 is,	 the	buyers	will	be	able	 to	 tell	 the	processors:	during	 the	 last	auction	 the	bottle	was	sold	at	33	cents	and	therefore	I	am	not	willing	to	pay	more	than	35	cents	per	bottle.	This	is	very	dangerous	and	could	scare	away	many	processors.		Another	problem	is	that	these	auctions	often	take	place	before	the	harvest	season.	 Processing	 companies	 that	 win	 an	 auction	 may	 not	 even	 have	 all	tomatoes	 they	need	 in	order	 to	meet	 the	supply	contract.	This	 is	one	of	 the	reasons	 that	 can	 push	 private	 label	 processors,	 especially	 larger	 ones,	 to	resort	to	short	selling.			Larger	 companies	 are	 those	 that	 mainly	 participate	 in	 auctions.	 In	the	southern	areas,	there	are	about	ten	of	these	companies.	If	smaller	companies	are	not	able	to	enter	into	this	or	other	markets,	they	sell	their	 products	 to	 larger	 companies	 through	 intermediaries.	 The	value	of	the	industrial	exchange	in	the	Nocerine-Sarnese	agricultural	area	 is	 60%.	 For	 example,	 if	 Doria	 Spa	 needs	 a	 ton	 of	 tomatoes	because	it	has	to	supply	Conad,	it	can	buy	it	from	another	processor																																									 																					28	Cfr.	https://www.internazionale.it/reportage/stefano-liberti/2018/07/25/passata-pomodoro-eurospin	
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and	then	place	a	supermarket	label	on	it.	What	could	also	happen	is	a	processor	wins	an	important	auction	and	it	runs	out	of	its	product.	In	the	meantime,	 a	 repeat	 customer's	 order	 comes	 in	 and	 it	 does	 not	have	 the	 goods	 to	 supply	 it.	 So,	 what	 can	 be	 done	 at	 this	 point?	 It	could	resort	to	short	selling.	It	could	simply	call	an	intermediary	who	would,	 in	 turn,	 buy	 the	 product	 from	 another	 company	 and	 then	supply	the	repeat	customer.	Several	italian	brands,	for	example,	buy	tomatoes	 through	 an	 agency	 and	 limit	 themselves	 to	 just	 placing	 a	label	on	them	(Interview	with	the	general	manager	of	Anicav).			This	 auction	 system	 is	 not	 regulated	 by	 any	 law.	 The	 only	 constraint	 for	processors	is	to	not	sell	tomatoes	below	the	production	costs.	This	constraint	is	 often	 circumvented	 by	 private	 label	 processors	 lowering	 the	 referring	production	price	due	to	the	strong	competition	between	them29.			The	point	 is	 if	 you	calculate	 the	costs	you	will	understand	 that	 it	 is	impossible	 to	 sell	 a	 bottle	 of	 tomato	 sauce	 to	 food	 retailers	 for	 31	cents.	 To	 me,	 tomatoes	 cost	 0.34	 cents	 per	 bottle	 without	 adding	indirect	costs	such	as	labeling,	packaging,	quality	control	costs,	waste	disposal,	factory	maintenance,	etc.	How	could	I	sell	it	for	31	cents	to	them?	 This	 means	 that	 you	 would	 have	 to	 save	 or	 cut	 corners	 on	something	or	somewhere.	So,	how	would	you	do	so?	You	would	have	to	 butcher	 the	 agricultural	 part	 in	 order	 to	 be	 able	 to	 meet	 costs.	Therefore,	I	have	chosen	to	no	longer	participate	in	auctions.	I	think	that	 a	 10%	 increase	 on	 the	 final	 price	 of	 the	 product	 would	 be	enough	 to	 guarantee	 higher	 profit	 margins	 for	 the	 supply	 chain!	(Interview	with	Francesco	Franzese).	
	
The	role	of	buying	alliances			 The	online	auction	system	was	created	 fifteen	years	ago	and	only	affects	private	 labels	 product.	 In	 the	 past,	 online	 auctions	 were	 organised	 by																																									 																					29	Cfr.	 F.	 Panié,	 G.	Mininni	 (Eds.),	#ASTEnetevi,	Grande	distribuzione	organizzata.	Dalle	aste	
on-line	all’inganno	del	sottocosto,	FLAI	CGIL,	December	2017.	
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national	 buying	 alliances.	 In	 the	 last	 few	 years,	 instead,	 they	 have	 become	organised	by	international	buying	alliances.			 International	 food	 retail	 alliances	 emerged	 in	 the	mid	 to	 late	 1980s.	 An	important	feature	of	these	alliances	is	the	existence	of	a	central	secretariat	to	facilitate	the	coordination	between	members.	One	of	the	main	reasons	for	the	development	of	 these	 alliances	was	 to	 counter	 the	power	of	manufacturers	that	 were	 increasing	 their	 hold	 in	 the	 food	 market	 through	 cross-border	mergers	and	acquisitions	and	joint	venture	activities30.			 Nowadays	a	large	and	increasing	share	of	the	European	food	market	is	in	the	hands	of	international	buying	alliances.	A	buying	alliance	or	buying	group	is	 an	 organization	 created	 by	 several	 retailers	 in	 order	 to	 improve	 their	purchasing	 power	 vis-à-vis	 to	 manufacturers	 and	 distributors	 as	 well	 as	enhancing	 their	 market	 competitiveness	 compared	 to	 other	 types	 of	 retail	players31.	 The	 main	 aim	 of	 these	 alliances	 is	 to	 negotiate,	 implement	 and	coordinate	 common	 supplies	 in	 order	 to	 obtain	 better	 purchase	 prices	 for	their	members	by	leveraging	on	their	associated	power.	Each	retailer	informs	the	 central	 secretariat	 on	 the	 quantity	 of	 goods	 that	 it	 needs.	 The	 central	secretariat	collects	the	orders	and	purchases	the	goods	for	their	members.			 In	addition	to	the	already	mentioned	objective	of	achieving	better	prices,	as	 noted	 by	 Balan,	 there	 are	 other	 objectives	 such	 as	 distributing	international	private	brands	of	 the	 retail	members,	 exchanging	 information	and	know-how	among	members	and	creating	partnerships	for	the	expansion	in	new	markets32.		 The	 most	 important	 European	 buying	 alliances	 are:	 EMD	 (European	Marketing	 Distribution)	 with	 14	 food	 retail	 chains	 in	 more	 than	 15	countries33;	 AMS	 Sourcing	 B.V.	 with	 10	 retailers	 (Morrison,	 Ahold,	 Booker,	Dansk	 Supermarked	 Gruppen,	 Esselunga,	 etc.)	 in	 22	 countries	 such	 as	 the																																									 																					30 	T.	 Robinson,	 C.	 M.	 Clarke-Hill,	 International	 alliances	 in	 European	 retailing,	 The	International	Review	of	Retail,	Distribution	and	Consumer	Research,	Vol.	5,	Issue	2:	167-184,	1995.	31	C.	Balan,	The	Alliances	of	European	Retailers	and	Their	Effects	in	the	Field	of	Marketing	and	
Supply	Chain,	The	Romanian	Economic	Journal,	Year	X,	NO.	25	BIS,	2007.	32	Ibidem.	33	http://www.emd-ag.com/our-members/members.html	
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Netherlands,	 UK,	 Italy,	 Sweden,	 Portugal,	 etc.	 Its	 members	 serve	 a	 billion	customers	 every	 week	 and	 have	 a	 global	 turnover	 of	 100	 billion	 euros34;	
Coopernic	 that	 sources	 and	 negotiates	 on	 behalf	 of	 Coop	 (Italia),	 E.	 Leclerc	(France),	Delhaize	(Belgium)	and	Rewe	Group	(Germany)	that	together	have	a	 turnover	of	125	billion	euros;	Alidis-Agenor,	 that	 is	a	Swiss-based	Buying	Alliance	 for	 six	 of	 the	major	 European	 retailers	 for	whom	 it	 buys	 national	brands	 and	 Private	 Label;	 another	 buying	 alliance	 was	 created	 in	 2018	between	Tesco	e	Carrefour35	that	together	control	more	than	19,000	stores.	All	of	these	buying	alliances	are	sourced	by	manufacturers	for	the	production	of	 private	 brands	 that	 will	 be	 distributed	 by	 the	 alliance	 members	 at	 the	European	level.			 In	 2007	 the	 top	 15	 retailers	 and	 retail	 alliances	 in	Western	 and	 Central	Europe	 had	 a	 combined	 share	 of	 77%	 of	 the	 sales	 value36.	 As	 reported	 by	Francesco	Franzese:		 These	 buying	 alliances	 act	 on	 behalf	 of	 big	 food	 retail	 chains	 that	serve	 a	 billion	 customers.	 A	 few	 years	 ago	 a	 big	 buying	 alliance,	Coopernic,	 had	 organised	 an	 online	 auction	 of	 17	million	 euros	 for	the	 supply	 of	 industrial	 tomatoes	 for	 the	 private	 labels	 of	 its	members.	The	problem	is	that	these	alliances,	with	their	huge	buying	power,	 can	 achieve	 further	 lower	 prices	 from	 producers,	 pushing	manufacturers	 that	own	a	brand	out	of	 the	 sales	market,	 especially	small	 ones	 like	me.	 To	 sum	 up,	 these	 alliances	 aim	 to	 crush	 brand	
manufacturers	 and	 producers	 at	 the	 same	 time	 (Interview	 with	Francesco	Franzese).		 	The	development	of	buying	alliances	is,	therefore,	changing	the	economic	and	power	relations	between	retailers	and	suppliers.	These	changes	are	also	affecting	the	industrial	tomato	sector	with	a	big	negative	impact	throughout	the	 supply	 chain	especially	 to	 the	detriment	of	 small	 farms	and	 farmhands.																																									 																					34	https://www.ams-sourcing.com/ams/	35	https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/jul/02/tesco-carrefour-strategic-alliance-french-retailer-prices	36	C.	Balan,	The	Alliances	of	European	Retailers…,	cit.	
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This	is	particularly	striking	in	the	southern	district	where	the	production	of	industrial	tomatoes	on	behalf	of	private	labels	of	European	retail	alliances	is	concentrated.	What	 are	 the	 responses	 from	 Italian	 industrial	 organizations	 toward	buying	alliances	power?	How	can	the	power	of	lead	firms	be	regulated?		 According	 to	 the	 National	 canneries	 association,	 the	 market	 cannot	 be	modified	through	a	trust	response	due	to	increased	international	competition.			Nowadays	retailers	can	purchase	 food	products	 in	several	places	 in	the	world.	We	 cannot	 establish	 a	 coalition	 by	 telling	 them	 “we	 are	not	 willing	 to	 sell	 our	 products	 below	 this	 price”.	 This	 is	 because	there	are	other	companies	in	Europe	and	in	the	world	that	willing	to	sell	 the	 same	products	 at	 the	price	 set	by	big	buyers.	 Furthermore,	it’s	impossible	to	respond	individually	to	buyers’	demand	when	they	organize	online	auctions.		You	cannot	say	to	processors	“you	have	to	take	part	 in	 the	auction	organised	by	Tesco,	you	 in	 those	organised	by	Lidl,	etc.”	(Interview	with	the	general	manager	of	Anicav).			 	For	 industrial	 organizations,	 the	 main	 strategy	 for	 responding	 to	 the	power	 of	 buying	 alliances	 is	 the	 implementation	 of	 a	 value-added	 product	policy.	 This	 signifies	 in	 promoting	 local	 characteristics	 of	 the	 products,	setting	 up	 a	 common	 brand,	 obtaining	 a	 protected	 geographical	 indication	(P.G.I.)	certification	and	then	requesting	for	a	higher	price	of	the	product	and	redistributing	it	throughout	the	supply	chain.		Other	strategies	are	the	elimination	of	the	double	downward	system	for	 online	 auctions	 through	 a	 government	 response	 and	 the	establishment	of	 a	minimum	price	 that	 is	 able	 to	 ensure	 fair	 supply	chains.	Through	the	establishment	of	a	minimum	price,	one	can	say	to	consumers		“if	you	buy	a	can	of	tomatoes	below	this	price	it	means	that	 the	 product	 comes	 from	 a	 supply	 chain	 that	 doesn’t	 respect	labor	 rights”	 (interview	 with	 the	 general	 manager	 of	 Anicav).		
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IV	Chapter	
Made	 in	 Capitanata.	 Labor	 in	 the	 lower	 rings	 of	 the	 tomato	
value	chain	
	 As	stated	in	the	previous	chapters,	during	the	last	few	decades	agricultural	production	in	southern	Italy	had	suffered	profound	shifts	that	have	affected	farms	 and	workers.	 The	deterioration	 of	working	 conditions	 of	 farm	hands	can	be	considered	a	structural	element	of	industrial	tomato	production	of	the	southern	 district	 and	 as	 the	 result	 of	 power	 and	 economic	 asymmetrical	relations	 between	 “lead	 firms”	 (buyers)	 and	 other	 firms	 included	 in	 their	supply	chain.		The	structure	and	characteristics	of	the	chain,	the	relationships	of	power	and	authority	between	companies	within	it,	the	instability	and	seasonality	of	production,	 and	 growing	 international	 competition	 have	 made	 the	 entire	production	process	centered	on	the	ability	of	companies	to	resort	to	a	highly	flexible	and	low-cost	labor	force.	In	 the	 production	 chains,	 however,	 companies	 respond	 to	 their	 need	 for	flexible	 and	 low-cost	 labor	 through	 the	 activation,	 exploitation	 and	emphasizing	of	social	differences	-	race,	gender,	age,	citizenship,	immigration	status	-	existing	between	the	labor	force	in	order	to	maximize	their	profits1.	In	response	to	the	structural	pressures	originating	from	the	characteristics	of	the	chain,	companies	that	are	included	in	the	tomato	chain	emphasize	the	social	segmentations	of	 the	 labor	 force	present	 in	 the	territory	where	these	companies	are	located.		Within	 the	companies	 located	 in	 the	 lower	 links	of	 the	 industrial	 tomato	production	 chain,	 the	 labor	 force	 used	 is,	 in	 fact,	 strongly	 racialized.	 This	labor	force	is	locally	and	socially	built	according	to	the	sub-standard	working	conditions,	 that	 is,	 comparably	 inferior	 to	 those	 that	are	generally	accepted	
																																								 																					1	A.	Tsing,	Supply	Chains	and	the	Human	Conditions,	Rethinking	Marxism,	21(2),	pp.	148-176,	2009.	
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because	 they	 are	 immigrants,	 foreigners,	 precarious	 workers	 and	 in	conditions	of	housing	marginalisation.		The	activation	and	exploitation	of	this	extra-economic	element	in	order	to	increase	 the	 share	 of	 surplus	 to	 be	 retained,	 and	 therefore	 resist	 the	pressures	 exerted	 by	 other	 companies	 in	 the	 chain,	 allows	 companies	 to	strengthen	and	reproduce	the	social	differences	that	exist	between	the	labor	force	and,	at	the	same	time,	legitimize	their	use	of	a	flexible,	precarious	and	low-cost	labor	force.	Furthermore,	within	supply	chains	diversity	is	activated	and	exploited	not	only	in	order	to	extract	surplus	but	also	to	control	the	labor	force2.			The	ability	of	companies	included	in	the	chain	to	emphasize	economic	and	extra-economic	 elements	 also	 involves	 the	 social	 reproduction	 of	 the	 labor	force3.	The	use	of	a	flexible	and	low-cost	labor	force	is,	in	fact,	favored	by	the	methods	 of	 the	 spatial	 arrangement	 of	workers	 and	 by	 the	 compression	 of	the	 cost	 of	 reproduction	 of	 the	 agricultural	 labor	 force	 in	 the	 Italian	countryside.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																								 																					2	Ibidem.	3	Cfr.	G	Alberti,	D.	Sacchetto,	F.	A.	Vianello	(Eds.),	Spazio	e	tempo	nei	processi	produttivi	e	
riproduttivi,	Sociologia	del	Lavoro	no.	146,	Franco	Angeli,	Milan,	2017.	
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4.1	Migrant	workers	in	Capitanata		 According	 to	 official	 statistics,	 in	 2015	 the	 number	 of	 non-EU	 citizens	employed	in	Apulian	agriculture	was	19,430	and	originated	from	Macedonia,	Pakistan,	 Maghreb,	 Senegal,	 India,	 Sri	 Lanka,	 Albania,	 Eritrea,	 Ethiopia,	Ukraine,	Somalia,	and	the	former	Yugoslavia4.	However,	the	main	component	of	 foreign	workers	 in	 agriculture	 in	 the	 region	was	made	up	of	 EU	 citizens	(30.048)5.	The	latter	originated	mainly	from	Eastern	Europe,	primarily	from	Romania	 and	 Bulgaria;	 with	 regard	 to	 these	 two	 groups,	 according	 to	unofficial	estimates,	there	are	about	28,000	Romanian	laborers	and	5,000	to	5,200	Bulgarian	laborers	present	throughout	the	territory	of	Puglia6.	The	 main	 work	 activity	 carried	 out	 by	 immigrants	 in	 the	 Apulian	agricultural	sector	is	the	harvesting	of	produce:	78%	of	the	total	foreign	labor	force	was	 employed	 in	 this	 activity.	 According	 to	 official	 statistics,	 8.8%	 of	non-EU	workers	 and	 10%	 of	 EU	 workers	 employed	 in	 Apulian	 agriculture	were	 hired	 with	 informal	 contracts.	 Almost	 90%	 of	 total	 EU	 and	 non-EU	workers	in	the	region	earned	a	salary	that	did	not	correspond	to	union	rates	and	therefore	was	considered	irregular7.	The	 area	 with	 the	 highest	 agro-food	 vocation	 of	 the	 Puglia	 region	 is	Capitanata,	a	territory	with	an	area	of	7,000	square	kilometers	that	is	part	of	the	province	of	Foggia.	94%	of	the	tomato	production	is	concentrated	in	this	area	for	the	entire	Puglia	region	and	30.7%	of	the	entire	national	production8.	According	to	the	National	Census	of	Agriculture	(2010),	in	the	Puglia	region,	there	 are	 20,603.49	 hectares	 of	 cultivated	 land	 and	 2,354	 farms	 for	 the	production	 of	 industrial	 tomatoes.	 The	majority	 of	 these	 farms	 (1,901)	 are	located	 in	 the	province	 of	 Foggia9.	 The	production	of	 tomatoes	 in	 this	 area	
																																								 																					4	Cfr.	Crea,	Annuario	dell’agricoltura	italiana	2015,	Rome,	2017,	p.	172	5	Ibidem.	6	F.	Carchedi,	Il	lavoro	indecente	nel	settore	agricolo.	Casi	di	studio	territoriali.	Puglia:	il	caso	di	
Borgo	 Mezzanone,	 in	 Osservatorio	 Placido	 Rizzotto	 (Eds.)	 Quarto	 Rapporto	 Agromafie	 e	Caporalato,	FLAI	CGIL,	Rome,	Ediesse,	2018.	7	Cfr.	Crea,	Annuario	dell’agricoltura	italiana	2015,	Rome,	2017.	8	See	Chapter	III.	9	Authors’	elaboration	on	http://dati-censimentoagricoltura.istat.it/Index.aspx	
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supply	 the	 processing	 industries	 of	 the	 southern	 tomato	 district,	 which	mainly	operate	for	the	private	labels	market	of	big	food	retail	chains.	The	territory	is	characterized	by	a	strong	presence	of	immigrant	workers	that	 make	 up	 the	 main	 source	 of	 seasonal	 labor	 for	 the	 agricultural	companies	of	 the	province	 involved	 in	the	production	of	 industry	tomatoes.	The	agricultural	vocation	of	the	province,	with	various	productions	according	to	the	seasons,	was	one	of	the	factors	that	brought	on	the	influx	of	thousands	of	foreign	laborers	in	Capitanata.	According	to	official	statistics,	in	fact,	53.4%	of	the	total	number	of	foreign	workers	employed	in	this	province	work	in	the	agricultural	sector10.	The	 territory	 of	 the	 Foggia	 province	 is	 characterized	 by	 the	 presence	 of	laborers	 of	 different	 ethnicities	 and	 nationalities	 who	 follow	 a	 plurality	 of	migratory	models.	 In	addition	 to	 immigrant	workers,	EU	as	well	as	non-EU,	who	 permanently	 live	more	 or	 less	 in	 the	 province,	 there	 are	 the	migrant	laborers	who	follow	diverse	cycles	of	the	seasonal	agricultural	harvest	in	the	countryside	of	Southern	 Italy,	and	migrants	who	 live	 in	an	European	Union	country	who	move	to	Capitanata	for	a	short	period	of	time	during	the	tomato	harvesting	period.	As	 noted	 by	Daniele	 Iacovelli,	 general	 secretary	 of	 the	 Flai-Cgil	 union	 in	Foggia:	
In	 agriculture,	 workers	 are	 registered	 through	 the	 civil	 status	 lists	where	 the	 employment	 is	 reported11.	 At	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Nineties,	 a	very	low	number	of	immigrant	workers,	about	a	few	hundred,	were	registered	in	the	civil	status	lists	of	the	Foggia	province.	Based	on	the	latest	data	available,	 relating	 to	2017,	 there	are	50,000	agricultural	
																																								 																					10	AA.	VV.,	Puglia.	Rapporto	Immigrazione	2016,	Dossier	Statistico	Immigrazione	2016,	Centro	Studi	e	Ricerche	IDOS,	Edizioni	Idos,	Rome,	2016,	pp.	424-428.	11	Employers	of	agriculture	work,	in	Italy,	when	declaring	the	employment	and	salary	data	of	laborers,	 must	 complete	 and	 submit	 to	 INPS	 a	 so-called	 "agricultural	 labor	 declaration"	(DMAG).	The	law	provides	for	the	possibility	for	employers	to	present	the	declaration	at	the	end	 of	 each	 quarter.	 This	 mechanism	 often	 leads	 to	 tax	 and	 contributory	 frauds	 for	 the	employer	tends	to	declare	only	a	part	of	the	working	days	actually	carried	out	by	the	laborer	to	the	authorities.	
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workers	 in	 the	 civil	 status	 lists	 of	 the	 Foggia	 province12.	 15,000	 of	these	 workers	 are	 immigrants.	 Of	 the	 15,000	 immigrant	 workers,	5,000	 are	 of	 African	 origin	 and	 12,000	 of	 European	 origin,	 In	 the	latter	case	they	are	mainly	Bulgarians	and	Rumanians13.	 In	 the	case	of	Romanians,	we	had	discovered	a	reversal	of	the	trend	compared	to	the	 past,	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 for	 the	 2017	 year,	 the	 number	 of	Romanians	 present	 had	 decreased	 by	 2000	 units	 compared	 to	 the	previous	year.	This	was	due	to	the	fact	that	laborers	had	understood	that	working	conditions	were	quite	heavy	and	not	very	profitable.	It	is	 a	 bit	 similar	 to	 what	 had	 happened	 with	 Albanians:	 they	 had	arrived,	verified	 the	conditions	of	 the	 territory	and	 then	decided	 to	abandon	it	because	they	were	not	as	enticing	as	they	were	made	to	believe.	The	only	component	that	has	been	constantly	growing	over	the	years	is	the	African	one.		 According	 to	 Iacovelli,	many	of	 these	 laborers,	holders	of	 legal	 residence	permits,	 carry	 out	 their	work	 activities	 informally	 and	without	 any	 kind	 of	guarantee:		 Many	of	the	 immigrant	 laborers	employed	in	the	agricultural	sector	of	the	Foggia	province	carry	out	their	work	that	is	mainly	undeclared.	Of	the	5,000	Africans	present	in	the	civil	status	lists	of	the	province,	3800	do	not	reach	the	threshold	of	51	working	days14.	It	is	the	same	situation	 with	 Bulgarians	 and	 Romanians:	 out	 of	 the	 12,000	registered	workers,	more	than	2000	have	only	one	or	two	registered	working	days.	Half	of	the	immigrant	laborers	employed	by	the	farms	in	 the	 province	 have	 an	 average	 of	 two	 to	 ten	 legally	 registered	working	days	per	year.	 Is	 it	possible	 that	a	 laborer	 leaves	Romania,																																									 																					12	The	 lists	 of	 agricultural	 laborers,	 published	 annually	 by	 INPS,	 allows	 us	 to	 obtain	 just	 a	partial	idea	of	the	recruited	agricultural	labor	force	because	after	a	recruitment,	rarely	does	a	registration	follow	of	all	 the	working	days	carried	out	by	the	 laborer	and	the	payment	of	the	relative	social	security	taxes	by	the	employer.	13	If	 the	main	 foreign	communities	employed	 in	 the	agricultural	 sector	of	 the	Puglia	 region	are	 Romanian	 and	 Bulgarian,	 70%	 of	 the	 Bulgarian	 laborers	 of	 the	 entire	 region	 are	concentrated	 in	 the	 province	 of	 Foggia	 (Cfr.	 F.	 Carchedi,	 Il	 lavoro	 indecente	 nel	 settore	
agricolo…,	cit.).	14	In	agriculture,	51	days	of	work	represent	the	minimum	threshold	for	access	to	social	safety	cushions.		
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arrives	 here,	 lives	 in	 a	 farmhouse,	 perhaps	 under	 blackmail	 by	 a	recruiter	of	day	laborers,	just	to	obtain	ten	days	of	work?	This	means	that	 the	employer	 is	 limited	 to	registering	 just	a	small	part	and	not	the	 total	 number	 of	 days	 actually	worked	by	 the	 farm	worker.	 It	 is	therefore	 evident	 that	 a	 large	 part	 of	 the	 immigrant	 agricultural	labor	force	present	in	the	civil	status	lists	of	the	municipalities	of	the	province	 perform	work	 that	 is	mainly	 undeclared,	 rarely	 gray,	 and	with	a	salary	that	does	not	correspond	in	the	least	to	that	established	in	 the	 provincial	 labor	 contract	 (Interview	 with	 Daniele	 Iacovelli	Flai-CGIL).			 As	 observed	 by	 Perrotta	 and	 Sacchetto,	 a	 central	 element	 in	 the	management	 of	 labor	 and	 the	 labor	 market	 in	 the	 Italian	 countryside	 is	represented	by	housing	segregation15.	In	 the	 province	 of	 Foggia,	 as	 well	 as	 in	 all	 the	 provinces	 of	 the	 Italian	countryside,	 low-wage	migrant	 laborers	 have	 settled	 in	 the	many	 informal	settlements	 of	 the	 province16.	 In	 the	 Capitanata	 area,	 they	 mainly	 live	 in	informal	 camps	 -	 farmhouses,	 abandoned	 buildings,	 and	 shacks	 -	 located	almost	 all	 near	 the	 countryside	 and	 quite	 far	 from	 the	 city	 center.	 The	separation	 between	 laborers	 and	 the	 local	 population	 takes	 on	 different	forms:	spatial,	economic,	cultural	and	political17.	The	main	settlements	of	the	province	 are	 Borgo	 Mezzanone,	 known	 as	 "La	 Pista",	 consisting	 mainly	 of	shacks	 and	 where	 more	 than	 two	 thousand	 migrants	 of	 predominantly	African	 nationality	 live	 during	 the	 summer	 season;	 "Borgo	 Tre	 Titoli"	 in	Cerignola,	 consisting	 of	 country	 farmhouses	 housing	 a	 hundred	 migrants	mainly	 from	Ghana;	 the	Ex	Daunialat	Factory,	with	a	presence	of	about	one	hundred	people,	the	only	settlement	located	in	the	city	center	of	Foggia;	the	encampment	of	 San	Marco	 in	Lamis,	 consisting	of	 farmhouses	where	 about	another	one	hundred	people	live;	the	settlement	of	Poggio	Imperiale,	where																																									 																					15	D.	Perrotta,	D.	Sacchetto,	 Il	ghetto	e	lo	sciopero:	braccianti	stranieri	nell’Italia	Meridionale,	in	V.	Borghi,	M.	Zamponi	(Eds.)	Terra	e	Lavoro	nel	capitalismo	contemporaneo,	Sociologia	del	Lavoro	128,	Franco	Angeli,	Milan,	2012.	16	Cfr.	 Medici	 Senza	 Frontiere,	 Fuori	 Campo.	 Insediamenti	 informali,	 marginalità	 sociale,	
ostacoli	all’	accesso	alle	cure	e	ai	beni	essenziali	per	migranti	e	rifugiati,	February	2018.	17	Cfr.	D.	Perrotta,	D.	Sacchetto,	Il	ghetto	e	lo	sciopero,	cit.	
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more	than	one	hundred	and	fifty	people	live	during	the	summer	season18;	the	Great	ghetto	of	Rignano,	a	shantytown	inhabited	by	more	than	five	hundred	people	 and	 another	 settlement,	 called	 "cicerone"	 is	 located	 between	 the	ghettos	of	Rignano	and	Arpinova,	where	another	two	hundred	people	live.	There	 is	 also	 the	 Bulgarian	 ghetto	 of	 Borgo	 Mezzanone	 where	 there	 are	several	 agglomerations,	 consisting	 of	 caravans,	 makeshift	 houses,	 and	temporary	tents,	where	more	than	a	thousand	Bulgarian	Roma	live19.		The	 ghettos	 represent	 areas	 that	 Gambino	 defines	 as	 a	 condition	 of	"seclusion",	 a	 spatial	 arrangement	 that	 is	 different	 from	 the	 internment	because	 it	 formally	 allows	 the	 subjects	 a	 spatial	 freedom,	but	which	 in	 fact	entraps	him	in	the	meantime	in	a	precise	location20.	Throughout	the	province,	however,	 there	 are	 hundreds	 of	 informal	 settlements	 of	 very	 small	dimensions	 where	 migrant	 laborers	 form	 small	 groups	 and	 find	 shelter.	These	are	places	without	any	utilities	-	water,	electricity,	heating,	etc.	-	where	legal	 and	 illegal	 immigrants	 decide	 to	 settle	 even	 for	 very	 long	 periods	 of	time.	As	Daniele	Iacovelli	states:		 Although	in	several	areas	the	concentration	is	greater,	for	example	at	the	 "Pista"	 in	 Borgo	 Mezzanone	 where	 2000	 people	 live	 and	 the	ghetto	 of	 Rignano	 where	 more	 than	 1000	 people	 live,	 the	 vast	majority	 of	 the	 laborers	 live	 in	 hundreds	 of	 informal	 settlements	located	in	different	areas	of	the	provincial	territory.	Throughout	the	Capitanata,	we	estimate	that	there	is	a	presence	of	15,000	immigrant	workers	 in	 agriculture.	 The	 presence	 of	 these	 workers	 in	 the	 two	main	ghettos	of	 the	province,	Borgo	Mezzanone,	 and	Rignano,	does	not	 concern	 the	more	 than	30%	of	 the	 total	presence	of	 immigrant	laborers	in	the	province	(Interview	with	Daniele	Iacovelli,	Flai	Cgil).																																										 																					18	Some	of	the	laborers	living	in	this	settlement	died	in	the	summer	of	2018	when	returning	from	work	in	the	fields.	19	F.	Carchedi,	Il	lavoro	indecente	nel	settore	agricolo.	Casi	di	studio	territoriali.	Puglia:	il	caso	
di	Borgo	Mezzanone,	cit.	20	Cfr.	 F.	 Gambino,	 Migranti	 nella	 tempesta.	 Avvistamenti	 per	 l’inizio	 del	 nuovo	 Millennio,	Verona,	Ombre	Corte,	2003,	cit.	in	D.	Perrotta,	D.	Sacchetto,	Il	ghetto	e	lo	sciopero,	op.	cit.	
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These	places	represent	the	main	labor	reserves	from	which	intermediaries	and	 employers	 tap	 into	 during	 the	 tomato	 harvest	 season.	 The	 residential	segregation	 in	 the	 Italian	 countryside	 is	 produced	 by	 the	 mixture	 of	 a	multiplicity	 of	 factors	 such	 as	 legislation	 on	 migration	 and	 labor,	 the	impossibility	 of	 accessing	 the	 private	 market	 of	 rentals,	 the	 informality	 of	labor	 relations	 (many	of	 these	 laborers	work	without	a	 contract	or	a	 faulty	contract),	low	salaries	and	the	seasonality	of	employment.	In	the	province	of	Foggia,	the	tomato	harvest,	in	fact,	requires	the	availability	of	labor	for	a	very	limited	period	of	time;	the	beginning	of	July	to	the	end	of	August.	During	this	season,	the	laborer	usually	cannot	perform	more	than	fifty	total	days	of	work.	The	inability	of	the	local	agricultural	system	to	provide	work	and	salary	on	an	annual	 basis,	 therefore,	 contributes	 to	 the	 expanding	 of	 time	 spent	 by	 a	laborer	in	these	settlements.	If	they	do	not	move	to	other	regions,	or	simply	fail	to	achieve	stable	and	lasting	employment,	the	laborers	end	up	trapped	in	these	settlements.	As	Najm,	a	Sudanese	laborer	in	the	Rignano	ghetto	explains:		 Most	 of	 the	 people	 living	 in	 the	 ghetto	 stay	 here	 all	 year	 round	because	they	do	not	know	where	to	go.	We	do	not	have	work,	we	do	not	have	money,	and	many	do	not	have	 legal	documents.	Where	do	you	want	us	to	go?	One	can	stay	here	even	without	legal	documents;	it	is	like	a	big	family.	And	then	we	still	have	to	pay	off	the	debts	owed	to	the	taxi	who	got	us	here	to	Italy,	we	cannot	spend	the	little	money	we	earn	(Najm,	Ghetto	of	Rignano).		 Among	the	informal	settlements,	 there	 is	a	high	level	of	 laborer	mobility.	In	 fact,	many	 laborers	 tend	 to	move	 from	one	 settlement	 to	 another	 in	 the	same	 province	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 specific	 needs	 of	 daily	 life	 and	work.	When	laborers	try	to	get	out	of	these	settlements,	even	for	home	reasons,	the	same	logic	of	subjugation	governing	labor	relations	also	repeats.	This	is	the	case	of	Abdul,	 a	 Senegalese	 laborer	 living	 in	 an	 informal	 settlement	 located	near	 a	provincial	road	of	the	city:		
	 95	
	 I	moved	 from	 the	ghetto	 to	 the	 countryside	 to	go	work	on	a	 farm.	 I	slept	in	a	room	with	5	other	people	in	a	country	house	owned	by	the	Italian	head.	 I	worked	10	hours	 a	day	 for	3	 euros	 an	hour.	 I	 picked	tomatoes,	 cabbage,	 asparagus,	 celery,	 beets,	 fennels,	 etc.	However,	 I	also	had	to	pay	for	a	place	to	sleep,	6	euros	a	day.	I	paid	180	euros	a	month	when	there	were	30	days	in	the	month	and	185	euros	when	it	had	31	days.	Two	hours	of	work	a	day	went	 to	 just	paying	 the	rent.	Even	if	you	did	not	work,	you	still	had	to	pay	six	euros	a	day	to	sleep.	It	was	cheaper	to	 live	at	the	ghetto	because	you	did	not	have	to	pay	rent	and	you	kept	whatever	you	earned.	At	the	ghetto,	you	save	one	euro	a	day	because	the	transportation	costs	only	5	euros.	When	I	left	the	company,	I	moved	to	this	big	house	with	other	friends	(Abdul,	an	informal	settlement	in	Via	Manfredonia).		 In	 recent	 years	 in	 the	 Capitanata	 plain,	 the	 number	 of	 people	 living	 in	these	settlements	has	 increased	considerably.	Growth	had	affected	not	only	the	number	but	also	the	average	time	spent	by	immigrants	in	these	areas.	At	the	origin	of	this	process	there	are	several	changes	that	have	been	recorded	in	the	southern	border	of	the	Mediterranean,	in	particular,	the	increase	in	the	number	 of	 landings	 on	 Italian	 territory	 following	 the	 outbreak	 of	 the	 Arab	springs	 as	 well	 as	 the	 breakdown	 of	 international	 geo-political	 balances21,	changes	 concerning	 the	migration	policy	 of	 the	 Italian	 government	 and	 the	management	 of	 the	 reception	 system,	 the	 economic	 and	 employment	 crisis	that	 had	 hit	 the	 country	 beginning	 in	 2008,	 and	 several	 changes	 in	 the	method	of	production	recorded	 in	 the	Foggia	countryside,	 in	particular,	 the	increase	in	levels	of	the	mechanization	of	agricultural	production22		that	has	
																																								 																					21	According	 to	 data	 provided	 by	 ACNUR	 on	 arrivals	 just	 by	 sea	 in	 Euro-Mediterranean	countries	(Greece,	Italy,	Malta	and	Spain),	in	2011,	following	the	Arab	Springs,	the	number	of	landings	 in	 Italy	 had	 doubled	 compared	 to	 the	 previous	 peak	 of	 2008,	 when	 about	 36	thousand	arrivals	had	been	registered,	reaching	a	total	of	64	thousand.	22	According	 to	 the	 Cgil	 union,	 beginning	 in	 2015,	 in	 the	 plain	 of	 Capitanata,	 the	 tomato	harvest	season	has	undergone	a	substantial	increase	in	the	level	of	mechanization.	According	to	the	trade	unions,	mechanization	involves	70%	of	the	total	production	in	the	province.	
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made	 the	 presence	 of	 many	 immigrant	 workers	 on	 the	 territory	 higher	compared	to	the	true	needs	of	agricultural	businesses.	The	 informal	 settlements	 of	 the	 Capitanata	 have	 gradually	 turned	 into	places	 where	 shelter	 can	 be	 found	 not	 only	 for	 the	 immigrant	 labor	 force	expelled	from	different	sectors	of	the	labor	market	in	the	country	but	also	for	many	immigrants	who	have	recently	arrived	on	the	Italian	territory	and	hold	international	protection.		 In	the	past,	settlements	would	empty	out	during	the	winter	seasons.	The	 laborers	closely	 followed	the	seasonal	cycles	of	 the	agricultural	harvest	seasons	or	returned	to	work	in	factories	up	in	the	North.	The	economic	crisis	and	then	the	increase	of	landings	on	the	Italian	coast	has	 meant	 that	 the	 presence	 of	 immigrants	 in	 these	 settlements	became	 more	 sedentary.	 The	 ghetto	 of	 Rignano,	 for	 example,	 was	originally	 a	 spontaneous	 village	 of	 laborers.	 It	 has	 now	 become	 a	village	organized,	managed	and	controlled	by	a	few,	especially	by	the	recruiters	of	day	laborers,	and	is	inhabited	throughout	the	year.	This	transition	 occurred	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 Arab	 springs.	 Between	 2012	and	2016,	the	landings	increased	and	so	did	the	presence	of	migrants	on	 our	 territory.	 The	 reception	 system	 could	 not	 manage	 these	arrivals	and	set	forth	a	path	of	integration	for	everyone,	such	as	the	start	of	SPRAR	projects23,	and	therefore	many	migrants	 invaded	the	ghettos	 and	 the	 countryside,	 remaining	 trapped	 in	 these	 places.	Where	 could	 all	 of	 these	people	have	 gone?	 I	 have	 also	met	people	who	have	had	their	homes	up	north	mortgaged	and	wound	up	living	here.	Within	the	large	settlements,	those	who	had	some	extra	money	had	organized	themselves	to	manage	the	lives	of	others:	work,	daily	life	(washing	clothes,	cooking,	etc.),	leisure,	etc.	Control	within	these	places	went	from	being	in	a	productive	sphere	to	a	reproductive	one.	(Interview	with	Concetta,	social	worker).		 In	the	last	few	years,	the	informal	settlements	of	the	Foggia	province	were	invaded	 by	many	 of	 the	 immigrants	 who	 had	 emerged	 from	 the	 reception																																									 																					23	The	Protection	System	for	Asylum	Seekers	and	Refugees	(SPRAR)	consists	of	a	network	of	local	 authorities	 which,	 for	 the	 implementation	 of	 projects	 of	 integrated	 reception,	 have	access,	within	the	limits	of	available	resources,	to	the	National	Fund	for	Asylum	Policies	and	Services.	At	a	local	level,	the	local	authorities,	with	the	support	of	the	third	sector,	guarantee	interventions	 of	 "integrated	 reception"	 that	 go	 beyond	 the	 sole	 distribution	 of	 food	 and	accommodations,	also	providing	complementary	measures	of	 information,	accompaniment,	assistance	 and	 guidance,	 through	 the	 construction	 of	 individual	 itineraries	 for	 socio-economic	integration.	https://www.sprar.it/	
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centers	who	did	not	manage	to	benefit	from	the	second	reception	programs	arranged	by	 the	SPRAR	network.	This	was	 the	case	of	Malam,	a	holder	of	a	residence	permit	for	humanitarian	reasons,	who	along	with	other	immigrants	had	to	leave	the	Center	of	Extraordinary	Reception	(CAS)	in	Abruzzo	where	he	lived.	He	lives	with	fifteen	other	people	in	a	large	farmhouse.					 I	arrived	in	Italy	in	2014.	I	am	from	Guinea-Bissau.	I	am	married	and	have	 two	children,	 one	 that	 is	 twelve	and	 the	other,	 seven,	whom	 I	left	in	Africa	with	my	wife.	I	am	thirty-eight.	I	did	not	know	anyone	In	Italy.	 I	 left	 from	 Libya	 and	 arrived	 in	 Sicily,	 Messina	 to	 be	 exact.	 I	remained	 there	 for	 four	 months	 before	 I	 was	 transferred	 to	 a	reception	center	in	Abruzzo.	I	stayed	in	Abruzzo	for	a	year	and	four	months	 and	 then	 I	 was	 transferred	 again	 to	 a	 small	 town	where	 I	remained	 for	 three	years.	The	 complex	was	very	 far	 from	 the	 town	center.	 It	was	 located	 in	a	very	 isolated	countryside,	where	only	us	Africans	 lived.	 In	all,	we	were	 twelve	men.	The	complex	was	closed	by	the	prefecture	and	everyone	had	to	look	for	a	new	place	to	stay.	I	arrived	 in	 Foggia	 three	months	 ago	with	 eight	 other	 friends,	 in	 the	month	of	June,	for	the	tomato	harvest	season.	I	don’t	know	when	I'll	leave	because	I've	found	other	friends	here	and	I	like	being	here.	I'm	looking	for	a	job	that	would	give	me	the	chance	to	build	a	life	in	Italy.	Without	work,	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	 live.	 I	 am	 now	 trying	 to	 obtain	 a	legal	 work	 contract	 so	 that	 I	 can	 stay	 in	 Italy	 without	 having	problems	 with	 the	 law.	 For	 now,	 I	 have	 a	 residence	 permit	 for	humanitarian	reasons	(Interview	with	Malam,	informal	settlement	of	San	Severo,	Foggia).		 The	direct	consequence	of	these	changes	of	an	endogenous	and	exogenous	nature	has	been	the	broadening	of	low-cost	labor	areas	for	local	agricultural	businesses	 and	 the	 radicalization	 of	 labor	 exploitation.	 Although	 the	exploitation	also	concerns	EU	and	non-EU	immigrants	with	regular	residence	permits,	for	many	of	the	migrants	without	a	residence	permit	the	condition	of	irregularities	 on	 the	 territory	 has	 contributed	 to	 a	 further	 increase	 in	blackmail	 in	 the	 labor	 market	 by	 employers	 strongly	 limiting	 their	 wage	
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demands.	This	 is	what	has	emerged	from	the	story	of	Thierno,	a	Senegalese	laborer.		I	 had	 a	 residence	 permit	 for	 humanitarian	 reasons.	 It	 is	 currently	expired	and	I	am	waiting	for	a	renewal.	They	have	told	me	that	it	 is	very	difficult	to	obtain	a	renewal	without	an	employment	contract.	I	work	day	to	day	in	the	countryside	and	only	for	a	few	months	a	year.	I	always	work	for	the	same	owner	but	I	do	not	have	a	contract.	I	pick	tomatoes,	asparagus,	artichokes,	etc.	I	earn	25	euros	for	each	day	of	work.	It	is	not	much,	but	not	having	to	pay	the	rent	is	enough	for	me.	When	 I	 ask	 for	 more,	 the	 owner	 tells	 me	 that	 25	 euros	 is	 already	more	than	enough	because	I	am	not	allowed	to	stay	in	Italy	and	if	the	police	ever	stop	him	while	on	our	way	to	work	he	would	risk	prison.	I	know	 that	 it	 is	 all	 just	an	excuse	 to	not	pay	more	 (Interview	with	Thierno,	informal	settlement	of	Arpinova,	Foggia).	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 99	
4.2	 Farm	 work	 in	 Capitanata:	 sweatshop,	 labour	 contractors,	
circumventing	regulations	
	 In	the	province	of	Foggia,	ninety	percent	of	those	employed	in	agriculture,	both	 natives	 and	 immigrants,	 do	 not	 have	 a	 correct	 salary	 framework.	Irregular	 work	 concerns	 the	 entire	 workforce,	 but	 it	 registers	 high	percentages	especially	among	immigrant	workers24.	The	 provincial	 collective	 labor	 agreement	 in	 the	 province	 of	 Foggia	provides	a	work	schedule	of	six	hours	and	thirty	minutes	a	day	with	a	daily	pay	of	 fifty-four	and	 fifty-eight	euro	cents.	 In	 the	countryside	of	Capitanata,	only	Italian	workers	are	able	to	get	this	pay.	Immigrant	workers,	both	EU	and	non-EU,	 take	what	 is	 commonly	 called	 “paga	di	piazza”	 (public	 pay),	which	ranges	 from	 a	minimum	 of	 three	 euros	 and	 a	maximum	 of	 four	 euros	 per	hour.	 Instead,	 in	 the	case	of	piecework,	pay	 is	by	 “cassone"	 (chest)	and	 it	 is	attested	at	 three	euros	and	 fifty	cents	per	chest.	The	 two	methods	result	 in	the	same	pay	for	in	order	to	fill	15	chests	it	would	take	a	laborer	more	than	ten	hours,	 therefore,	 the	pay	almost	always	comes	to	being	thirty-five/forty	euros	a	day.	Only	a	few,	especially	those	who	have	greater	physical	strength,	working	on	a	piecework	basis	with	a	pay	per	chest,	manage	to	earn	more,	but	are	forced	to	work	for	more	than	twelve	consecutive	hours.	It	is	not	rare,	in	fact,	 to	 see	 laborers	 pick	 tomatoes	 until	 late	 at	 night	with	 small	 flashlights	attached	 to	 their	 bodies.	 African	 laborers	 are	 by	 far	 the	 most	 oppressed	because	 many	 of	 them	 are	 without	 regular	 residence	 permits	 and	 are	therefore	blackmailed	more	often	and	more	likely	to	accept	low	wages.	The	regulation	of	labor	relations	in	the	tomato	sector	takes	place	mainly	in	an	 informal	 manner	 and	 through	 the	 appeal	 of	 agricultural	 companies	 to	those	 that	 are	 commonly	 referred	 to	 as	 "caporali"	 (informal	 labour	contractors/recruiters	of	day	laborers).	The	 informal	 labour	 contracting	 is	 an	 ancient	 and	 widespread	phenomenon	in	the	plains	of	Capitanata,	as	well	as	in	all	of	Southern	Italy.	In																																									 																					24	Interview	with	Daniele	Iacovelli,	Flai-Cgil.	
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the	past,	companies	had	an	intermediary	of	reference	in	every	municipality	in	order	 to	 obtain	 laborers	 that	 were	 available	 for	 every	 harvesting	 season:	tomatoes,	 broccoli,	 asparagus,	 etc.	 The	 intermediary	 was	 in	 charge	 of	contacting	the	laborers,	gathering	them	together	and	accompanying	them	to	work.	For	the	intermediation,	little	or	nothing	was	asked	in	return.	Over	the	years,	 the	 farms	 had	 entrusted	 these	 subjects	 who	 carried	 out	 the	intermediary	service,	therefore,	establishing	solid	bonds	with	them.	The	restructuring	of	Italian	agriculture	in	the	last	three	decades	in	terms	of	 production	 and	 labor	 has	 also	 transformed	 the	 profile	 of	 this	 figure.	Today’s	 recruiter	 is	 an	 informal	 intermediary,	 often	 a	 laborer	 or	 former	laborer	 belonging	 to	 the	 different	 immigrant	 communities	 present	 in	 the	territory,	who	recruits	workers	on	behalf	of	a	third	party	company	and	keeps	for	 himself,	 through	 different	 methods,	 a	 part	 of	 the	 salary	 paid	 by	 the	business	for	every	single	laborer.	The	majority	of	the	recruiters	operating	in	the	Italian	countryside	belong	to	the	various	foreign	communities	present	in	the	territory.	They	mainly	recruit	laborers	who	belong	to	their	own	national	or	ethnic	group.	As	widely	discussed	 in	 the	previous	chapters,	agricultural	 farms	are	now	included	 within	 transnational	 agri-food	 chains	 led	 by	 big	 buyers.	 These	companies	need	to	resist	the	pressure	that	is	carried	out	by	companies	at	the	head	 of	 the	 transnational	 supply	 chains,	 keeping	 labor	 costs	 as	 low	 as	possible.	Factors	such	as	production	 instability	and	harvest	seasonality	also	require	 the	 availability	 of	 a	 very	 flexible	 workforce.	 The	 informal	 labour	contractors	satisfy	the	needs	of	flexibility	desired	by	companies,	helping	the	latter	to	manage	the	highs	and	lows	in	labor	demand	through	the	provision	of	temporary	and	low-cost	labor.	They	then	benefit	and	profit	from	the	inability	of	the	public	protagonist	to	regulate	the	encounter	between	the	demand	and	supply	 of	 labor,	 the	 needs	 of	 companies	 to	 keep	 labor	 costs	 low	 and	 the	inability	of	local	labor	markets	to	provide	a	temporary	labor	force	on	a	just	in	
time	 basis.	 In	 transnational	 production	 networks,	 the	 informal	 labour	contractor	carries	out	three	fundamental	functions:	coordination	(organizing	and	 coordinating	 the	 supply	 of	 the	 labor	 force	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 specific	
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requests	 by	 companies),	 information	 (connecting	 with	 different	 groups	 of	laborers	 and	 helping	 to	 overcome	 informational	 obstacles	 between	entrepreneurs	and	workers),	efficiency	 (reduces	transaction	costs	related	to	the	search	and	recruitment	of	a	certain	number	of	laborers	to	be	employed	at	a	certain	time)25.		As	Ernesto,	an	agricultural	businessman	in	the	province	of	Foggia	explains:		 It	 is	 difficult	 for	 the	 employer	 to	 organize	 a	 team	 of	 laborers	independently.	It	is	not	easy	to	find	thirty	people	in	a	few	hours	who	would	 come	 to	 pick	 tomatoes	 on	 your	 farm.	 The	 company	 cannot	contact	 laborers	one	at	a	time	and	take	them	to	the	fields	to	do	one	or	 more	 days	 of	 work.	 It	 is	 easier	 to	 contact	 an	 intermediary	 and	entrust	him	with	the	organizing	of	the	labor	force.	During	the	harvest	season,	 you	 have	 to	 be	 efficient;	 you	 must	 quickly	 contact	 and	organize	the	team,	and	have	the	necessary	means	to	accompany	the	laborers	to	the	farm.	Then	you	have	to	consider	that	the	majority	of	the	farm	companies	are	small.	With	almost	any	company	the	harvest	stage	could	 last	even	a	week,	and	not	all	can	afford	to	be	organized	and	efficient	(Interview	with	Ernesto,	Farmer,	San	Severo,	Foggia).		 The	 resorting	 to	 informal	 labour	 contractors	 is	 also	 simplified	 by	 the	fragmentation	 of	 the	 agricultural	 production	 system	 of	 the	 province,	 in	particular,	 by	 the	 presence	 of	 small	 businesses	 that	 are	 unable	 to	 develop	forms	of	aggregation	and	for	which	harvesting	by	hand26	is	the	only	possible	method	of	production:		 Companies	 that	 produce	 tomatoes	 are	 very	 small27		 and	 cannot	afford	 to	 buy	machinery.	 The	machinery,	 in	 fact,	 is	 usually	 rented.																																									 																					25 	Cfr.	 S.	 Barrientos,	 Labour	 chains:	 analysing	 the	 role	 of	 labour	 contractors	 in	 global	
production	 networks,	 University	 of	 Manchester,	 Brooks	 World	 Poverty	 Institute,	 Working	Paper	153,	July	2011.	26	According	to	estimates	by	the	CGIL	trade	union	organization,	harvesting	by	hand	makes	up	for	30%	of	the	total	tomato	production	in	the	province.			27	As	mentioned	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 the	 structure	 of	 properties	 in	 the	 south	 is	 more	fragmented	 than	 the	north.	 In	 the	Puglia	region,	 the	average	size	 farm	 is	8.75	hectares	per	farm.	
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Obviously,	 the	owner	of	the	machinery	would	say:	 if	 I	have	to	come	to	you	and	you	have	only	three	hectares,	I	would	rather	prefer	to	go	to	 someone	 else	 who	 has	 twenty	 because	 I	 could	 spend	 the	 entire	day	on	a	single	field,	not	going	from	one	farm	to	the	next,	and	earning	a	lot	more.	It	would	not	be	worth	it	for	the	owner	of	the	machinery	to	go	to	ten	different	 farm	businesses	who	have	three	to	four	hectares	each.	He	would	waste	more	time	and	earn	less.	So,	if	you	have	a	small	business	like	mine,	you	have	to	pick	the	tomatoes	by	hand	(Interview	with	Angelo,	Farmer,	Borgo	Mezzanone,	and	Foggia).		The	farm	businesses	in	the	area	make	use	of	these	informal	intermediaries,	but	do	not	carry	out	any	kind	of	control	over	them.	In	the	Foggia	countryside,	the	 informal	 labour	contractors	are	responsible	 for	different	kinds	of	abuse	and	 labor	 exploitation.	 These	 intermediaries,	 who	 have	 very	 strong	consolidated	 economic	 relationships	 with	 local	 businesses,	 dictate	 the	working	and	salary	conditions	of	the	laborers	on	behalf	of	the	businesses	and	have	the	power	to	control	the	agricultural	labor	market	in	the	province.	As	noted	by	Giovanni	Mininni,	national	secretary	for	the	Flai-Cgil	union:		 The	 informal	 labour	 contractor	 represents	 the	 "armed	wing"	of	 the	agricultural	company	because	entrepreneurs	are	aware	that	without	recruiters	 they	 would	 encounter	 enormous	 difficulties	 in	 finding	low-cost	laborers	who	are	willing	to	offer	their	skills	for	a	few	euros	per	hour.	The	recruiter	is	a	very	useful	tool	for	companies	that	want	to	 reduce	 costs	 and	 retain	more	profit	margins	 from	 their	business	activities.	 If	 a	 company	were	 to	 recruit	 laborers	 on	 a	 legal	 basis	 it	would	 have	 to	 abide	 by	 a	 provincial	 contract	 and	 pay	 laborers	 €	54.58	 a	 day	 for	 6	 hours	 and	 thirty	 minutes	 of	 work.	 Labor	 costs	represent	the	only	expense	for	a	company	to	leverage	on.	For	the	rest,	it	 is	 not	 possible	 to	 do	 so	 with	 fuel,	 equipment,	 plant	 protection	products,	 etc.	The	point	 is	 the	productive	 system	of	 the	province	 is	not	 interested	 in	 developing	 forms	 of	 aggregation	 aiming	 towards	the	 valorization	 of	 its	 products	 in	 order	 to	 obtain	 a	 higher	market	price.	The	only	strategy	producers	use	to	remain	in	the	market	is	to	
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go	 to	 the	 laborer	and	say:	 there	are	many	of	you	 in	 the	province	of	Foggia;	I	can	pay	you	a	maximum	of	30	euros	a	day.	If	you	can	agree	to	 that	 then	come	 to	work,	otherwise	 stay	at	home	(Interview	with	Giovanni	Mininni,	Flai	Cgil,	Rome).		 The	need	to	keep	labor	costs	 low	and	meet	the	 just	in	time	demand	force	farmers	to	refer	to	informal	labor	contractors.	Based	on	stories	from	laborers,	 labor	exploitation	mainly	affects	working	hours	and	wages.	The	control	of	the	labor	force	by	recruiters	is	organized	on	different	 levels	 and	 covers	 a	 series	 of	 activities	 ranging	 from	 the	transportation	of	the	laborer	to	the	workplace,	up	to	the	payment	of	wages	at	the	end	of	 the	 season,	passing	 through	a	 series	of	 services	provided	by	 the	recruiter	directly	on	the	worksite,	earning	economic	compensation	as	a	result.	At	dawn,	 laborers	are	overloaded	into	vans	without	 insurance	and	any	type	of	 safety	 measure	 and	 are	 then	 accompanied	 to	 crammed	 fields;	 they	 are	obliged	to	pay	the	recruiter	five	euros	a	day	for	the	ride	to	the	countryside.	They	also	often	buy	water	and	food	from	him;	in	some	cases,	especially	when	the	 pay	 is	 carried	 out	 by	 piece,	 the	 laborers	 are	 also	 forced	 to	 pay	 part	 of	their	earnings	to	the	recruiter;	Omar,	 a	 farm	 laborer	 from	 Guinea-Bissau,	 describes	 the	 conditions	 he	worked	in	in	the	tomato	companies	of	the	province.		 In	 Foggia,	working	 in	 the	 countryside	 is	 very	heavy.	 In	 order	 to	do	this	work,	you	must	first	eat	well.	Only	if	you	eat	well	will	you	be	able	to	do	your	 job	according	 to	 the	boss.	Then,	 if	you	go	 to	work,	 there	must	be	a	start	and	end	time,	otherwise,	it	is	not	work.	The	work	I	do	is	untimed	and	very	heavy.	They	also	gave	me	a	contract,	but	I	know	the	contract	 is	 false	because	 the	contract	 should	state	 the	start	and	end	times	and	how	much	money	I	earn	per	hour.	I	work	ten	hours	a	day.	A	working	day	is	thirty-five	euros	for	ten	hours	of	work.	There	are	 those	who	pay	3.50	euros	per	hour	and	 those	who	pay	4	euros.	It	depends	on	the	boss;	there	are	the	good	ones	and	the	not	so	good	ones.	However,	this	is	not	legal	because	the	work	is	very	heavy	
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and	 should	 be	 compensated	more.	When	 you	 come	 home,	 you	 feel	very	tired,	so	you	have	to	eat	well.	We	go	out	at	four	in	the	morning	to	go	to	work.	There	are	those	who	return	at	half	past	three	in	the	afternoon,	some	at	half	past	four	and	some	 even	 later.	 It	 depends	 on	 the	work	 to	 be	 done.	 There	 are	 no	fixed	hours.	If	you	want,	you	can	work	every	day,	even	on	Saturdays	and	Sundays.	The	problem	is	thirty-five	euros	a	day	is	nothing.	Then	you	 have	 to	 pay	 five	 euros	 for	 the	 taxi	 ride	 to	 the	 countryside	 and	you	eventually	earn	 just	 thirty	euros.	This	must	end	because	 this	 is	not	good.	You	can	work	like	this	for	eight	years,	but	 in	the	end,	you	are	nobody	to	the	state	because	you	have	always	worked	without	a	contract.	 If	 I	 had	 a	 contract	 instead,	 I	 could	 find	 a	 home	 and	 be	 in	good	standing	with	a	residence	permit.	The	team	consists	of	twenty-five/thirty	people.	In	one	day,	we	could	fill	even	seven	trucks,	all	by	hand.	The	countryside	is	all	around	here,	half	an	hour/an	hour	away	from	the	ghetto.	The	owners	of	the	farms	are	all	Italians.	They	don’t	care	 about	 the	 contract	 or	 us,	 they	 don’t	 even	 give	 us	 a	 bottle	 of	water,	we	have	to	buy	it	from	the	boss.	You	just	have	to	do	your	job.	Then,	when	you	 finish	 -	 after	 twenty	days,	 a	month,	 a	month	and	a	half	-	the	Italian	recruiter	pays	the	black	boss	who	takes	the	workers	to	the	fields	(Interview	with	Omar,	informal	settlement	of	via	Borgo	Mezzanone).			 The	transportation	of	laborers	to	the	countryside	is	not	always	carried	out	directly	 by	 the	 recruiter.	 The	 recruiter	 has	 several	 "work	 teams"	 and	coordinates	the	supply	of	 labor	to	more	businesses.	More	often,	he	entrusts	them	 to	 the	 same	 laborers.	 Usually,	 a	 trusted	member	 of	 the	work	 team	 is	given	 the	 task	 of	 driving	 the	 van	 and	 accompanying	 the	 laborers	 to	 the	working	 field.	 The	 laborer	 in	 charge	 is	 exempted	 from	 the	 cost	 of	 the	 taxi	service	and	has	the	additional	task	of	collecting	the	fees	paid	by	each	member	of	the	team	for	the	taxi	service.	This	is	the	case	of	Bangi,	a	laborer	from	Sierra	Leone	and	former	resident	of	the	Rignano	ghetto.			
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I	arrived	 in	Lampedusa	on	August	8,	2013.	 I	 am	 twenty-eight	years	old	and	I	come	from	Sierra	Leone.	Before	arriving	in	Italy,	 I	worked	in	Libya	for	a	year.	I	did	everything,	any	kind	of	work.	The	situation	was	very	dangerous	 in	Libya,	 I	 saw	people	dying	while	walking	 the	streets.	 So,	 I	 decided	 to	 take	 a	 boat	 and	 come	 to	 Italy.	 From	Lampedusa,	I	was	transferred	to	a	Sprar	center	in	Ravenna,	where	I	stayed	 for	 two	 years.	 After	 two	 years	 in	 Ravenna	 without	 work,	 I	decided	to	go	to	work	in	the	countryside	here	in	Foggia.	I	arrived	at	the	Rignano	ghetto	on	April	9,	2016.	As	soon	as	I	arrived,	while	I	was	looking	for	work,	 I	met	a	girl	who	told	me	that	a	 friend	of	hers	was	looking	for	a	laborer	who	could	also	drive	a	van.	There	was	a	team	of	eight	 people	 to	 bring	 to	 the	 fields	 every	morning	 but	 there	was	 no	driver.	The	van	belonged	to	this	person.	I	would	leave	in	the	morning	with	eight	other	men	and	go	 to	work.	 I	 also	worked	 the	 fields	with	them.	I	took	5	euros	from	every	person	for	the	transportation	fee	and	then,	at	the	end	of	the	evening,	I	gave	the	money	to	the	owner	of	the	van.	 I	 did	 not	 pay	 my	 5	 euros	 because	 I	 drove	 the	 van	 and	 the	transportation	fee	was	free.	Now	I	work	with	another	boss.	Work	is	very	 heavy.	 The	 workday	 starts	 at	 6	 in	 the	 morning	 and	 ends	 at	4/4.30	in	the	afternoon.	We	have	one	break	that	lasts	half	an	hour.	In	the	countryside,	you	never	work	less	than	ten	hours	because	the	pay	is	 three	 euros	 per	 hour.	 If	 you	work	 ten	 hours	 you	 earn	 30	 euros.	Then	you	have	to	pay	5	euros	for	transportation.	You	have	to	work	as	hard	as	you	can	because	 the	harvesting	season	 for	us	 laborers	only	lasts	a	few	months.	The	first	year	I	arrived	at	the	ghetto	I	worked	26	days	 a	month	 for	 three	months.	When	 you	 are	 very	 tired,	 you	 can	stop	 for	 a	 maximum	 of	 3/4	 days;	 no	 more	 than	 that,	 because	 you	have	to	work	and	earn	all	that	you	can	during	the	season	(Interview	with	Badgi,	informal	settlement	of	via	Manfredonia).		The	 temporary	 nature	 of	 the	 labor	 demand	 requires	 many	 laborers	 to	accept	piecework,	payments	per	chest,	in	order	to	increase	the	daily	pay	and	the	 total	wages	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 harvest	 season.	 Piecework	 represents	 an	incentive	 to	 increase	 the	 rhythm	 of	 work	 up	 to	 the	 limit	 of	 physical	
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possibilities.	 It	creates	a	true	form	of	self-exploitation	because	it	pushes	the	laborers	 to	work	 to	 the	maximum	with	 the	mirage	 of	 earning	 a	 few	 euros	more.	 The	 excessive	 physical	 concentration,	 which	 the	 laborer	 undergoes,	ends	up	debilitating	his	bodily	health.	This	is	what	emerges	from	the	story	of	a	Senegalese	laborer:		 I	always	work	by	chest	because	I	earn	more.	In	a	day,	I	can	even	fill	fifteen	 chests.	 Each	 chest	 is	 worth	 3.50	 euros.	 I	 work	 this	 way	because	when	 the	 harvest	 season	 arrives,	 I	 have	 to	 take	 advantage	and	earn	all	 that	 I	 can	because	 the	harvest	does	not	 last	more	 than	two	 months.	 During	 the	 tomato	 season,	 I	 work	 almost	 every	 day.	Sometimes	 I	 rest	 because	 the	work	 is	 quite	 heavy	 and	 it	 hurts	my	back	 (Interview	 with	 Amadou,	 informal	 settlement	 of	 Borgo	Mezzanone).		 One	of	 the	elements	 that	associates	with	 the	 story	of	 the	 interviewees	 is	the	complaint	expressed	by	the	laborers	regarding	the	control	performed	by	the	recruiters	with	the	methods	as	well	as	the	time	it	takes	for	the	payment	of	wages.	Farm	laborers	collect	the	wages	for	the	days	worked	at	the	end	of	the	season.	Increasingly,	however,	they	find	it	difficult	to	collect	the	entire	sums	of	money	they	are	entitled	to	because	the	intermediary	tends	to	keep	a	small	part	 for	 himself.	 This	 control	 performed	 by	 the	 intermediaries	 further	reduces	the	salaries	of	the	laborers	by	extracting	other	value	from	they	labor	performance.	Mbaye,	a	Senegalese	laborer,	explains:			 We	 workers	 are	 paid	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 harvest	 season.	 When	 we	finish,	 the	recruiter	comes	and	says:	 "you	worked	 twenty	days,	you	thirty,	you	twenty-five,	etc.",	and	then	he	pays	us.	But	there	are	also	those	who	do	not	pay.	The	black	recruiter	gets	 the	money	 from	the	Italian	one,	they	split	it	half-and-half,	and	then	he	"eats"	everything.	I	am	 still	 waiting	 for	 money	 from	 my	 boss.	 He	 claims	 that	 it	 hasn’t	arrived.	I	cannot	do	anything	because	I	don’t	have	a	contract.	There	
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are	 those	 who	 even	 have	 to	 wait	 two	 or	 three	months	 to	 be	 paid.	Then,	when	they	do	pay	you,	you	do	not	even	get	all	 the	money	 for	the	days	worked.	Even	if	I	call	the	police,	I	have	no	legal	documents	proving	that	I	worked	for	him.	That	is	the	problem.	This	thing	has	to	end!	 Some	 of	 the	 laborers,	who	 come	here	 only	 during	 the	 harvest	period,	 sometimes	 are	 forced	 to	 leave	 Foggia	 without	 even	 being	paid	(Interview	with	Mbaye,	informal	settlement	of	San	Severo).		 The	risk	that	a	laborer	is	not	paid,	or	collects	only	part	of	his	wages,	also	emerges	from	the	story	of	another	Senegalese	laborer:		 I	always	work	in	the	countryside	now,	above	all	with	tomatoes.	I	earn	4	 euros	 an	 hour	 and	 I	 always	 pay	5	 euros	 for	 transportation.	 I	 can	survive	with	the	money	I	earn.	The	problem	is	when	you	work	in	the	countryside	 you	 then	 have	 to	wait	 two	months	 to	 be	 paid	 for	 your	days	of	work.	Nobody	pays	immediately.	My	boss	pays,	but	I	have	to	wait.	There	are	also	those	who	do	not	pay	at	all	or	keep	a	part	of	the	money	 for	 themselves	 (Interview	 with	 Samba,	 an	 informal	settlement	of	Borgo	Mezzanone).		 Although	 recruiters	 and	 agricultural	 companies	 are	 directly	 responsible	for	 the	poor	working	conditions	of	 laborers	 in	 the	 tomato	 industry	chain,	 it	should	however	be	emphasized	that	the	processes	and	working	conditions	in	companies	supplying	industry	tomatoes	are	heavily	influenced	by	the	actions	of	 other	 companies	 included	 in	 the	 value	 chain	 and	 by	 the	 decisions	 and	power	of	global	buyers	who	are	at	the	head	of	agri-food	transnational	chains.	As	discussed	in	the	second	chapter,	the	possibility	for	companies	to	make	use	 of	 a	 flexible	 and	 low-cost	 labor	 force	 represented	 the	 only	 method	 to	remain	 incorporated	 in	 the	 transnational	 agri-food	 networks,	 take	 on	international	competition	and	resist	the	pricing	policy	imposed	by	big	buyers.		The	use	of	labor	contractors	and	a	temporary	and	low-cost	labor	force	allows	suppliers	 to	 respond	 to	 the	 demand	 of	 international	 buyers	 at	 the	 lowest	possible	cost.	In	the	tomato	industry	chain,	the	farmers	of	Capitanata	satisfy	
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the	 requests	 for	 supply	 of	 processing	 companies	 located	 in	 the	 province	 of	Naples.	These	processing	companies	are	specialized	in	the	supply	of	private	label	 products	 to	 large	 international	 buyers.	 These	 big	 buyers	 seek	 to	maximize	 their	 market	 share	 by	 obtaining	 products	 by	 suppliers	 at	 the	lowest	possible	costs.	As	widely	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter,	large	retailers,	united	in	buying	alliances,	 buy	 industrial	 tomatoes	 at	 an	 ever-lower	 price	 through	 the	mechanism	 of	 double-reduction	 online	 auctions.	 The	 tomatoes	 are	 sold	 by	the	processor	at	a	market	price	that	often	and	only	manages	to	cover	direct	costs	 (raw	 material,	 transport,	 labor,	 processing	 costs,	 etc.)	 excluding	 all	those	 that	 are	 related	 to	 depreciation,	 labeling,	 maintenance	 of	 facilities,	quality	controls,	etc.	(indirect	costs)28.	The	only	possibility	for	the	processor	to	remain	in	the	market	is	to	place	pressure	on	the	cost	of	the	raw	material,	therefore,	obtaining	the	lowest	possible	prices	from	the	producers.	For	 the	 producers,	 the	 constant	 decrease	 in	 the	 price	 of	 tomatoes	 is	confronted	by	the	pressure	of	labor	costs,	which	for	them	is	the	only	entry	of	expenditure	which	to	act	on.		 This	 year,	 round	 tomatoes	 were	 sold	 at	 87	 euros	 per	 ton,	 which	would	amount	to	0.087	per	kilo.	You	must	keep	in	mind	that	the	fixed	price	 is	 not	 always	 respected.	However,	 even	 if	 you	pay	€87	 a	 ton,	the	 final	price	will	always	different	because	you	have	 to	 remove	all	the	 waste	 and	 unripe	 tomatoes.	 The	 price	 may	 seem	 high,	 but	 in	reality,	 it	 isn’t.	 The	 fact	 is	 the	 average	 yield	 per	 hectare	 ranges	anywhere	 from	 900	 to	 1000	 quintals,	 depending	 on	 the	 crops.	 To	harvest	5	hectares	of	 tomato	 I	need	20	workers	a	day	 for	5	days.	A	company	 like	 mine	 of	 five	 hectares	 can	 earn	 between	 9,000	 and	10,000	euros	a	year	from	the	sale.	But	then	I	have	to	subtract	all	the	expenses	 that	 I	 have	 to	 bear:	 fuel,	 seedlings,	 fertilizers,	 herbicides,	and	plant	protection	products.	How	can	I	pay	laborers	€54	a	day	and	pay	 their	 taxes	 and	 dues?	 What	 is	 left	 for	 me?	 (Interview	 with	Antonio,	Farmer).																																									 																					28	See	third	chapter.	
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	 The	availability	of	 flexible	and	 low-cost	 labor	 is	 for	companies	 located	 in	the	lower	rings	of	the	chain	-	those	involved	with	low	added	value	activities	-	a	true	buffer	against	the	risks	deriving	from	the	instability	of	production	and	against	the	competitive	pressure	carried	out	on	them	from	other	companies	in	the	chain.	The	demand	for	flexibility	and	competitiveness	from	companies	situated	 in	 the	 intermediate	 segments	and	at	 the	 top	of	 the	chain	 is	passed	onto	 the	 laborers	 of	 the	 supplying	 companies,	 therefore,	 creating	 and	reinforcing	 the	 practices	 of	 informal	 regulation	 of	 labor	 relations	 (illegal	employment,	 use	 of	 labor	 contractors,	 etc.)	 and	 further	worsening	working	conditions	 (salaries,	 wages,	 hours,	 rhythms,	 etc.).	 The	 possibility	 for	 these	companies	to	continue	to	extract	a	share	of	the	surplus	from	the	production	activity	 can	 only	 be	 achieved	 by	 the	 exploitation	 of	 the	more	 informal	 and	invisible	segments	of	the	labor	force	present	on	the	territory,	such	as	migrant	laborers.								
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4.3	 Trade	 union’s	 action	 in	 fighting	 the	 deterioration	 of	
labour	 relations:	 strategies,	 limits,	 obstacles	 and	
responsibilities	
	This	 section	 discerns	 two	 set	 of	 strategies	 which	 could	 potentially	complement	 each	 other	 in	 the	 empowerment	 of	migrant	workers29.	 On	 the	one	 hand,	 trade	 unions	may	 seek	 to	modify	 state’s	mediation	 in	 the	 labour	market	 and,	 hence,	 look	 for	 the	 state’s	 intervention	 in	 the	 recognition	 and	defence	 of	 ‘the	 whole’	 working	 class’	 rights,	 including	 migrants’,	 within	 a	specific	 territory.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 in	 conditions	 in	 which	 the	 former	strategy	 is	not	 successful30,	 trade	unions	may	also	seek	 to	directly	organise	and	 mobilise	 workers,	 in	 a	 sort	 of	 strategic	 by-pass	 of	 labour	 laws	 and	paternalistic	 behaviour	 towards	 unorganised	 workers 31 ,	 to	 achieve	 an	
immediate	 improvement	 of	 the	 living	 and	 working	 conditions.	 What	 is	 at	stake	is	that	since	migrants	struggles	lie	well-beyond	normalized	patterns	of	collective	bargaining,	«trade	unions	today	must	act	as	a	civil	society	actor	…	rather	than	as	a	strictly	labour-related	interest	body»32.	 In	 Italy	 the	 relations	 between	 trade	 unions	 and	 migrant	 workers	 have	represented	 a	 special	 case	 comparing	 to	 other	 European	 countries33.	 In	between	 the	 1980s	 and	 1990s	 actions	 of	 the	main	 the	 Italian	 trade	 unions	(CGIL-CISL-UIL)	 toward	migrant	workers	have	been	based	on	 inclusion	and																																									 																					29Cfr.	 S.	 Marino,	Trade	Union	 Inclusion	 of	Migrant	 and	Etnich	Minority	Workers:	 Comparing	
Italy	and	the	Netherlands,	European	Journal	of	Industrial	Relations,	18	(1),	2012,	pp.	5-20;	S.	Marino,	 R.	 Penninx	 and	 J.	 Roosblad,	 Trade	 Unions,	 Immigration	 and	 Immigrants	 in	 Europe	
revisited:	Union’s	attitudes	and	actions	under	new	conditions,	Comparative	Migration	Studies	3(1),	2015,	pp.	1-16.	30	Cfr.	 JF.	 Rye	 and	 J.	 Andrzejewska,	 The	 structural	 disempowerment	 of	 Eastern	 European	
migrant	farm	workers	in	Norwegian	agriculture.	Journal	of	rural	studies,	26(1),	2010,	41-51;	B.	 Selwyn,	 Social	 upgrading	 and	 labour	 in	 global	 production	 networks:	 A	 critique	 and	 an	
alternative	conception,	Competition	&	Change,	17(1),	2013,	75-90.	31	Cfr.	B.	Rogaly,	Migrant	Workers	in	the	ILO's	Global	Alliance	Against	Forced	Labour	Report:	a	
critical	appraisal,	Third	World	Quarterly,	29(7),	2008,	1431-1447.	32	S.	Marino,	 R.	 Penninx	 and	 J.	 Roosblad,	Trade	Unions,	 Immigration	and	 Immigrants	…,	cit.,	p.10.	33	Cfr.	Rinaldini	M.,	Marino	S.,	Trade	unions	and	migrant	workers	in	Italy:	Between	labour	and	
social	rights,	in	Trade	Unions	and	Migrant	Workers,	Edward	Elgar	Publishing,	2017,	pp.	266-286.		
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cooperation.	 Starting	 with	 an	 approach	 oriented	 to	 provide	 services	 and	solutions	 for	 practical	 problems,	 trade	 unions	 aimed	 to	 involve	 migrant	workers	 in	 unions’	 membership	 enabling	 their	 participation	 and	 inclusion	within	 unions’	 organization34.	 However,	 since	 the	 2000s	 their	 attitude	 to	empower	migrant	workers	 has	 been	 increasingly	 undermined	by	 economic	crises35	and	 by	 the	 less	 influence	 of	 Italian	 trade	 unions	 in	 socio-economic	decision-making	 processes	 at	 state	 level36.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 current	 relation	between	 trade	union	and	migrant	workers	 in	 Italy	has	 lost	 its	original	 trait	based	 on	 inclusion	 and	 cooperation37.	 In	 a	 context	 of	 European	 unions	decline	 in	 organizing	migrant	workers,	 the	 action	 of	 the	main	 Italian	 trade	union	in	the	agri-food	industry	confirms:	(1)	the	loss	of	capacity	to	organize	and	 protect	 migrant	 workers	 from	 work	 exploitation;	 and	 (2)	 that	 the	prevalence	 of	 conservative	 positions	 among	 major	 trade	 unions	 sows	 the	seeds	for	new	forms	of	class	resistance	and	organisation	to	emerge. 	
CGIL:	The	Contractors	Law	and	the	Caravans	Italian	trade	unions	have	not	been	successfully	responding	to	the	shifts	in	the	organization	 of	 production	 and	 labour	 relations	 in	 agri-food	 sector.	 Their	action	is	still	linked	to	a	strategy	that	aims	to	counter	labour	exploitation,	and	therefore	 claim	 more	 rights	 and	 better	 working	 conditions,	 by	 putting	pressure	 mainly	 upon	 ‘direct	 employers’.	 The	 actions	 of	 the	 main	 Italian	trade	unions	against	the	exploitation	of	migrant	farmhands	have	taken	place	in	 line	 with	 this	 pattern	 of	 union’s	 response	 oriented	 to	 exercise	 legal	pressure	on	the	“formal”/”direct”	employers,	i.e.	the	farmers.	
																																								 																					34	Cfr.	S.	Marino,	M.	Rinaldini,	Il	rapporto	tra	sindacati	e	immigrati	in	Italia	in	una	prospettiva	
di	lungo	periodo,	La	rivista	delle	Politiche	Sociali	2-3/2015,	Ediesse,	Roma,	2015,	pp.	87-112.	35	Cfr.	 L.	 Pradella,	 R.	 Cillo,	 Immigrant	 Labour	 in	Europe	 in	Times	 of	 Crisis	 and	Austerity:	 An	
international	Political	Economy	Analysis,	Competition	and	change,	19	(2),	2015,	pp.	145-160.	36	S.	Marino,Trade	Union	 Inclusion	of	Migrant	and	Etnich	Minority	Workers:	Comparing	 Italy	
and	the	Netherlands,	European	Journal	of	Industrial	Relations,	18	(1),	2012,	pp.	5-20.	37	Cfr.	S.	Marino,	M.	Rinaldini,	Il	rapporto	tra	sindacati	e	immigrati	in	Italia,	cit.	
	 112	
The	most	important	trade	union	in	the	Italian	agricultural	sector	is	FLAI-CGIL.38	In	the	last	few	years	its	response	toward	labour	exploitation	has	been	implemented	both	at	national	and	local	levels.	At	national	level	the	union	has	put	the	issue	of	labour	exploitation	of	farmhands	in	Italian	countryside	on	the	policy	 agenda	 of	 the	 Italian	 Department	 of	 Agriculture	 and	 achieved	 the	inclusion	 of	 new	 requirements	 in	 labour	 law	 (199/2016).	 The	 law	 is	 the	outcome	 of	 several	 sector	 strikes,	 demonstrations	 and	 national	 campaigns	organized	 in	 the	 last	 few	 decades	 both	 by	 migrant	 farmhands	 and	 Italian	trade	unions	 in	 order	 to	denounce	work	 exploitation	 and	 informal	work	 in	agricultural	sector39.	It	contains	several	measures	against	informal	work	and	labour	 exploitation	 in	 the	 agricultural	 sector.	 The	most	 important	measure	affects	 the	 fight	 against	 labour	 exploitation	 punishing	 informal	 labour	contractors	and	employers	by	imprisonment	of	between	one	and	six	years40.	Furthermore,	 the	 law	provides	the	government	to	 take	 judicial	control	over	the	 firm	where	 the	workers	have	been	exploited	 illegally,	 and	establish	 the	proceedings	 for	 their	 regularisation	 in	 terms	of	wages,	 contracts	 and	 social	security	 contributions.	 The	 law	 also	 set	 up	 the	 ‘High	 Quality	 Farm	 Work	Network”:	 job	 centers,	 employment	 agencies,	 workers’	 organizations,	 and	employers	may	join	the	network	on	a	voluntary	basis	in	order	to	manage	at	local	 level	 the	 demand	 and	 supply	 of	 (migrant)	 labour	 within	 agricultural	areas.		At	 local	or	workplace	level	proper,	where	 labour	exploitation	 takes	place,	FLAI’s	response	has	been	organised	in	different	ways,	depending	on	the	type	of	 production	 and	 on	 the	 number	 of	 union’s	 members	 available	 in	 the	territory.	 In	 the	 province	 of	 Foggia,	 FLAI’s	 response	 has	 been	 organized	around	 three	 actions:	 First,	 support	 migrant	 workers	 through	 assistance	points	wherein	free	services	as	check	on	social	security	position,	wages	and																																									 																					38	FLAI	(Agroindustry	workers	federation)	is	a	Trade	Union	of	Italian	General	Confederation	of	 Labour	 (CGIL)	 that	 organises	 farm	 workers	 and	 agri-food	 workers.	 The	 number	 of	 its	affiliates	is	250.090	at	31/12/2017.	39	A.	Valentini,	Dalla	denuncia	alla	proposta,	dal	sindacato	di	strada	alla	legge	n.199/2016	 in	
Agromafie	 e	 Caporalato,	 Quarto	 Rapporto,	 Osservatorio	 Placido	 Rizzotto	 (Eds.),	 Ediesse,	Roma,	2018,	pp.	26-28.	40	See	http://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2016/11/3/16G00213/sg 
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work	 contracts	 were	 offered.	 Second,	 support	 to	migrant	 workers	 through	‘street	 unions	 squads’.	 During	 the	 summer	 harvesting	 season,	 for	 three	months,	the	squads	go	out	early	in	the	morning	every	day.	In	Capitanata	each	squad	 consists	 of	 three	 trade	 unionists.	 On	 three	 caravans,	 trade	 unionists	travel	 around	 the	 countryside	 to	 meet	 farm	 workers	 and	 give	 them	information	 about	 their	 working	 rights	 –	 wages,	 working	 time,	 health,	contracts,	social	security,	unemployment	benefits	and	especially	information	about	 the	 possibility	 to	 denounce	 informal	 labour	 and	 exploitation	 to	 the	labour	inspectorate.	Their	major	aim	is	to	meet	workers,	make	direct	contact	with	them	and,	when	possible,	encourage	them	to	come	to	the	union’s	office.	As	reported	by	a	street	unionist:		 “If	 we	 find	 evidence	 of	 labour	 exploitation	 taking	 place	 we	cannot	 stop	 the	 labour	process.	We	 rather	prefer	 to	meet	 the	workers	later	in	order	to	protect	them	from	the	employer	and	labour	contractors.	For	example,	last	year,	a	Moroccan	worker	got	 beat	 when	 he	 denounced	 his	 employer	 	 during	 a	 labour	inspector	control.	So,	it	is	obvious,	that	it’s	definitely	safer	if	we	meet	 them	 later	 in	 a	 different	 place	 far	 from	 employers	 and	labour	 contractors”	 (Interview	 with	 Tony,	 street	 unionist,	Foggia,	August	2018).		The	third	action	consists	in	supporting	migrant	workers	to	build	a	‘grass-root	union	 representation’	 system.	 More	 specifically,	 the	 FLAI-CGIL	 is	 training	migrant	 trade	 unionists	 in	 order	 to	 have	 delegates	 in	 the	 main	 informal	settlements	 of	 the	 Capitanata,	 by	 giving	 them	 the	 skills	 to	 support	 other	migrant	workers	 in	 their	 claims.	The	action	 is	 still	 on-going	and	 it	 seeks	 to	train	 at	 least	 sixteen	 trade	 unionists	 in	 the	 province	 of	 Foggia	who	will	 be	able	to	give	information	to	the	farmhands	about	their	working	rights.	These	trade	unionists	shall	have	the	responsibility	of	pushing	workers	to	denounce	exploitation,	 informal	 labour	 contractors	 and	 informal	 employers	 to	 have	right	wage	and	better	working	conditions.		
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FLAI’s	 efforts	 to	develop	 these	 two	mentioned	 strategies,	 at	 the	national	and	 local	 levels,	 have	 barely	 up	 until	 today	 produced	 positive	 results.	 For	example,	despite	unions’	membership	has	increased	among	migrant	workers	–	today	almost	the	30%	of	FLAI-CGIL	union’s	membership	in	the	province	of	Foggia	 are	 foreign	 workers41–	 the	 number	 of	 legal-complaints	 for	 labour	exploitation	 is	 still	 low.	 In	 2017,	 within	 the	 entire	 province,	 only	 forty	workers	 reported	 to	 the	 labour	 inspectorate	 and	 the	 general	 working	conditions	 of	 migrant	 farmhands	 remains	 miserable.42	Moreover,	 the	 ‘High	Quality	Farm	Work	Network’	set	up	by	the	law	(199/2016)	has	been	a	failure	because	 very	 few	 employers	 have	 joined	 it43	and,	 most	 problematically,	because	the	law	provides	no	disposition	for	any	extra	budgetary	expenditure	to	secure	its	real	implementation	at	workplace	level.	The	 enforcement	 of	 labour	 law	 cannot	 be	 left	 to	 the	 voluntary	implementation	 of	 employers	 nor	 to	 the	 periodic	 supervision	 of	 labour	inspectors	that	will	more	often	than	not	interpret	the	law	softly.	Instead,	it	is	rather	 up	 to	 the	 capacity	 of	 unionised	 workers	 to	 actively	 defend	 and	implement	 their	 rights	 at	 the	 workplace.	 A	 formalist	 or	 institutionalist	perspective	may	obviate	that	class	power	relations	are	constituted	integrally,	by	 formal	 and	 informal	 relations44	and,	 most	 importantly,	 that	 it	 is	 the	capital-labour	 relationship	 which	 constitutes	 labour’s	 exploitation,	 i.e.	 that	regardless	 the	 provisions	 established	 by	 labour	 law,	 it	 is	 the	 concrete	relationship	 in	 between	 tomato	 producers	 and	 migrant	 workers	 what	determines	 the	 actual	 conditions	 in	 which	 the	 labour	 process	 is	 organised	and	its	produce	distributed	in	South	Italy	45.	
																																								 																					41	Following	 latest	 available	data	 in	2015	 the	FLAI-CGIL	union’s	members	 in	Puglia	Region	were	35.020:	7.298	in	Foggia,	2.973	in	Andria,	6.657	in	Bari,	7.692	in	Brindisi,	5.370	in	Lecce,	5.030	in	Taranto	(Archivio	Tesseramento	CGIL).	42	Interview	with	Daniele	Iacovelli	FLAI-CGIL	(August	2018).	43	Interview	with	Daniele	Iacovelli	FLAI-CGIL	(August	2018).  44	Cfr.	 S.	 Marino,	 Trade	 Union	 Inclusion	 of	 Migrant	 and	 Etnich	 Minority	 Workers,	 cit.;	 P.	Fairbrother,	Rethinking	 trade	 unionism:	Union	 renewal	 as	 transition,	Economic	 and	 Labour	Relations	Review	26(4),	2015,	pp.	561–576.	45	D.	 Spencer,	 Braverman	 and	 the	 contribution	 of	 labour	 process	 analysis	 to	 the	 critique	 of	
capitalist	production-twenty-five	 years	on,	Work,	 Employment	 and	 Society	14(2):	 2000,	 pp.	223–243.	
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FLAI’s	efforts	to	inform	and	mobilise	migrant	workers	against	their	‘direct	employers’	 is	 hindered	 by	 some	 infrastructural	 constraints.	 In	 not	transcending	 the	 representative	 structure	 that	 the	 union	 preserves,	 it	maintains	 a	 union	 structure	 functional	 to	 support	 the	 interests	 of	 core	workers	 who	 are	 already	 organised,	 rather	 than	 of	 incorporating	 workers	located	 in	 the	 periphery	 of	 labour	 market.	 The	 adoption	 of	 various	‘organising’	strategies	of	migrant	workers	after	a	critical	reading	of	the	limits	to	 social	 dialogue	 and	 institutionalised	 forms	 of	 collective	 bargaining46	has	not	 really	 taken	 place	 in	 this	 case-study.	 Significantly,	 in	 the	 province	 of	Foggia	the	number	of	FLAI	union	officials	is	only	six,	a	ridiculous	number	for	the	 amount	 of	 workers	 living	 from	 the	 agricultural	 industry	 and	 the	approximately	 20,000	 migrant	 workers	 who	 have	 few	 power	 resources.	Whether	 if	 it	 can	be	argued	 that	FLAI	has	adopted	a	multi-level	 strategy	 in	the	 empowerment	of	migrant	workers	 in	 Foggia,	 through	 the	 caravans	 and	information	 points	 that	 we	 have	 mentioned,	 is	 quite	 problematic	 because	most	of	the	migrant	workers	have	had	none	or	very	little	connection	with	this	actions47	and,	hence,	have	suffered	from	the	limited	infrastructural	resources	that	have	been	devoted	to	them.	In	addition	to	these	infrastructural	constraints,	we	can	spot	a	weakness	in	FLAI’s	culture	to	produce	the	necessary	cognitive	knowledge48	to	learn	from	and	 incorporate	migrant	workers’	claims,	especially	 in	 the	capacity	 to	voice	the	 interests	of	 the	most	mobile	seasonal	workers.	FLAI’s	strategy	has	been	rather	 predominantly	 oriented	 to	 put	 pressure	 exclusively	 on	 the	 direct	employer	 and	 prohibit	 irregular	 work.	 The	 law	 punishes	 informal	 labour	contractors	 and	 direct	 employers	 not	 contemplating	 in	 the	 least	 the	 role	played	 by	 leading	 firms	 in	 determining	 the	 prices	 and,	 so,	 the	 working	conditions	and	labour	processes	within	the	supplying	firms	of	the	GVC.	FLAI’s	strategy	 has	 been	 thought	 and	 adopted	 vertically,	 and	 have	 not	 sought	 to																																									 																					46	Cfr.	S.	Marino,	R.	Penninx	and	J.	Roosblad,	Trade	Unions,	Immigration	and	Immigrants…,	cit.	pp.	11-12	47	Interview	with	Samba,	immigrant	farmhand	(August	2017).	48	Cfr.	 C.	 Lévesque,	 G.	 Murray,	 Renewing	 union	 narrative	 resources:	 How	 union	 capabilities	
make	a	difference,	British	Journal	of	Industrial	Relations,	51(4),	2013,	777-796.		
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build	 alliances	 with	 other	 workers	 and	 trade	 unions	 operating	 across	 the	agri-food	 sector	 to	 update,	 learn	 from	 and	 unify	 their	 claims.	 As	 it	 will	 be	shown	 in	 the	 next	 section,	 FLAI’s	 demands	 remain	 distant	 from	 the	 more	urgent	needs	that	migrant	workers	have	both	at	 the	workplace	and	 in	their	living	areas.	 In	trying	to	voice	them	better,	however,	a	grass-root	union	has	taken	some	space	and	deployed	its	efforts	to	build	the	associational	ties	that	FLAI	has	missed	to	produce.		
Radical	Unions	Creating	the	Space	for	Migrants’	Empowerment	As	noted	by	Appay	 (1998),	 in	 the	 context	 of	GVCs,	 acting	upon	 the	 smaller	‘direct	 employers’	 can	be	 an	 ineffective	or	 even	 counterproductive	 strategy	because	their	profits,	which	derive	from	unstable	contracts	with	larger	firms	that	buy	their	products,	are	 too	 limited	 for	a	substantial	raise	of	wages	and	the	 improvement	 of	 working	 conditions49.	 Workers	 face	 the	 challenge	 of	finding	 different	 strategies	 in	 order	 to	 put	 pressure	 on	 real	 employer	 and	counteract	the	deterioration	of	labour	relations	within	supply	firms50.	In	 the	 Italian	agri-food	 sector	 it	 is	 the	work	of	USB	 (Unione	Sindacale	di	Base)	 which	 we	 may	 say	 to	 be	 heading	 towards	 this	 direction.	 USB	 is	 an	independent	union	that	was	born	in	2010	as	an	alternative	to	historical	and	traditional	 Italian	 trade	 unions,	 including	 FLAI-CGIL.	 This	 union	 is	 far	 less	representative	in	terms	of	union’s	delegates	and	has	far	fewer	resources	than	the	main	Italian	confederations.	The	action	of	this	union	aims	to	regain	social	and	 union’s	 rights	 through	 the	 strategies	 of	 organising	 and	 unionising	 the	workers	 along	 the	 entire	 agri-food	 chain,	 ‘from	 field	 to	 table’.	 This	 trade	union	 asserts	 the	 role	 of	 migrant	 farmhands	 in	 Italian	 agriculture	 and	 the	amount	 of	 economic	 value	 produced	 by	 them	within	 agri-food	 sector.	 The	union	denounces	to	be	the	oligopolistic	power	and	pricing	policy	of	the	firms	
																																								 																					49 	B.	 Appay,	 Economic	 Concentration	 and	 the	 Externalization	 of	 Labour,	 Economic	 and	Industrial	Democracy,	19	(1),	1998,	pp.	161-194.	50	J.	Wills,	Subcontracted	Employment	and	its	Challenge	to	Labor,	Labor	Studies	Journal,	34	(4),	2009,	pp.	441-460.		
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at	 the	head	of	agri-food	chains	the	cause	 for	 labour	over-exploitation	 in	the	agricultural	sector51.	The	strategy	of	this	union	is	based	on	building	an	integral	alliance	between	local	workers	and	farmers,	and	national	consumers	so	that	they	can	pressure	‘from	the	beginning	until	the	end’	of	the	GVC	the	dominant	firms	at	the	top	of	agri-food	 chains.	 Their	 major	 claim	 is	 to	 defend	 the	 production	 of	 healthy	food	through	securing	a	decent	 life	 for	all	 the	workers.	The	workings	of	the	union	 have	 led	 to	 the	 birth,	 in	 September	 2016	 in	 Venosa52,	 of	 the	 ‘USB	National	 coordination	 group’	 for	 agri-food	 sector	 with	 delegates	 for	 any	territorial	agricultural	area.	Two	years	later,	a	trade	unionist	member	of	this	group,	Soumaila	Sacko,	got	murdered	 in	Calabria	 in	 June	2018.	 In	response,	USB	organised	a	regional	strike	 in	Calabria	and	a	national	demonstration	in	Rome.53	In	august	2018,	other	12	migrant	farmhands	died	in	Foggia	when	the	migrant	driver	who	was	taking	them	home,	and	who	had	also	been	working	all	the	day	long,	went-off	the	road.	USB	and	other	Italian	Unions	organized	a	huge	 strike	 in	 Foggia	 in	 order	 to	 claim	 their	 rights	 and	 better	 working	conditions	for	all	farmhands.		In	 September	 2018,	 after	 several	 demonstrations,	 USB	 has	 presented	 in	Foggia	a	platform	for	the	respect	of	the	agricultural	workers’	union	and	social	rights.	The	platform	aims	to	introduce	an	ethical	code	within	agri-food	supply	chains	able	to	ensure	respect	for	the	workers’	union	and	social	rights	and	for	the	 rights	 of	 farmers	 and	 consumers54.	 The	 most	 important	 points	 of	 the	platform	 are:	 equal	 work	 and	 equal	 pay	 (decent	 work	 and	 fair	 pay),	compliance	with	employers’	social	security	contributions,	 the	regularisation	of	migrants	and	refugees	(the	repeal	of	Bossi-Fini	 law	and	the	access	to	the																																									 																					51	Cfr.	 USB,	 Agricoltura	 Eticoltura.	 Per	 un	 sistema	 agroalimentare	 basato	 sul	 rispetto	 della	
dignità	 e	 dei	 diritti	 sindacali	 dei	 lavoratori,	 sui	 doveri	 dei	 produttori	 e	 sui	 diritti	 di	 tutti	 i	
cittadini	a	produzioni	sane,	Foggia,	22	Settembre	2018.	52	Venosa	 is	 located	 in	 the	 province	 of	 Potenza	 in	 Basilicata	 Region.	 Also	 in	 this	 region	immigrant	 farmhands	 and	 farmers	 supply	 fresh	 tomatoes	 to	 southern	 Italian	 processing	companies.		53	http://www.usb.it/index.php?id=1132&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=102925&cHash=b98630024b	54	Cfr.	 USB,	 Agriculture/Ethiculture,	 A	 Platform	 for	 the	 respect	 of	 the	 agricultural	 workers’	
union	and	social	rights,	Foggia,	22	September	2018.		
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residence	permit	for	social	protection	according	to	the	art.	18	(286/1998)	and	the	 delinking	 of	 residence	 permit	 from	 labour	 contract)55,	 solutions	 to	 the	structural	housing	problem	(with	the	direct	involvement	of	local	authorities,	employers	 and	 workers	 to	 provide	 affordable	 housing	 for	 all	 migrant	workers),	a	public	management	of	work	recruitment,	and	the	conditionality	of	 the	 aids	 for	 firms	 (European	 subsidies	 subject	 to	 the	 compliance	 with	minimum	standards	of	workers’	rights)56.	According	to	USB,	only	by	rethinking	the	whole	agri-food	system	and	the	consequent	policies	that	regulate	the	agricultural	world,	 it	could	rebuild	the	proper	 balance	 between	 producers,	 consumers	 and	 workers 57 .	 Last	September	 of	 2018,	 in	 Foggia,	 the	 union	 opened	 a	 great	 international	campaign	that	aims	to	involve	all	stakeholders	along	the	global	tomato	value	chain:	siding	farmers	and	labourers,	as	well	as	consumers	and	authorities	at	the	 European,	 national	 and	 local	 levels58.	 The	 outcome	 of	 this	 action	 will	depend	on	how	much	this	union	will	be	capable	of	pressuring	leading	firms	and	governmental	authorities	to	affect	the	production,	logistic	and	marketing	strategies	of	the	former,	i.e.	from	the	relations	in	between	firms	within	agri-food	 supply	 chains	 up	 until	 their	 merchandise	 to	 the	 consumers,	 and	 the	infrastructural	resources	of	the	latter	to	provide	political	solutions	to	the	dire	living	 conditions	of	 the	workers	at	 the	 local	 level.	 In	 the	day	 this	 section	 is	been	written,	the	fight	for	producing	an	integral	solution	is	still	on-going.		
Limits	and	possibilities	of	Italian	Unions’	action	
	 Based	 on	 the	 findings	 presented	 in	 the	 section	 we	 can	 to	 conclude	 by	advancing	 four	 arguments.	 First,	 against	 the	 progressive	 deterioration	 of	living	 standards	 of	 tomato-picking	 migrant	 workers,	 the	 agricultural	federation	of	the	major	socialist	Italian	trade	union	Confederazione	Generale	
																																								 																					55	The	residence	permit	for	social	protection	is	issued	to	the	community	and	non	EU-person	who	has	been	in	situations	of	violence	or	serious	sexual	and/or	labour	exploitation	related	to	certain	serious	crimes. 56	Cfr.	USB,	Agriculture/Ethiculture,	A	Platform	for	the	respect	of	…,	cit.	57	Cfr.	USB,	Agricoltura	Eticoltura.	Per	un	sistema	agroalimentare…,	cit.	58	Ibidem.	
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Italiana	 del	 Lavoro	 (CGIL),	 i.e.	 FLAI-CGIL,	 has	 directed	 most	 of	 its	organisational	 resources	 into	 the	 negotiation	 and	 validation	 of	 a	 national-level	 labour	 law	 that	 criminalizes	 labour	 contractors	 for	 hiring	 ‘ilegal’	workers.	 Although	 the	 law	 is	 more	 than	 welcome,	 as	 it	 encourages	 ‘direct	employers’	 to	 legalise	 irregular	employment	 relations	 if	 they	want	 to	avoid	prison,	 the	 strategy	 is	 flawed	 because	 the	 law	 provides	 no	 dispositions	 for	any	 extra	 budgetary	 expenditure	 to	 secure	 its	 real	 implementation	 at	workplace	 level.	 Trade	 unions	 then	must	 adopt	 the	 supervisory	 role	 of	 the	state	 but	 without	 having	 as	 many	 infrastructural	 resources	 and	 political	power	to	enforce	it.	Nevertheless,	and	as	it	has	also	been	show,	FLAI-CGIL	has	complemented	 such	national	 strategy	 through	an	 increasing	engagement	 at	the	 local-level:	 informing	 migrant	 workers	 on	 legal	 and	 working	 issues,	unionising	migrant	workers,	and	denouncing	criminal	contractors.	Although	30%	of	the	FLAI-CGIL	membership	is	of	foreign	origin,	we	can	argue	that	the	union	 has	 not	 been	 effective	 in	 the	mobilisation	 of	migrant	workers	 since,	among	other	things,	has	not	deployed	as	many	resources	to	such	purpose	as	they	would	 be	 necessary,	 e.g.	 the	 union	 has	 only	made	 use	 of	 three	 union	officials	 to	organise	and	supervise	around	20,000	migrant	workers	who	are	geographically	dispersed.		Second,	a	more	radical	and	grass-root	union,	the	USB,	has	by-passed	FLAI-CGIL’s	 strategy	 and	 engaged	with	 the	 contractor-worker	 relationship	 ‘from	below’.	 Instead	 of	 criminalising	 the	 employer	 and	 ignoring	 their	 crucial	position	in	the	value	chain,	USB	has	made	repeated	efforts	to	gather	primary	information	of	the	entrenched	structure	of	the	tomato-picking	industry.	USB	has	 repeatedly	 organised	 meetings	 and	 networked	 with	 marginalised	 and	highly-precarious	 migrant	 workers,	 as	 well	 as	 with	 other	 civil	 society	organisations.	The	result	has	been	a	more	nuanced	understanding	of	the	real	conditions	and	needs	of	 these	workers	who,	among	other	 things,	demand	a	legal-status	and	citizenship	that	the	 labour-law	falls	to	secure.	However,	we	can	also	argue	that	such	strategy	has	failed	to	substantially	improve	workers’	conditions	 because	 USB	 is	 a	 small	 union	 and	 lacks	 the	 infrastructural	resources	that	bigger	unions	have.	 In	this	sense,	to	directly	engage	with	the	
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employers	and	the	workers	is	not	 in	opposition	to	FLAI-CGIL’s	strategy,	but	we	can	understand	it	as	rather	complementary59.	A	complementary	strategy	that	stresses	that	trade	unions	need	to	be	built	as	much	‘from	below’	as	from	‘from	above’.		Third,	 the	Foggia	experience	shows	 that	FLAI-CGIL	has:	 (1)	 incorporated	or	 voiced	 the	 demands	 of	 those	 who	 they	 pretend	 to	 represent	 quite	limitedly;	 and	 (2)	 that	 in	 so	 doing	 it	 has	 predominantly	 reproduced	 its	already-existing	 organisational	 structure	 that	 separates	 ‘insiders’	 who	already	 have	 institutionalised	 patterns	 of	 collective	 bargaining	 from	 the	‘outsiders’	who	lack	them60.	Or	put	 it	differently,	 traditional	 trade	unions	 in	Italy	 have	 not	 yet	 redirected	 significant	 resources	 to	 defend	 and	 unionise	those	workers	who	are	more	in	need,	and	they	have	neither	made	the	effort	to	educate	their	‘core’	membership	that	such	strategy	ought	to	be	prioritised	under	current	historical	conditions.	It	follows	that	major	Italian	trade	unions	have	not	advanced	the	interests	of	all	workers	under	a	unitarian	strategy,	but	that	 they	 have	 rather	 reproduced	 to	 an	 extent	 the	 strong	 class-fractioning	processes	 prevailing	 global	 capitalism	 that,	 no	 matter	 how	 contradictorily,	homogenise	and	downgrade	workers	position	vis-à-vis	capital61.	Fourth,	 the	strategic	division	in	between	 ‘insiders’	and	 ‘outsiders’	 locates	migrant	workers	on	 a	 secondary	plane	within	 the	overall	 strategy	of	 union	renewal.	This	may	have	much	more	important	repercussions	for	the	workers	in	 the	 short-run	 than	 what	 we	 may	 even	 think	 of.	 The	 increasing	pauperisation	 and	 fragmentation	 of	 farmhands	 does	 not	 only	 erode	 the	ideological	power	of	trade	unions	to	gather	and	mobilise	workers	along	left-solidarity	 transformative	 projects,	 but	most	 importantly,	 it	 gives	 the	 space	for	 a	 fascist	 management	 of	 migration	 and	 integration	 policies,	 based	 on																																									 																					59	Cfr.	 S.	 Marino,Trade	 Union	 Inclusion	 of	 Migrant	 and	 Etnich	 Minority	 Workers…,	 cit.;	 S.	Marino,	R.	Penninx	and	J.	Roosblad,	Trade	Unions,	Immigration	and	Immigrants	…,	cit.	60	R.	Hyman,	Industrial	Relations:	A	Marxist	Introduction.	London:	MacMillan,	1975:	44-60.	61	Cfr.	 G.	 Starosta,	Global	 commodity	 chains	 and	 the	Marxian	 law	 of	 value,	 Antipode,	 42(2),	2010,	 433-465;	 G.	 Charnock,	 G.	 Starosta,	 Introduction:	 The	 New	 International	 Division	 of	
Labour	and	the	Critique	of	Political	Economy	Today,	 In	G.	Charnock	and	G.	Starosta	G.	(Eds.),	
The	New	International	Division	of	Labour.	Palgrave	Macmillan,	London,	2016,	pp.	1-22.			
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criminalization	 of	 immigrant	 workers	 and	 on	 an	 increasingly	 declining	 of	their	 social	 rights,	 hence,	 contributing	 to	 the	 reproduction	 of	 a	 social	construction	 according	 to	 which	 the	 immigrant	 workforce	 can	 be	everlastingly	exploited.		
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Conclusions			 The	 farm	 labour	 needs	 to	 be	 analysed	 taking	 into	 account	 several	transformations	 that	 have	 affected	 the	 changes	 in	 food	 regimes,	 the	restructuring	of	agriculture	 in	 terms	of	 labour	and	production	 in	 the	age	of	neoliberal	 globalization,	 the	 structure	 and	 the	 composition	 of	 the	transnational	agri-food	chains,	the	increasingly	power	of	the	buying	alliances	in	Europe	and	their	pricing	policy	vis-à-vis	to	manufacturers	and	suppliers.			 Since	 the	 end	 of	 the	 eighties	 a	 new	 food	 regime,	 characterized	 by	 a	hegemonic	 power	 exercised	 by	 transnational	 agri-business	 chains,	 has	profoundly	 restructured	 production	 (increasingly	 intensive,	 industrialized,	specialized	 and	 standardized)	 and	 labor	 (increasingly	 cheap,	 flexible	 and	exploitable)	in	the	agricultural	sector.		The	emergence	of	big	buyers	as	transnational	supermarket	chains	has	led	to	a	reconfiguration	of	the	manufacturer-dominated	supply	chain	moving	the	control	 over	 agri-food	 supply	 chains	 from	 food	manufacturers	 to	 retailers.	Retailers	have	become	“gatekeepers”	 for	access	to	consumers.	Their	control	over	 suppliers	 is	exercised	not	 through	ownership	but	 through	governance.	They	are	able	to	control	the	terms	and	conditions	of	supply	and	therefore	the	quality	and	the	type	of	food	that	people	consume,	its	cost,	how	and	where	it	should	be	produced	and	at	what	price.		The	exploitation	of	 labor,	especially	migrant	labor,	has	been	fundamental	for	 the	 incorporation	 of	 agri-food	 suppliers	 in	 retailer-driven	 chains.	 	 The	mobility	 of	 labour,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 mobility	 of	 capital,	 has	 been	 a	fundamental	way	used	by	agri-food	capital	to	increase	its	profits.	The	 use	 of	 cheap	 migrant	 labour	 has	 allowed	 also	 southern	 European	farms	 to	 respond	 to	 the	 pressure	 of	 vertical	 agri-food	 chains.	Within	 these	farms,	which	carry	out	their	activities	during	the	periods	of	“great	harvests”,	the	 pricing	 policy	 imposed	 by	 buyers	 is	 reflected	 in	 a	 great	 demand	 for	unskilled,	 flexible,	precarious	and	cheap	 labor.	 In	 southern	 Italy	agriculture	
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this	demand	is	covered	by	migrant	workers	from	Africa	and	Eastern	Europe	who	represent	the	main	pool	of	cheap	labour	for	the	agricultural	firms.		This	 cheap	 and	 flexible	 migrant	 workforce	 -	 characterized	 by	heterogeneous	migration	patterns	and	different	 immigration	status	 -	 is	also	employed	 in	 the	 harvesting	 of	 tomatoes	 within	 small	 firms	 located	 in	Capitanata	 included	 in	 the	 production	 chain	 driven	 by	 big	 retailers.	 	 The	production	processes	and	 the	working	conditions	 in	 these	 firms	need	 to	be	analysed	 taking	 into	 account	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 tomato	 value	 chain	 in	southern	Italy	district.	Food	 retail	 chains	 are	 the	 main	 buyers	 of	 tomatoes	 processed	 within	southern	Italy	district.	More	than	80%	of	the	tomato	processed	in	this	district	is	 for	 private	 labels	 of	 food	 retailers.	 Through	 the	 development	 and	distribution	 of	 private	 labels	 the	 control	 of	 retailers	 over	 farmers	 and	processors	 has	 become	 increasingly	 stronger.	 Their	 power	 is	 further	strengthened	by	 the	pricing	policy	 by	which	 Italian	 and	European	 retailers,	organised	 in	 buying	 groups,	 buy	 tomatoes	 from	 private	 label	 suppliers.	Futhermore,	using	their	power	as	gatekeepers	for	access	to	consumers	they	try		to	undermine	brands	and	increase	the	sales	of	private	labels	products.		The	economic	and	power	asymmetrical	relations	between	firms	within	the	chain	have	 a	big	negative	 impact	 throughout	 the	 supply	 chain	 especially	 to	the	 detriment	 of	 farmhands	 located	 in	 the	 lower	 rings	 of	 the	 production	chain.	The	power	of	 retail	 chains	 to	 set	prices,	 standards	 and	 conditions	of	supply	have	resulted	in	a	race	to	the	bottom	mainly	affecting	farm	workers.	Within	the	farms	a	labor	force	strongly	racialized	carry	out	its	work	activity	informally	 and	 without	 any	 kind	 of	 guarantee.	 Labor	 exploitation	 mainly	affects	working	hours	and	wages.	Farmhands	take	what	 is	commonly	called	“paga	di	piazza”	 (public	pay),	which	ranges	 from	a	minimum	of	 three	euros	and	a	maximum	of	four	euros	per	hour.	Instead,	in	the	case	of	piecework,	pay	is	 by	 “cassone"	 (chest)	 and	 it	 is	 attested	 at	 three	 euros	 and	 fifty	 cents	 per	chest.	Most	of	them,	trying	to	earn	more,	are	pushed	to	work	for	more	than	twelve	consecutive	hours.		
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Within	 tomato	 supply	 chain	migrant	workers	 have	 come	 to	 constitute	 a	key	segment	of	the	labor	force	insofar	as	they	allow	agricultural	firms	to	keep	low	 labor	cost	and	 to	cope	 to	network	pressures.	The	management	and	 the	control	 of	 this	 labor	 force	 are	 achieved	 through	 housing	 segregation	 and	informal	 labour	 contracting.	 In	 the	 province	 of	 Foggia	 low-wage	 migrant	laborers	have	settled	in	the	many	informal	settlements	of	the	province.	These	places	 represent	 the	 main	 labor	 reserves	 from	 which	 informal	 labour	contractors	 and	 employers	 tap	 into	 during	 the	 tomato	 harvest	 season.	Factors	 such	 as	 production	 instability	 and	 harvest	 seasonality	 require	 the	availability	 of	 a	 very	 flexible	 workforce.	 The	 informal	 labour	 contractors	satisfy	 the	 needs	 of	 flexibility	 desired	 by	 companies,	 helping	 the	 latter	 to	manage	 the	 highs	 and	 lows	 in	 labor	 demand	 through	 the	 provision	 of	temporary	 and	 low-cost	 labor.	 Furthermore,	 the	 constant	 decrease	 in	 the	price	 of	 tomatoes	 push	 producers	 to	 reduce	 labor	 costs	 using	 informal	laborers.	 The	 availability	 of	 flexible	 and	 low-cost	 labor	 allows	 agricultural	firms	to	respond	to	the	pressures	carried	out	on	them	from	other	companies	in	the	chain.	The	 shifts	 in	 the	 organization	 of	 production	 and	 labor	 relations	 in	 agri-food	 sector	 has	 pushed	 Italian	 trade	 unions	 to	 find	 different	 strategies	 in	order	to	fighting	the	deterioration	of	labour	relations	within	supply	firms.		If	the	FLAI-CGIL	has	directed	most	of	its	organisational	resources	into	the	negotiation	 and	 validation	 of	 a	 national-level	 labour	 law	 that	 criminalizes	labour	contractors,	the	USB	has	by-passed	FLAI-CGIL’s	strategy	and	engaged	with	 the	 contractor-worker	 relationship	 ‘from	 below’.	 Furthermore,	 USB’	action	 aims	 to	 put	 pressure	 on	 lead	 firms,	 affecting	 their	 decisional	 and	organization	 processes	 and	 the	 relations	 between	 firms	 within	 agri-food	supply	 chains,	 through	 a	 strong	 alliance	 between	 workers,	 farmers	 and	consumers.	The	two	union	strategies	are	not	in	opposition	between	them.	As	said	in	the	previous	section	they	instead	pointed	out	how	trade	unions	need	to	be	built	as	much	‘from	below’	as	from	‘from	above’.		
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